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Abstract 
Taking its point of departure in the case of mobilisation on the issue of rights for 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the present thesis seeks to investigate the 
explanatory potentials of social movement theory in a Middle Eastern context. 
With the theoretical tools of the political process approach, and perspectives on 
mobilisation strategies, resources and framing strategies, the thesis seeks to explore 
the structural and organisational dynamics affecting the potentials of mobilisation 
as a method for obtaining rights for the Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Analysing the findings of previous scholarly work, interviews and observations 
carried out during field studies in Lebanon, the thesis concludes that the sectarian 
logic underlying Lebanese politics and society poses a great challenge for 
mobilisation as a method of obtaining political influence – in particular on issues 
with conflicting sectarian interests, of which the case of rights for Palestinians is a 
prime example. 
While the thesis acknowledges the descriptive power of the chosen social movement 
theory framework as a tool for structuring and categorising empirical data, it 
however finds that the chosen theoretical framework is not able to explain the 
significant interactions and causal relations between variables in the Lebanese 
context.  As a result of this conclusion, additional theoretical perspectives and 
supplementary cases are introduced, in order to propose directions for future 
improvements of social movement theory, for explaining Middle Eastern 
mobilisations. 
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1. Introduction The following is a presentation of the reflections which formed the motivation for the present investigation. The problem formulation and research questions outlined are a result of the insights gained from the project and the structure of the report is presented to create an overview for the reader.  
1.1. Problem field The Palestinian refugees1 living in Lebanon have been an integral part of the country’s internal history since the first refugees arrived in 1948. Before the exit of PLO2 following the Israeli invasion in 1982, the Palestinians had their own representation in the country. However once PLO exited the country, the refugees were left with few channels for voicing their concerns. Furthermore, with the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in 19873, that had until then secured the PLO jurisdiction of the refugee camps with concomitant service institutions, these institutions were no longer able to operate (Hanafi, 2010, p. 138ff). In light of the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians were prevented from returning to their homeland, why the urgency of dealing with the refugee situation became immediate. The Palestinians thus had to strike a balance between the importance of standing by their right of return4
                                                          
1 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. It should be noted that ’refugees’ will be used throughout the report to refer to Palestinian refugees. 2 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
 and the aim of securing a fair and endurable life in their transitional circumstances. In contrast to other host countries, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are in a transitional status as they are denied of access to basic rights. In Jordan, Palestinian refugees have gained the right to citizenship since 1949 and enjoy socio-economic rights, in both Jordan and Syria. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are until now deprived of the right to own property, the right to employment in a large number of professions, and freedom of 
3 The Cairo Agreement was the basis for PLO establishing a state within a state in Lebanon. It was an agreement made between the PLO and the Lebanese army in 1969, allowing the PLO to stage attacks against Israel from Lebanese soil, and to establish PLO institutions inside the camps (Brynen, 1990). 4 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
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movement (Al-Husseini & Bocco, 2009, p. 263;265). The continuous non-presence of basic rights5 for the ‘protracted refugees’6 in Lebanon for the past 63 years stands in stark contrast to the rhetoric of Lebanese political figures when they agitate for the right of return for the Palestinians. However some politicians argue that not granting rights to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is considered a step towards permanent settlement, expressed by the Arab word tawteen7
Our initial interest focused on the designated status of the refugee camps as ticking ‘time bomb’ islands of insecurity outside the realm of the Lebanese state (Sayigh, 2001, p. 102), and the effect of these on the stability of Lebanese internal affairs (Hanafi, 2010). However, our readings, as well as a series of unexpected regional events, guided us in a somewhat different direction. Throughout our research, a majority of the literature on Palestinians portrayed a somewhat ‘victimising’ perspective on the issue of Palestinian refugees. Scholars tend to focus on the detrimental actions of governments, international organisations and others towards the Palestinians, and we found that the literature lacked a more ‘active’ agent perspective on the Palestinians and the ways in which they were working to improve their own situation in Lebanon. Lebanon was considered a good point of departure for such an investigation, as it possesses one of the more democratic regimes in the Middle East, with a population that seize even the smallest opportunity for staging demonstrations (Slemrod, 2011) - features that would arguably facilitate the emergence of a popular movement on the rights for 
, thereby giving up the fight for the right of return  (Haddad, 2003). Our curiosity for this controversial subject was awakened pondering on the dynamics that affected this status quo on rights for Palestinians in Lebanon for more than 50 years. 
                                                          
5 See appendix B for the elaborate definition.. In the report Palestinian ’rights’ is used to refer to both socio-economic and political rights. 6 A term used by a recent join AUB-UNRWA report to properly account for the continuously transitional position of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Chaaban, et al., 2010, p. 1).  7 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
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Palestinians. Furthermore, the Palestinian camps are perceived by politicians as a time bomb for Lebanese security, the lack of rights have a direct impact on the daily lives of Palestinians in Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process shows no sign of producing a solution to the conflict in the nearby future . In light of these circumstances one would assume that Lebanese state leaders, Palestinians, and the international community would have an interest in improving the situation for the Palestinians, and the Palestinians in improving their situation.  Simultaneously with our progressing identification of a delimited research area, a series of popular revolutions unfolded themselves in Lebanon’s near vicinity, which changed our perspective on the Lebanese case. The neighbouring countries saw their populations take matters into their own hands, while the notorious unstable Lebanon seemed to keep its calm. People took it to the streets in countries where suppression had ruled for decades, in an unprecedented all inclusive protest targeting the corrupt elite’s lavish living, the lack of jobs for the educated youth, the high fuel prices for taxi drivers, and the increasing food prices souring the life of the poor. Within months two suppressors were ousted. People power works. This was a seemingly peculiar development, and we continuously pondered on the possibilities for the Palestinians to imitate these methods in order to improve their rights. Thus we began to question the underlying factors influencing the continuous lack of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon and attempted to understand existing perspectives on Palestinians lacking an ‘action’ perspective. While Lebanon was becoming an island of stability in a regional sea of ongoing revolutions, we became increasingly attentive to social movement theory (SMT).  The main focus of SMT is to develop an understanding of how social movements8
                                                          
8 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
 function and how they obtain political influence through mobilisation. A focus we found fit to combine with our intent to explore the potentials of Palestinians to take matters into their own hands, with regards to their situation in Lebanon. However, 
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as we investigated the theory further we found that it had primarily been applied in a Western context, only further kindling our interest of its explanatory potentials for the case of Palestinians in Lebanon.  The above developments resulted in a two-fold research aim. Firstly to investigate how the Lebanese political and social systems and the possibilities of the Palestinians ‘doing something’ about their situation will in turn affect the potential development of mass mobilisation as a means. Secondly, the aim was to look into the explanatory power of social movement theory for Lebanon with perspectives on its applicability for the general Middle Eastern context. 
1.2 Problem formulation and research questions The motivation above leads us to the following problem formulation:       In order to structure and facilitate how our analysis and discussion contribute to answer the problem formulation, we have formulated the following research questions, based on the theoretically derived understanding of structural and organisational factors influencing the potential of mobilisation as a means to gain political influence.   
To what extent can social movement theory explain the interplay between 
political opportunity structures, configurations of actors and social movement 
organisations, regarding mobilisation as a method to gain rights for 
Palestinians in Lebanon, and what additional perspectives might be added to 
social movement theory in order to enhance its explanatory power? 
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For our analysis the research questions are as follows:         
1.3. Report design The following section will introduce the design of the thesis to clarify the line of argumentation, and to explain how aspects of the thesis contribute to answering our problem formulation. Our aim is to investigate the explanatory power of SMT on the case of mobilisation for rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. We have first drawn up a theoretical framework that aims to account for the influence of the interplay between structure and agency on mobilisation potentials. The analysis presents the combined results of our desk and field studies – both based in the variables of the theoretical framework. In the concluding discussion we conclude on the overall results of the analysis, discuss the explanatory power of the theoretical framework for our case, as well as the added value of selected theoretical perspectives, and other cases for understanding mobilisation as a method in Lebanon. Finally, we broaden the perspective by adding regional perspectives to the discussion of mobilisations as a means of political influence.  
 
1st level: the political opportunity structure analysis 
RQ.1.1. To what extent do the theoretical variables of the political opportunity 
structure influence the potentials of mobilisation as a method to gain rights for 
Palestinians in Lebanon? 
2nd level: the analysis of the configuration of actors 
RQ.1.2. To what extent do the theoretical variables of the configuration of actors 
influence the potentials of mobilisation as a method to gain rights for Palestinians in 
Lebanon? 
3rd level: the organisational level analysis 
RQ.1.3. To what extent do the theoretical variables of the organisational level 
influence the potentials of mobilisation as a method to gain rights for Palestinians in 
Lebanon? 
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2. Methodology The present chapter will outline the methodological considerations concerning research methods, and the ways in which the choices made have shaped the outcome of the research conducted. The aim of the chapter is to create an understanding of the path taken to our reached conclusion thereby facilitating assessment of the validity of the research. The chapter will first present the delimitation of the research, followed by our considerations regarding the choice of the Palestinians in Lebanon as a case, whereupon we will introduce our choice of theory and empirical data, and the methodological connections between the two. Hereafter we will present the chosen types of data and our data collection methods. Finally, the chapter will be concluded with an overall assessment of the validity of the thesis.  
2.1. Delimitations  The focus of this project is to investigate the explanatory power9 of social movement theory in the Lebanese context. The specific subject of analysis is the theory’s applicability as an explanatory framework for studying the many factors influencing the nascent movement for the rights of Palestinians in Lebanon. Therefore, we have only taken Lebanese political and societal structures10
Furthermore, specific regional dynamics linked to the peace process are relevant to the issue of the right of return for the Palestinians refugees, and included when necessary. The foreign actors influencing Lebanon, in particular Syria, Saudi Arabia, America and European powers, are only taken into account when relevant for Palestinian rights. In respect to Lebanon’s relations with Syria we recognise that the 
 into account when relevant for the mobilisation for Palestinian rights in Lebanon. For example, we will only analyse the general power games in Lebanese politics, when they directly influence mobilisation as a method to obtain rights for Palestinians. 
                                                          
9 Explanatory power is understood as a theory’s ability to explain the subject it deals with. In our case it is used when referring to the theory’s ability to explain the cases of mobilisation in Lebanon. 10 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
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current regional upheavals have the potential of altering this relationship, but since the repercussions of the protests have not yet solidified themselves, our analysis is based on the snapshot knowledge gained from our fieldwork and secondary studies. The relationship between Lebanon and Syria and its potential alteration will only be focused on if it has an impact on the potential for mobilisation on Palestinian rights.  The temporal scope of our research deals with the period 2005-2011. This is due to 2005 being the year of several potentially important events for our case, i.e. the establishment of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC)11
In Lebanon there were certain events and dynamics that we have not gone into detail with. The Independence Intifada in 2005
, and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The effects of these developments for our case will form part of the analysis.  
12
2.2. Choice of case   
 was a case of mass mobilisation, but since it was on ousting Syria and not on Palestinian rights, we have not described it in depth. Many of the SMOs interviewed use methods of lobbying, but we delimit ourselves from this, as the definition of social movement organisations underline the work outside institutional channels. 
Since our aim is to generate knowledge in depth on a broad set of variables we have chosen a case study. As Eckstein writes “comparative and case studies are alternative 
means to the end of testing theories” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 227). Part of our problem formulation explores the applicability of SMT in a Lebanese context, and examines additional perspectives that can support its explanatory power. Therefore, we believe that a case study is a suitable methodological choice for exploring our theoretical framework, since it does not only verify or falsify, but provides in-depth knowledge on to relations that we have not hypothesised on before conducting the research (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). A case study is defined as “involving the detailed 
                                                          
11 See appendix A for the definition used in this project. 12 See appendix E for a detailed description. 
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and intensive analysis of a single case” (Bryman, 2008, p. 48) and involves the intensive examination of the setting (Bryman, 2008, p. 49). Though a case is often understood as a single community, event or organisation, we use the concept of the case study to account for a series of protracted events and the organisation and prospects of these events in a limited time period, i.e. the mobilisation efforts on rights for Palestinians in Lebanon from 2005 and until now.  Bent Flyvbjerg mentions four strategies of exploring case studies as a strategy for producing knowledge. Firstly, the maximum deviation cases are used for studies of several cases in one analysis. Secondly, in order to reject a claim or get a point across in a dramatic manner, extreme cases contrasting with the norms can be useful. Thirdly, the critical cases have strategic importance for the subject with certain characteristics being significant and are used to generate knowledge on the importance of these characteristics for other cases. Often they are the “most likely” or “least likely” cases. Fourthly, paradigmatic cases highlight general characteristics in society, and can be used as a reference point for future schools of thought (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 229-234). In addition to these, Denscombe's criteria of the case being particularly suitable for theory testing or building by its relevance for previous theory, is useful for characterising cases (Denscombe, 2003, p. 33).  In order to produce the most knowledge on the theory’s applicability in Lebanon, we have not chosen a representative case for our theoretical exploration. Instead we wanted to investigate the potentials of the theory in a Middle Eastern context, since the theory is based on developments in Western societies.  We were intrigued by the nascent movement in Lebanon, as we believed there may be a reason for the lack of success of the movements, with many of the conditions providing the backdrop for mass mobilisations in the region having been present for decades, i.e. high levels of corruption, mass poverty, high food prices etc. At the same time Lebanon was chosen as a most-likely case of mobilisation, as it is perceived as being the most democratic state in the Middle East with the highest 
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level of freedom of speech. Therefore, theoretically, there should be a higher chance of a movement happening in Lebanon, where it is allowed to carry out demonstrations13. The specific case of the Palestinian rights was chosen due to the grievances experienced by the Palestinians in Lebanon, and the general opinion of the camps being perceived as a security threat for Lebanon, providing a potential incentive for mobilisation. In addition to this, the international focus on the situation of the Palestinians provides a possibility to create international pressure. The apparent political opening in Lebanon with the government creation of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) in 2005, and the passing of the law for the right to work in 201014
2.3. Choice of theory 
, demonstrated that there were activities on the subject, and a nascent movement. Therefore we decided to investigate how the theoretical framework could explain the dynamics influencing the movement – and investigate if it was a failure or a success, with success being understood in the theoretical conception of broad mobilisation resulting to having political influence. Due to the above, the case of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon mainly has elements of the critical case, and is used in order to do theory-building. The case is critical since it holds societal elements different from the basis of the theory, for example having different societal structures as forming the basis for power sharing, different channels of influence, and different conceptions of individual freedom as opposed to collective responsibility. We expect that these will have an influence on the structural level and the ways of organising, why the case will be able to shed light on it and thereby explore the theory.  
Social movement theory is a widespread theoretical body, with contributions from several academic disciplines. The choice of the theory as a whole was based on our intention to put together a theoretical framework that could provide a dynamic 
                                                          
13 Obviously this was disproven in January and February with Tunisia and Egypt setting the scene for major uprisings. We decided to keep our focus on Lebanon, as we found there would be major difficulties involved in researching the other movements while their result was not yet clear. 14 See Appendix D for a specification of the historical incidents. 
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perspective of the many factors influencing mobilisation as a potential method to gain rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. In the following we will outline which parts of the theory we have focused on, and the considerations behind the choices. The chosen theory takes its point of departure in a Western democratic context with freedom of expression, free media and a history of class solidarity. Therefore we pondered on the applicability of theoretical assumptions regarding political and systemic structures in states with different levels of political freedom, media and democracy, and different societal structures. This contextual limit is part of our motivation for selecting social movement theory as our theoretical guiding tool. We find it relevant to explore whether the theory will maintain its explanatory value in a political context and geographic region that differs from the one upon which the theory’s main suppositions are based, and in which it has not been widely applied15To our knowledge, social movement theory has predominantly been used retrospectively to describe and explain processes of mobilisation that have already taken place. We find this unfulfilling and therefore see it as highly relevant to investigate the theory’s explanatory values as to enlighten the emergence and potential success of a social movement, which is why we have chosen an object of research in the process of working towards its goal. In doing so, we do not wish to utilise the theory in a naive fortune-telling adventure, but rather seek to derive a framework of main variables from the theory, to be used for assessing current potentials of mobilisation success, and subsequently discuss their explanatory power in the Middle Eastern context
.  
16
                                                          
15 For further perspectives on this, see chapter 3. 
. Our object of research is however not a fully developed social movement, but is working towards becoming one, and is therefore in the beginning of a wave, with an unclear final position. Since we cannot predict 
16 This is related to the theoretical concept ‘waves of contention’. In social movement theory it refers to general tendencies in the patterns of social movement developments over time, and is an adaptation of Charles Tilly’s original term ‘cycles of protest’ that implies greater variety in each wave of protest action, as opposed to repetitive cycles (Koopmans, 2004).  
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the future outcomes of its actions, we limit ourselves to a snapshot analysis of the current potentials of mobilisation, and the explanatory power of the theoretical framework concerning the use of mobilisation as a means of political influence.   
2.3.1. The theoretical duality and the analytical dualism of structure and 
agency The primary assumption underlying the theory of social movement is that mobilisation makes it possible to obtain political influence, in which it indicates a dynamic relationship between structure and agency. In our choice of theory we thus take our point of departure in Anthony Giddens’ understanding of structure and agency as mutually influencing one another in a duality (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). We initially chose social movement theory as our point of departure because we expected it to formulate hypotheses as to the ways in which structures enable or constrain mobilisation efforts, and the ways in which collectivities of actors act to influence these structures. Based on this we chose the political process approach (PPA) as suggested by Hanspeter Kriesi (2004), as it is the framework best accounting for the interactions between structure and agency. Since we still found that the theoretical framework of the political process approach more focused on structures than on agency, we have supplemented it with aspects of the resource mobilisation perspective (RMP) by John D. Edwards & BobMcCarthy (2004), and theories of mobilisation strategies, put forward by Bert Klandermans & Dirk Oegema (1987) and  David A. Snow et al (1986) , in order to enable an agency analysis of the mobilising potentials of the SMOs working with rights for Palestinians.  While many recent social movement theory developments are concerned with the organisational and individual level, such as Karl Dieter Opp in his attempt to create framework with a focus on socio-psychological aspects (Opp, 2009), we have chosen to delimit ourselves from the specific individual level, except for theoretical variables concerning incentives as the SMOs take these into consideration in their 
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strategies. We do not focus on the individual, but on ‘collectivities of actors’17
Through our choice of theory we maintain Giddens’ understanding of structure and agency as a duality. However we find Margaret Archer’s concept of analytical dualism useful, in its underlining of the necessity to analytically separate structure and agency, in order to fully understand their mutual interaction (Archer, 1995, p. 165ff). In our presentation of the chosen theoretical framework we present the theoretical understanding of how structure and agency variables interact to influence mobilisation on the issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. In the analysis the different factors are separated into three parts: the political opportunity structure, accounting for influence of structural factors; the configuration of actors, analysing the influence of political alliances on the issue; and finally the organisational level, analysing the influence of mobilising agents on the mobilisation potentials.  Finally, in the discussion, we will return to the duality of structure and agency. Here we will discuss the extent to which the theory can explain the picture painted by our interviewees of the interplay between structure and agency, when using mobilisation for Palestinian rights.  
, as we choose to prioritise investigating the power the accumulation of individuals. 
2.4. Connection between theory and empirical data The relation between theory and empirical data in the present research reflects the process of deduction, defined as:  
1. Theory 
2. Hypotheses 
3. Field observations 
4. Findings 
5. Conclusions incl. confirmation or rejection of hypotheses 
6. Possible revision of theory (Bryman, 2008, p. 8). 
                                                          
17 See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
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Even though the overall framework of social movement research turned out to be a veritable jungle of half a century’s different traditions of social science, empirical studies and theoretical claims that urges researchers to formulate own hypotheses and models for each specific research, we chose to take a somewhat alternative approach to the deductive process. Studies of social movements tend to be descriptive and involve the suggestion of a novel theoretical approach, based on empirical examples of why the addition is needed, leading to an abundance of theory. We have instead chosen a process where, by looking at the theory and pinpointing where it is able to explain the Lebanese situation, we can point out the theory’s strengths and weaknesses through empirical observations. We have selected a theoretical framework of variables believed to account for the main causal relations we would expect to be relevant to our case, but decided to carry out our empirical study without formulated hypotheses. This is not because we could not formulate hypotheses, but because we wanted to maintain an open perspective when researching the ways in which structures and agents interact in the Middle Eastern context. Our analysis thus does not seek to test hypotheses, but to investigate the explanatory potential of the overall framework of SMT specifically in Lebanon. Our approach is therefore a somewhat untraditional deductive process, in which the case study is used to shed light on the causal relations between variables in SMT and its underlying assumption of mobilisation as a means of political influence that are explored, and not specific theoretical hypotheses.  In order to improve our conclusions and understand the dynamics behind the divergences between the theoretical and empirical results additional theoretical perspectives are added to SMT, in the discussion chapter. Although these new perspectives enhance the understanding of the Lebanese dynamics influencing our case, which could beneficially have been included in the theoretical framework, we were methodologically unable to introduce them before we had carried out the analysis and identified the gaps in SMT. The aim of introducing the additional theoretical perspectives after the analysis is therefore to explore whether the 
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findings of our analysis can be supported by existing theoretic understandings, and whether the addition of these understandings can contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics influencing social movements in our case. 
2.5. Choice of data Our main source of data has been interviews. This was chosen because information regarding the issue of Palestinian rights in Lebanon was difficult to obtain as academic studies and media mainly work with the economic and legal conditions of the Palestinians, not with mobilisation attempts to better the situation (Mikdashi, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, from desk studies the issue was found to be so contested and politicised that it would be necessary to dig deeper to obtain a more diverse perspective on the different perceptions of the issue. Therefore, we chose to carry out a three and a half week field study in Lebanon, mainly to conduct interviews and observations. Besides interviews we have used observations and media sources to the extent they were available. While in the interviews we took point of departure in the phenomenology-derived understanding, wherein perceptions of actors are taken as expressions of the reality in which they live (Denscombe pp.98-100), we combine perceptions of actors from different spheres of interests to obtain a more multi-faceted perspective of the ways in which structures and agents interact to restrain or enable political influence through mobilisation.  
2.5.1. Interviewee categories Before arriving in Lebanon, we identified three desired categories of interviewees. Firstly, we wanted to obtain information from representatives of the political parties, in order to identify the workings of the political system and understand the ways in which it influences the political opportunity structure on the issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. Secondly, in order to identify different perceptions of the ways in which the political opportunity structure affected the potentials of mobilisation as a means of political influence, and the ways in which civil society and grassroots actors sought to mobilise, and use this mobilisation to gain political 
18 
 
influence, we wanted to interview Lebanese and Palestinian civil society organisation18
2.5.2. Interviewee selection method 
 and grassroots activists working with the issue of rights. Finally we wanted to speak to experts with knowledge of the political game in Lebanon concerning the Palestinian issue, as this provided us with perspectives on the interactions between political opportunity structures and SMOs from actors standing outside of the process, but still being part of the societal system in which the interactions take place. This provided us with additional perspectives for more triangulated answers to the three research questions.  
After identifying the categories of interviewees, contacts to informants within each category were initially established from our own contacts, and for CSOs, grassroots activists, and experts, the interviewee selection progressed through a snowballing method. From previous connections in Lebanese civil society, we obtained contacts to CSOs and grassroots activists working on rights for Palestinians. Connections in the youth wings of Lebanese political parties assisted us in setting up interviews with representatives of their mother parties. As for the experts, some contacts were established through our enquiries to relevant research institutes, while other experts were suggested by preceding interviewees. The snowball method can guide the selection of people to interview in a specific direction, based on the networks of previous interviewees. Therefore we continuously sought to verify the role and relevance of previous and forthcoming interviews with other people interviewed, and our selections depended on a potential interview person’s importance in the category of interviewees, and the amount of information already gathered in this category. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of relevant or alternative perceptions absent due to the applied method of interviewee selection, although the significant amount of interviewees and the triangulation by category to some extent makes up for this.  
                                                          
18 From here referred to as CSOs. See appendix B for the elaborate definition. 
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 This resulted in 38 interviews with the following distribution: 
• 10 SMOs (4 Lebanese, 4 Palestinian, and 2 international)  
• 9 activists (3 Lebanese, 4 Palestinian, 2 International).  
• 13 experts (3 journalists, 8 researchers, 2 diplomats).  
• 4 Lebanese parties.  
• 2 uncategorised (the LPDC, and the PLO)19Two interviews have not been categorised as they border the different categories. None of their answers are included in the statistical presentations. For the CSO interviewees the perception of the interviewees is considered as representative of their respective organisations.  When requesting permission to record the interview we also asked if the interviewee would represent the organisation, which all interviewees agreed to.  However, when interviewees are stating their opinion on strategies or causal relations, we acknowledge that they also express their personal opinion as an individual heavily involved in the cause, and use it accordingly.  Based on the request of some interviewees to remain anonymous, we have decided to anonymise all interviewees, apart from the parties and the LPDC, who are referred to by their name, as the interviewees consented to their statements representing the official position of the party. 
 
We thus refer to specific interviewees as IP1, IP2 etc., followed by an indication of the category they belong to. The activities of the CSOs and activists are overlapping though some of their opinions differ. Unless specifically relevant, both categories are referred to as SMOs, followed by their affiliation – Lebanese, Palestinian or international – as it is relevant for assessing their statements critically. The 
                                                          
19 See appendix A for elaborate descriptions of the different actors. 
20 
 
information of the experts and journalists is used in the same manner, why they are both referred to as experts.  
2.5.3. Observations and informal conversations In addition to the interviews conducted, we tried to observe any relevant events taking place during our fieldwork. While we were carrying out the interviews in Lebanon there were two major actions of mobilisation taking place unrelated to our case – one march of the anti-sectarian movement and a march for the Palestinian right of return.  We decided to interview the organisers and activists in these movements in order to compare the mobilisation strategies, and enable a more nuanced discussion of the possibilities of reaching political influence through mobilisations in a Lebanese context. The interviews were conducted with activists from these movements, and are included in the above mentioned interviews. We participated in the Laïque Pride20
2.5.4. Media sources 
, which is an annual march calling for a secular state, and observed an information event arranged by a Palestinian SMO, with the purpose of observation and informal data collection. Apart from the informal data collected at these events, we also had informal conversations with 5 participants in the march for the right of return. Besides this we visited two Palestinian refugee camps – Bourj al-Barajneh and Mar Elias – for visiting SMOs, collecting information on the living conditions of the refugees, observing the presence of militias in the camps and having informal talks on mobilisation as a method with camp dwellers. 
During the six month process of producing the present thesis we have continuously followed English Language Lebanese and Arab media (The Daily Star21, NOW Lebanon22
                                                          
20 See appendix A for a brief description of the Laïque, and appendix E for an elaboration on the event. 21 Daily Star is an independent English language Lebanese daily newspaper.   22 NOW Lebanon is an internet-based, independent, and non-sectarian news source that was established as a result of the Independence Intifada.  
, and Al-Jazeera), in order to obtain an overview of the relevant issues and how our case study was presented. When conducting interviews, articles were used 
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to triangulate the information obtained from the interviewees. The articles were utilised to point out which subjects and topics were currently relevant to dig into, as there were a lot of movements on the political scene with the formation of government taking place during our field work. The articles thus informed the unstructured part of our interviews, as the information obtained through media was frequently brought up by us in interviews, to contextualise the interviewee’s perceptions.  The articles used for this process of ongoing triangulation are included in the literature list, although, the analysis mainly contains references to the interviews. This is due to the fact that the subject of Palestinian rights has not been greatly portrayed in the Lebanese media during the period of investigation, as there has been more focus on government formation, the right of return and anti-sectarian movements23
2.6. Methods used for collecting and processing data 
. While it would have been preferable if we could have verified the perceptions of our interviewees regarding the specific issue of rights of Palestinians with other sources, like newspaper articles, the lack of such material underlines the necessity of conducting interviews in the first place.  
2.6.1. Selection of interview type and formulation of interview guides The limitation of a deductive approach is that the theoretical variables dictate the empirical data collection to such an extent that it closes the researcher’s outlook on other relevant information. Our decision to investigate the wider framework, and not the specific hypotheses, is an attempt to avoid this limitation as this approach allows us to use a more general frame of analysis. The semi-structured interview method was also chosen on the basis of this consideration because it enabled us to structure our interview guides into overall categories based on the theoretical variables, in order to contribute to the investigation of the theoretical framework. At the same time, this interview method allowed for alternative explanations to be discussed in the interviews on the basis of accumulated knowledge during the field work, understand the context of the case and further investigate the answers of the 
                                                          
23 See appendix E for an elaboration on these movements. 
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interviewees. On top of this, the semi-structured approach to interviews also enabled us to triangulate the perceptions of the different interviewee groups (Kvale, 2002, p. 104).  Semi-structured interview guides were formulated for each of the three groups of interviewees24
2.6.2. Recording the interviews 
. For the interviewee category of SMOs one interview guide was used, but with additional questions for CSOs for gaining knowledge of the more formalised structure and coordination of the SMOs; and additional questions for the activists, with a focus on their perceived legitimacy of the CSOs, and perceptions of political influence.  
Notes were taken for each interview, and if the interviewee consented, then it was recorded. We were two persons present at each interview in order to have one observer and note taker, and one interviewer. This enabled the interviewer to concentrate fully both on gathering information from the interviewee, while at the same time ensuring a double recording of data by both recording and interview notes – all ensuring that the information gathered from the interview was as nuanced and precise as possible. All interviews were conducted in English except for two interviews where the interviewees only spoke Arabic. In those two cases, our English was translated into Arabic by a translator, and from the interviewee’s Arabic into English. The English language in the interviewees was in general on a high level, enabling the interviews to flow smoothly, and with little risk of language based misunderstandings.  After each interview, written meaning extractions of the interviews were produced based on the interview notes and our immediate impressions of the interview. It ensured as coherent an account of the interview as possible, due to it being conducted within such a short time period after the interview had taken place. We 
                                                          
24 See appendix F for the interview guides. 
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have chosen not to transcribe our interviews, as our aim is not to make a language-based analysis of discourses, but to look for perceptions and information from the participants, where the language used is of less importance, when counterbalanced by the resources used on transcription. The meaning extractions and recordings of interviews have been verified by the supervisor, but are not published due to issues of confidentiality as there is sensitive information included concerning state repression.  
2.6.3. Analytical processing of interviews – structured analysis Due to the large quantity of data, a structured analysis of all interviews was carried out based on the written meaning extractions. The meaning extractions focused on identifying the interviewees’ statements concerning the theoretical variables – eased by the variables being the base for the interview guides.  The structured analysis was done by first grouping the statements according to the variable they referred to, thereby identifying patterns of perceptions in the grouped statements. Next, we assessed the plausibility of statements through a triangulation of interviewee perceptions from the three categories, finally enabling identification of the relations between variables, based on the structured ordering of statements according to the theoretical variables (Kvale, 1997, p. 201).   
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Picture 1: The above pictures show steps of the process in the structural analysis. From the written meaning 
extractions, interviewee answers were cut out and grouped according to the numbered variables they referred to, and 
collected under a post-it summarising the main findings on the variable in bullet points.  
 
2.6.3.1. Statistics Due to the large amount of empirical interview data, we have attempted to create a clear overview by presenting some data in graphs or tables. Appendix C serves as a presentation of the data. When useful for creating an overview of our data, the graphs and tables are inserted in the analysis. The selection of questions presented is primarily based on their relevance, for the analysis of theoretical variable, while the graphic presentation is generally done only in the cases where a large amount of respondents have answered the question. A few questions are included due to their relevance for the analysis, even though the level of response is low. For each question, the number of total respondents varies. This is due to our form of data collection. We used a semi-structured interview guide, meaning that we did not present a list of possible answers, but left the answers to the respondents. In this way the statistical presentation includes answers that arose spontaneously during the interview and not only answers to direct questions.  The questions answered in the statistical section are all related to questions asked in the interview guides. Thus there may be seven experts answering one question, and thirteen experts answering 
25 
 
another question. They had the possibility of giving multiple answers, which is why the total number of respondents is not equivalent to the amount of entries for each question. Concerning the SMOs, the SMOs with a different aim – the anti-sectarian SMOs, or the right of return SMOs – are taken into account where their opinions were relevant. When applicable, it is indicated together with the total number of respondents, in the caption underneath the figure in the appendix. 
2.7. Validity of the project Validity of a project is a question of the truth of the findings: do we measure what we think we measure? (Kvale, 1997, p. 232) The four concepts of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability developed by Lincoln and Guba (Bryman, 2008, p. 274) can be used to assess the validity of qualitative research, instead of the traditional concepts of validity or reliability. These four concepts, take the qualities of qualitative data into account more so than traditional concepts, by focusing at the trustworthiness of the research, instead of considering it possible to create a ”single absolute account of social reality” (Bryman, 2008, p. 274), as the quantitative concepts of internal and external validity and reliability indicates. 
 
Credibility, equivalent to internal validity in qualitative research, is the application of good research praxis, and the researcher’s understanding of the social world studied (Bryman, 2008, p. 274). We have attempted to understand the topic studied through  
• previous academic research in the Middle East,  
• knowledge and experience with the Lebanese context, and  
• A prolonged period of field work.  Adhering to good research praxis, we have attempted to take into account the interviewer effect, as we have been conscious of the effect of our position as young female students and the language barriers. Through adhering to cultural understandings of politeness and dressing, and keeping the language simple we 
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have attempted to reduce it, though the information collected through interviews is potentially biased due to the interviewer effect. 
Transferability, the equivalent to external validity, concerns if the study and its results can be transferred to other environments or areas (Bryman, 2008, p. 275). Since we are not using several cases we cannot create statistic generalisability, but it is possible to reach an analytical generalisability, by making the use of methods transparent, and highlighting the critical aspects of the case (Kvale, 1997, p. 228). Through a presentation of the factors of the case, which are essential to the outcome of the analysis, it is possible to assess if the results will also be valid for other cases, based on the presence of these factors in other cases. The characteristics are related to the background for our choice of Lebanon and the Palestinians as a case. The characteristics of the Lebanese case as being centred in a sectarian society, the differences between the Lebanese insiders and Palestinian outsiders, and the Lebanese political system sporting some kind of representational democracy with freedom of speech and assembly are critical. In addition Lebanon is influenced by the international interest sphere, where several national actors are in alliance with international actors, and the Palestinian rights are considered a ‘donor darling’ due to its rights based focus, which are critical factors for the transferability of the findings. Hence the transferability of our study to other contexts higher, if factors similar to those described above are in place. The transferability of the final result will be evaluated after the conclusion. 
Dependability refers to the consistency between the prescribed method, and what is done in the research, to highlight consistence and make a repetition of the results possible. This can be obtained by accounting for the different phases of the research, and if the procedures connected to them are followed (Bryman, 2008, p. 275). Through this chapter of describing our method, and continuous clarifications of our methodological steps we have tried to create the ability for the reader to assess our transferability. This is enhanced by the meaning extractions from all interviews, and descriptions of the categories of interviewees. There are two issues where we have 
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followed the described method, but to some extent deviate from best practices of research. Due to our prioritisation we did not transcribe the interviews, which can result in a lack of consistency between the researchers’ analyses, and a lack of verification. This is attempted compensated by both researchers reading the meaning extractions, and checking all quotes and opinions used in the analysis with the recordings. Another problem is with our use of interviewees as representatives for the opinion of their organisations, even though we have not interviewed several people from the same organisation. We have made it clear for the interviewees that they were interviewed as representatives of their organisation. We have tried to accommodate for this by cross checking the information given with other interviewees, and written material provided by the interviewees regarding the organisations, as well as by interviewing people in high ranking positions in the SMOs. 
Confirmability, equivalent to objectivity, recognises that complete objectivity is not possible in social science qualitative research, but it is attempted to leave out personal values and theoretical tendencies in the conclusions of the research (Bryman, 2008, p. 276). This is considered by recognising our theoretical heritage of civil society and neo-patrimonial theories, and being continually reflexive about our preconceptions’ influence on the knowledge that we construct.    
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3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Introduction In the following, the chosen theoretical framework for our analysis and discussion will be introduced. We will start by defining the central concepts of social movements and mobilisation, whereupon we will provide a quick overview of the field of social movement theory, as well as a critical perspective on its application to our specific context. Subsequently we will proceed to introduce the chosen aspects of social movement theory for this investigation, after which the chapter will conclude with an overview of the themes and variables that make up our theoretical framework. 
3.2. Social Movement Theory – central concepts 
3.2.1. Social movements – a type of protest group Since the emergence of large protest movements in the 1960’s and 70’s, the study of social movements has taken centre stage in scholarly work on collective action. Various social movement scholars have suggested different definitions and conceptualisations of social movements. Snow, Soule and Kriesi, in their introduction to Blackwell’s voluminous ‘Companion to Social Movements’, attempt to collect all the characteristics of a social movement in one detailed definition of social movements as  
“collectivities acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of 
institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or 
defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the 
group, organizations, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part” (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004, p. 11).  However, according to Karl-Dieter Opp, the most significant shared feature of all previous social movement definitions, including Snow, Soule & Kriesi’s, has been their complexity and vagueness. In Opp’s search for a definition that allows researchers to apply social movement theory to a wider research field of phenomena, he proposes an alternative conceptualisation of the researched 
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movements, enabled by a wider definition of the research field. Opp suggests an approach to social movements that is channelled through the wider concept of what he defines as ‘protest groups’: “a collectivity of actors who want to achieve their 
shared goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target” (Opp, 2009, p. 41). He views social movements as a specific type of protest groups, but sees no need to delimit this category by further definition (Opp, 2009, pp. 36-44).  As we are interested in applying social movement theory on a wider group of SMOs, and their potentials for evolving into a social movement, we find Opp’s conceptualisation of social movements as a type of protest group suitable to our object of research, as it allows us to use social movement theory without first having to justify whether the object of research is a social movement or not, and thereby fulfilling Opp’s intention with a broader and more encompassing definition – to enable application of social movement theory to a wider range of protest phenomena. We have however included Snow, Soule & Kriesi’s definition in order to emphasise the importance of social movement action as taking place ‘outside of 
institutional or organizational25
                                                          
25 While SMO activities do take place inside organisational channels, as is implied by the nomination of them as social movement organisations they are distinguished from the definition of the overall social movement, as these activities take place in the process of the SMOs evolving into a social movement, whereby it is only the actions carried out by the fully developed social movement that is seen as taking place outside existing organisational channels, i.e. the mass mobilisation.   
 channels for the purpose of challenging or defending 
extant authority’, as Opp’s concept neglects this important aspect, and encompasses lobbyist or other groups operating within political institutions. The definition of social movements serving as the background for the present thesis thus places itself in between Opp’s and Snow, Soule & Kriesi’s, by acknowledging the need for a broader conceptualisation, while at the same time emphasising the importance of social movement activity taking place outside existing institutional structures. The term social movement or SMO will be used in the following instead of protest group, as this is the term used by the majority of the applied theory. 
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3.2.2. Micro- and macromobilisation The term mobilisation applied in this section is referring to Snow et al.’s definition of micromobilisation as “the range of interactive processes devised and employed by 
SMOs and their representative actors to mobilize or influence various target groups 
with respect to the pursuit of collective or common interests (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 464-465). For the purpose of this investigation, it is necessary to define mobilisation success, for which we understand that the processes employed by SMOs result in mass mobilisation, and consecutively in the SMOs accomplishing their political goals.  When we look at the ways in which the political opportunity structure and the configuration of actors influence mobilisation potentials, we analyse what Snow et al. has defined as processes of macromobilisation, i.e. “changes in power relationships and opportunity structures’ (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). Despite the term mobilisation being used here to refer to micromobilisation, we understand the mobilisation potentials as influenced by the interaction between the two processes of micro- and macromobilisation, which is why we have chosen to incorporate both processes in our theoretical framework variables. 
3.3. Delimitation of the field The following is a brief introduction to the field of social movement theory, in order to argue for the choices undertaken in our theoretical framework. 
3.3.1. Social movement theory – an overview While disciplines such as political science, social psychology, anthropology and history have contributed important concepts to the theoretical framework for studying social movements, the majority of the theoretical framework for studying social movements has been developed within the discipline of sociology, while incorporating concepts and ideas from the contributions of the other disciplines.   Within the vast array of social movement approaches and theoretical developments, an overall distinction can been made between two major overarching approaches to social movements: a structural approach focusing on political opportunities, 
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mobilising structures, distribution of resources, and a cultural approach with focus on the perceptions of individuals and groups (Klandermans & Roggeband, 2010, p. 1ff)26
3.3.1.1. Contextual and temporal limitations to the theory 
. As our problem formulation deals with social movement mobilisation potentials on an organisational level, and the structural opportunities and constraints affecting the organisation, we have chosen to take our point of departure in the structural approach, whereupon we have added concepts from other theoretical perspectives concerning the organisational level. We are aware of the contributions and perspectives of the cultural approach, and have kept the significance of individual perceptions in mind when analysing the capability and potential of the researched SMOs’ mobilisation strategies.  In this manner, we maintain as our primary theory selection criterion the need for a multi-level approach to studying social movements, able to contain both structural and organisational aspects affecting social movement mobilisation. This selection criterion has led us to the choice of the political process approach as our main theoretical framework, with consecutive additions.  
Regardless of discipline or approach, the majority of social movement theory is based on research carried out in Western, democratic societies. Many of its suppositions are based on an underlying idea of the surrounding society as a politically open society. For this reason its applicability in other political and societal contexts has been questioned (Bayat, 2005, p. 892). While scholars like Asef Bayat (2005) and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) have attempted to apply or adjust social movement theory to the Middle Eastern context, they have primarily focused on the compatibility of social movement theory with Islamist movements. We want 
                                                          
26 Karl-Dieter Opp recently attempted to create an overall framework for studying social movements by uniting the main variables of all approaches in one coherent framework (Opp, 2009). While we agree with the main assumption of Opp - the need for a more coherent and multifaceted approach - we believe that, for the application of the theory to our specific delimited area of research, Opp places too much emphasis on social-psychological aspects of social movement participation. 
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to turn the gaze on movements with non-Islamic aims, and investigate its explanatory powers for these types of movements.  
3.4. Choice of theoretical framework:  the political process approach Our choice of theoretical framework was based on a critical reading of SMT, framed by our expectations for theoretical needs for explaining the Lebanese case. Based on our previous experience with academic research on Middle Eastern state and society27
The political process approach as proposed by Hanspeter Kriesi (2004) suggests a three-level analytical framework, including the structural and organisational level and with some interrelations. In its formulation of three distinct analytical levels, it attempts to accommodate the critique of social movement as being too broad (Opp, 2009), while Kriesi still maintains that the role of the political process approach is to function as an analytical framework. He argues that each researcher needs to formulate theories and set up models of specific variables in order to test the theory (Kriesi, 2004, p. 69). As explained in Chapter 2, we have not followed this specification, but have instead chosen to explore the ways in which the overall framework and its causal relations, as portrayed in the model above, are applicable to the Middle Eastern context, exemplified in the case of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon.  
, we expect that characteristics of regime type and societal structures have a great influence on the organisations’ room of manoeuvre. At the same time our initial focus on investigating the agency SMOs, pushed the framework in a direction where both levels were represented, in order to investigate the interrelations between the two. 
The figure below gives an overview of the different levels of the political process approach, with the arrows indicating the relations between the aspects.  
                                                          
27 The authors have conducted joint research on the relationship between civil society and the state in Jordan, and have separately written on the Lebanese confessional system, and the different understandings of civil society and regime types in a Middle Eastern context.    
33 
 
 
 (Kriesi, 2004, p. 70) The structural level28, also referred to as the political opportunity structure29
                                                          
28 See appendix B for an elaboration of the different conceptions of structure used in this report. 29 In the following, the term political opportunity structure will be used. 
, deals with the structural context in which the social movement is positioned, encompassing existing political, discursive as well as cultural structures. The second level, the configuration of political actors, refers to the power structures and alliances composing the relations between political actors. The third level, the interaction context, refers to interactions between the two previous levels and the responses of the social movement. The third level is thus conditioned on the previous analyses and deals with the specific strategies of the social movements and the way they respond to constraining and enabling structures and configurations of political actors.  
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The point of departure of the above model is that all three levels influence the mobilisation potential30
3.4.1. Level 1: The political opportunity structure 
, whereby it assumes a reciprocal relationship between structure and agency: “Social change determines structural and cultural potentials for 
political mobilization that remain latent as long as they are not politicized by a 
collective political actor such as a social movement”. (Kriesi, 2004, p. 73). While the political process approach includes the SMOs in its model, the approach lacks a coherent set of variables regarding the strategies of collective actors making it difficult to analyse different SMO strategies, their outcomes and effects on mobilisation potentials. Therefore we have supplemented the interaction context with variables and theoretical concepts borrowed from other social movement approaches, in order to provide a more multi-faceted analysis of the wide array of dimensions and variables that we expect to have an effect on social movement mobilisation potentials, enabling a more balanced relationship between structure and agency in the frame of variables used for analysing our case. The supplementary theory, which primarily concerns different mobilisation strategies, and the availability and use of resources, are mainly derived from the resource mobilisation perspective, and from frame alignment. The supplementary aspects, and our argumentation for including them, will be introduced following the description of the more structural levels.  
The first level of analysis, the political opportunity structure, is the core of the political process approach. It entails the vast array of structural factors influencing social movement potentials. The following are listed as the most influential:  Firstly, the political cleavage structures of a country, by which is meant the historical political and social conflicts that have solidified themselves in the political system, becoming structural political cleavage structures that are difficult to alter (Kriesi, 2004, p. 73). Secondly, the structure of the country’s political institutions, 
                                                          
30 See appendix B for an elaboration of the concept. 
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more specifically the level of centralisation and separation of powers, the type of electoral and party systems, and the composition of the public administration. The aim is to establish if the political structure is open, meaning that it is easy to access, but has limited capacity to act, or if it is closed meaning that it is difficult to access but has greater capacity to act (Kriesi, 2004, p. 70). Important variables are that high degrees of decentralisation and separation of powers, result in open systems, while a professionalised public systems result in a closed system. The behaviour and number of parties determine the system, as a unitary party or coalition with disciplined parties results in a closed system, whereas undisciplined parties in a coalition result in an open system (Kriesi, 2004, p. 70). The division between an open and closed system is not a hypothesis stating what kind of system enhances the chance of success for the SMOs, but a background analysis for devising the best strategy to target the system. Thirdly, the existing cultural models within the country, i.e. the stable elements in the cultural repertoires influencing the elite’s and public’s reaction to challengers are included. Important for identifying the political opportunities, are the prevailing strategies of the government in dealing with contenders, i.e. if they are exclusive or inclusive, repressive or facilitative. The existing discursive opportunity structure of the country is also included in this category, as it deals is concerned with the way specific issues are being talked about, and whether they are perceived as important or relevant (Kriesi, 2004, p. 72). Fourthly, the power relations and formalised structure with the international context are relevant. They may be able to create other political opportunities than the national context, depending on the interaction between the two (Kriesi, 2004, p. 73). 
3.4.2. Level 2: Configuration of political actors The second level of analysis, after setting the structural frame, is a configuration of the various political actors within the playing field made up of the structural level. According to Kriesi, the actor configuration will provide an image of the relevant actors at a given point in time – “their capabilities, perceptions and evaluations of the 
outcomes obtainable (their ‘payoffs’ in terms of game theory) and the degree to which 
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their interests are compatible or incompatible with each other” (Kriesi, 2004, p. 74). This snapshot configuration of political actors will be based on previous group formations that shape the current relationship between actors. While structures are rather stable, the configuration of political actors is more likely to be susceptible to pressure from social movements, especially if the contested issue provides opportunities for political actors to further their own political agendas or careers (Kriesi, 2004, pp. 74-75)(Tarrow, 1994, p. 98, in Kriesi, 2004, p. 75). Hence, for social movement scholars focusing on movement case studies within a country context, and especially if the analytical focus is on relations between configurations of political actors and movement mobilisation, “it is the shifts in the configurations of 
political actors – the instability of political alignments, which create the opportunity 
for successful mobilization” (Tarrow, 1994 pp.87-88, in Kriesi, 2004, p. 75). For understanding this relation between the different levels, it is necessary to underline that the configuration of actors is determined by the political context, the cleavage structures, but that “the configuration of political actors is less stable than the 
structural component of the political context” (Kriesi, 2004, p. 75). In our configuration of political actors we will apply Hunt et al.’s (1994) configuration of relevant actors, which divides the actors into the groups of protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders (Hunt et al., 1994, in Kriesi, 2004, p.74). The protagonists, or the movement’s allies, contain the actor categories of public authorities, political parties, interest groups, the media, and related movements. The antagonists, or the movement’s adversaries, can likewise include public authorities, as well as repressive agents, and possible counter-movements, while the bystanders refer to an audience that is not directly involved, but attentive (Kriesi, 2004, p. 74). This categorisation will be useful for our analysis, in that it will assist us in identifying relevant actors for an analysis of the overall interaction context that SMOs operate in, though Hunt does not specify how the existence of different actors influences the mobilisation potential.  
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3.4.2.1. The policy domain In order to identify the political actors that currently possess access to policymaking on the issue of civil rights for Palestinian refugees, a narrowed focus on the patterns of influence from the different political actors is necessary. The concept of the policy domain, and the theoretical categories it contains can aid this analysis, as it facilitates a categorisation of actors and the way in which they ally themselves with a specific issue. While the concept of the policy domain is not included in the model of the political process approach, it is part of the political process approach. As its concepts are highly relevant for our analysis, we have chosen to include it in the model.  As Kriesi uses the concept of policy domain without defining it specifically, we extracted a definition from his descriptions of the interactions and categories, which are specified below. In the following, we define the concept of policy domain as the sphere in which policy-making on a specific issue is shaped, through the influence and interaction of different structural factors and political actors. According to Kriesi actors belong to various advocacy coalitions, with different levels of influence within a policy domain (Kriesi, 2004, p. 76). The advocacy coalition – referring to a group of political actors joining forces to advocate for a certain aim – which dominates the policy domain in terms of influence, is defined as the ‘policy monopoly’ (Kriesi, 2004, p. 76). The possibility of changing the policy monopoly is partially determined by whether the policy domain is a high profile or low profile issue for the incumbent political elite. In addition to the dichotomous understanding of perceiving the policy domain as high or low profile, policy makers may adopt a so-called ‘bystander perspective’ to the issue, by which an actor  
“defines the primary issue as restoration of order and elimination of danger and 
inconvenience (...) For such a gallery, the issues being debated by the contestants in 
the arena are unimportant relative to the collateral damage and inconvenience they 
produce” (Gamson, 2004, p. 244).  
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Hence, instead of perceiving an issue as high or low profile, policy makers believe the issue to be so delicate that dealing with it will disturb the balance of things, which is why they resort to doing nothing, most often resulting in status quo. The bystander perspective thus becomes relevant when the object of research is such a contested issue as rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, with such wide perceived implications for many different political and sectarian groups. 
3.4.3. Level 3: The interaction context/organisational level This third and final level of analysis within the political process approach deals with the links between structures and configurations of actors on the one side, and agency and action on the other (Kriesi, 2004, pp. 77-78). Kriesi’s description of this level is insufficient for analysis. According to him the strategies of public authorities or policy makers are either repressive of facilitative, which constitute the background for identifying political opportunities. Though he places this variable in the interaction context in the model, he describes it under the discursive opportunity structure. This leaves the interaction context with very little interaction, as it mainly hosts the organisations and their strategies. Based on Archer’s methodological understanding that structure and agency needs to be analytically separated31
The collective actors’ part of the model contains the strategies of SMOs and their opponents and focuses on SMOs’ perception of mobilisation structures and configurations of actors, and how the movement intend to turn perceived potentials into mobilisation (Kriesi, 2004, pp. 77-78). As we are not only concerned with the 
, we will analyse the strategies of the authorities in the first level, and only return to the interactions between the strategies of the authorities and those of the SMOs in the discussion, where we pinpoint their interrelations. Therefore this level is termed the organisational level until the discussion, where it again returns to involving interaction.  
                                                          
31 See chapter 2. 
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perception of SMOs, but with their concrete strategies, we believe there is a need to expand the political process approach’s third level of analysis. The concepts used to extend the interaction context level originate in the resource mobilisation and framing perspectives of social movement theory. These perspectives are developed to assess the capability of social movements in using the resources available, and the extent to which their strategies fit the target groups.  When analysing individual behaviour and perceptions, the political process approach has traditionally assumed rational choices as the guiding tool for individual actors, in lack of available data on individual beliefs of social movement actors (Kriesi, 2004, p. 68). As our research focus is on mobilisation potentials and mobilisation strategies of SMOs, the rationality assumption will form the background for determining SMO mobilisation potentials, based on the extent to which the SMO has considered individual rational choices for participation in their mobilisation strategy, rooted in prospective participants’ perceptions of a given situation. 
3.4.3.1. The resource mobilisation perspective The aspects of the resource mobilisation perspective (RMP)32
“...the simple availability of resources is not sufficient; coordination and strategic 
effort is typically required in order to convert available pools of individually held 
 is added to the political process approach framework in order to deal with the various types of resources available to social movements, and the strategies they utilise to make use of them. The conception of resources is based on the assumption put forward by Edwards and McCarthy that  
                                                          
32 The Resource Mobilisation Perspective (RMP) was developed by McCarthy & Zald as a response to shortcomings in previous social movement theories, which they criticise for having too much focus on deprivation and grievances as the point of departure for social movement mobilisation success. McCarthy & Zald set forward a new approach, in which grievances and deprivation are seen as two of many components of social movement mobilisation (Opp, 2009, pp. 127-128).   
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resources into collective resources and to utilize those resources in collective 
action” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 116).  The resources available to SMOs are therefore attempted categorised according to the five resource types put forward by Edwards and McCarthy, in order to assess the ways SMOs make use of these resources.  
Typology of Resources Opp’s collection of various social movement scholars’ definitions of resources can be used for understanding resources in its broadest meaning, as he defines resources as goods “that actors can use to achieve their goals” (Opp, 2009, p. 139). Edwards and McCarthy categorise five different types of resources available to social movements, based on Bourdieu’s concept of different types of capitals. The five types of resources are moral, cultural, social-organisational, human and material (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 125). While Edward & McCarthy’s five categories leave much to be desired in terms of clarification, we still find them useful as a directional tool when identifying resources available to and utilised by SMOs. Edwards & McCarthy have no exact definition of moral resources, but they provide the example of legitimacy. As it originates from outside the SMO, it is often mimicked on traditions, culture or individuals external to the organisation (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, pp. 125-126). As it is often tightly controlled by external actors it is important for SMOs to ensure external legitimacy. RMP accordingly hypothesises that a social movements’ ability to align their actions with institutionally legitimised features enhances their chances of success (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1992, in Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 126).  According to Edwards & McCarthy, cultural resources are “artefacts and cultural 
products such as conceptual tools and specialized knowledge that have become widely, 
though not necessarily universally, known”. (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 126) Examples are the ability to use the internet, run a meeting, form an organisation etc. Cultural products can assist the SMO in their mobilisation efforts, as it attracts attention to their cause and can facilitate recruitment. However, in order to make 
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use of available cultural resources, the SMOs need proper human and material resources, for instance the money to buy a computer, and the skills to use one (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 126).  Edwards & McCarthy distinguish between three different forms of social-organisational resources: infrastructures, social networks, and organisations. For instance, mobilisation efforts can take place through one’s work or place of study. Social-organisational resources are, according to Edwards & McCarthy, one of the most important aspects in explaining mobilisation processes of SMOs, and their presence has been shown to increase the overall chances of mobilisation (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 127). The social-organisation resources also point to the level of coordination and cooperation between SMOs, and their ability to use existing networks between them, or create new ones. Human Resources are more individual than the other five resources, and refer to personal resources such as labour, experience, skills, expertise and leadership. Hence human resources available to SMOs are tightly linked to individuals who choose to make their resources available to the organisation. The capacity of the SMO is thus highly dependent on individual choices of providing resources or not.  If resources are available, and the social movements are not able to attract the human capital or resources to make use of them, the resources remain unavailable to the movement (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, pp. 127-128).  Finally, material resources are defined traditionally as financial and physical resources (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 128).  An additional note from RMP is the ability to innovate. There is a tendency for social movement organisations to become routinised, losing their ability to innovate strategies and use of resources:  
“Once in existence, SMOs, like all organizations, can be thought of as more or less 
routinized bundles of ‘ways of doing things’. The common patterns of these 
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institutionalized practices come to include preferred repertoire of exchange 
relationships and means of resource access, and importantly shape the extent and 
form of the mobilization of material resources and activism within any social 
movement. [...] And, they, in turn, constrain the choice of form of collective action” (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 136).   Hence, the inability to innovate on strategies and use new and creative means of mobilisation decreases their ability to form the mobilisation potential. 
Critique of RMP – Opp’s suggestion for an extended analytical model We shortly introduce Opp’s critique of the resource perspective in order to enhance our variables. As he correctly points out resources are a sufficient condition for social movements to develop, while they are not a necessary condition. Thus RMP on its own does not possess strong explanatory characteristics, as social movements can occur without resources (Opp, 2009, pp. 148-149). As an alternative Opp suggests an extended analytical model based on five independent variables with direct effects on the emergence, growth/decline, and success of SMOs. The five variables are as follows:  1. the extent of societal support for movement goals,  2. the control of authorities,  3. the amount of resources provided by external groups or individuals,  4. the amount of resources provided by members of the SMO,  5. “Incentives” of the target to yield (Opp, 2009, pp. 137-138).   According to Opp, the model needs to be further developed and empirically tested. He suggests supplementing the model with perspectives of social movement strategies and tactics in using the resources available to them (Opp, 2009, p. 138). While we find Opp to be correct in his critique of RMP, and in his suggestions for supplementary perspectives, we find some areas of his suggested model for resources to be limited, as they are only concerned with the amount of resources, and their origin, and not with a typology or prioritisation. Therefore, we maintain the resource typology suggested by RMP as part of our framework, while 
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supplementing it with perspectives on concrete mobilisation strategies and the frame alignment approach. Opp’s points of the control of authorities overlap with the variable concerning government responses to contention presented in the discursive opportunity structure. His points on the extent of societal support overlap with a later variable on societal beliefs, why they will be applied in unison, in the analysis. The ‘incentives’ of the target to yield will be applied in relation to perspectives on traditions of alliances and incentives of participation. 
3.4.3.2 Social movement mobilisations strategies – Klandermans and Oegema’s 
mobilisation processes We have chosen to base our assessment of SMO mobilisation strategies on Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema’s (1987)notion that mobilisation consists of four processes that social movements must succeed in, in order for their mobilisation effort to be successful: “formation of mobilization potentials, formation and 
activation of recruitment networks, arousal of motivation to participate, and removal 
of barriers to participation” (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, p. 519). Correspondingly, non-participation in collective action, despite mobilisation efforts, is a result of the following four: “lack of sympathy for the movement, not having been 
the target of mobilization attempts, not being motivated to participate, and the 
presence of barriers” (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, p. 529). Our assessment of potentials of SMO mobilisation success will thus be based on an analysis of to what extent the SMOs have gone through these processes. Each step will be further introduced in order to clarify the aspects of the theory used in the analysis. 
Formation of mobilisation potentials The first process, the formation of mobilisation potentials refers to what Klandermans (2004) concept of consensus mobilisation. A consensus mobilisation strategy seeks to mobilise passive bystanders and opponents into supporting the SMO goals (Klandermans, 2004, pp. 369-370). Klandermans and Oegema (1987, p. 519) define the mobilisation potential of a social movement as the pool of 
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individuals within society that, as a result of successful consensus mobilisation could be mobilised into collective action. Thus to them, the goal of consensus mobilisation is to convince as many people as possible to support the movement’s goals and the methods they use to pursue them. Klandermans and Oegema juxtapose consensus mobilisation with the concept of frame alignment, and defines the process as “campaigns in which a movement propagates its view that certain 
states of affairs are unacceptable and can be changed and that collective action will be 
effective in enforcing changes” (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, p. 519). In the section on frame alignment strategies, we will introduce further theoretical tools that can assist us in assessing the success of the SMOs’ consensus mobilisation/framing strategies. 
Formation and activation of recruitment networks  This level refers to the first step of action mobilisation understood as the strategy of turning passive supporters of the movement into participating activists engaging in collective action, thus being contingent on consensus mobilisation (Klandermans, 2004, p. 369-370). When consensus mobilisation increases the SMO’s mobilisation potential, the SMOs must have access to relevant networks, in order to realise their mobilisation potential and target relevant groups for further mobilisation. This also refers back to the social-organisational resources. According to Klandermans and Oegema (1987, p. 520), mobilisation of individuals can take place through one or more of the following channels: mass media, direct mail, ties with organisations, and friendship ties. Research has shown that friendship ties play a key part in mobilisation efforts, as people are more inclined to join in collective action when recommended or encouraged to do so by people they know (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, p. 520).  
Arousal of motivation to participate and removal of barriers to participation However, even when networks are in place for the SMO, participation is still based on individual choice of whether to respond to mobilisation efforts, based on perceived costs and benefits of participation, i.e. incentives to participate. In order 
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to mobilise successfully, SMOs need to be aware of possible costs and benefits of participation, and communicate these costs and benefits to their target groups, as part of their consensus mobilisation strategy. Furthermore, with regards to the removal of barriers, they must be aware of existing barriers, and possess the resources necessary for removing them (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, p. 520).  
Incentives In Klandermans and Oegema’s study, the following general conclusions regarding incentives for participation were made: first of all, collective and social incentives play the biggest role, and ideological collective incentives are considered highly important, in terms of acting according to one’s principals. As for the collective incentives people are more likely to participate if they; expect other people to participate, if they believe strongly in the goal of the movement, and/or if they believe that structural conditions are favourable, e.g. with regards to potentials of government intervention. As for social incentives, people surrounded by friends who support the cause are more likely to participate, as they are more likely to hear about the cause and receive negative comments if they do not participate. In general, participation is more likely if the cost is low, but the perception of cost varies. Some people perceive participation in a demonstration as a high cost, while others perceive the cost as low, e.g. different perceptions of giving up a day of your weekend, or the risk of police interaction (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, pp. 527-529). These considerations are necessary to include in an effective mobilisation strategy. 
3.4.3.3. Reactive mobilisations When assessing the interaction context in which the social movement operate in, it is necessary to investigate if there are competitors, for example appealing more efficiently to the incentives of a certain target group. Therefore other actors’ mobilisation efforts may also have an influence on the mobilisation potential of the researched SMOs. The interest of other groups in the policy-domain of civil rights for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon could lead to counter mobilisation by other 
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groups, whereby they seek to mobilise a different constituency against granting the Palestinians rights. Furthermore, reactive mobilisation can consist of competitive mobilisation by groups trying to mobilise the same constituency, but with a different agenda (Koopmans, 2004). 
3.4.3.4. The frame alignment approach The Frame Alignment Approach (FAA) as put forward by Snow et al. (1986) is based on Erving Goffman’s conceptualisation of frames as  
“’schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals‘ to locate, perceive, identify, 
and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering 
events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and 
guide action, whether individual or collective” (Goffman 1974, p. 21, in Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464).  The approach expands Goffman’s initial work on framing analysis to a theory of the processes of frame alignment, which is defined as  “the linkage of individual and SMO 
interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs 
and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 464). Alignment refers to the theory’s basic notion that in order to mobilise supporters for the movement’s goals, the frames of the potential supporters need to be in accordance with the frames of the movement (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 465-466)(Opp, 2009, p. 234). We thus apply the theory to the mobilisation strategy of the researched SMOs, in order to assess whether they have successfully identified the existing frames of their target groups, and whether they have adjusted their own frame accordingly, and how they seek to alter the frames of their opponents.   When combining this with our analysis of structural conditions for movement success, we are consequently able to provide a more multi-faceted perspective on potentials of SMO mobilisation success, as Snow et al. suggests that framing may play a central role a par with opportunity structures and regime responses (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 477). 
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Frame alignments and societal beliefs - Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford’s 
typology of frame alignment processes In order to identify the framing strategies of the SMO and assess their success, our analysis of SMO framing strategies takes its point of departure in Snow et al.’s (1986, pp. 467-476) typology of four frame alignment processes that social movements must carry out successfully in order to mobilise, as well as the societal beliefs that they perceive as having an influence on SMO framing potentials, and which therefore must be taken into consideration in SMO mobilisation strategies.  Snow et al. list five types of beliefs relevant to social movement mobilisation processes. They are used by the different framing strategies in order to identify matching strategies and beliefs to be changed: 1) beliefs about the seriousness of the issue in question, 2) beliefs about the locus of causality or blame, 3) stereotypic beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence33
Frame amplification, according to Snow et al., refers to “the clarification and 
invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of 
events” (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 469). The basic idea is that issues are often portrayed in multiple ways, thereby distorting and blurring the 
, 4) beliefs about the probability of change or the efficacy of collective action, 5) beliefs about the necessity and propriety of ‘standing up’ (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 470).  Of the four processes of frame alignment put forward by Snow et al., the first process, frame bridging, refers to the linking of individuals or groups who share the same ideology. In our case, this is particularly interesting in relation to frame bridging between individual SMOs, as increased frame bridging will arguably lead to greater potentials of them merging into one united social movement (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 467-68).  
                                                          
33 As the examples where amplification of this belief primarily concerns cases where the antagonist is not already perceived negatively, this belief is not relevant for our case, and will therefore not be applied in the following analysis.  
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frames through which an issue is perceived, and that social movements need to clarify and articulate their particular framing of an issue in such a way that potential supporters feel that it aligns itself with their existing frames (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, p. 469). In the SMO frame amplification strategy, existing stereotypes can be amplified by the movement, in order to increase sympathy or antipathy for certain individuals or groups. The probability of change can be amplified, by referring to past success of previous movements, and the propriety34 of participation can also be emphasised by referring to participation as a moral obligation (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 469-472). Although Snow et al. state that the belief of necessity of participation can also be amplified, this seems to only hold true in situations where a lack of participation will have a direct impact on the target group of the mobilisation, as the free-rider concept as put forward by Olson otherwise seems to hold true35
Frame extension refers to the process by which social movements attempt to attract new participants by extending existing frames, to accommodate the frames of potential supporters. The first step of this strategy implies locating specific interests of target groups, and extending movement frames to include these. The extension can either take place by framing the goal of the movement in new ways in order to expand the pool of potential participants, but it can also be separate from the 
. To conclude, propriety, or moral obligation, of participation, aligned values and the dominant beliefs of one’s network appear to have more influence in participation than a belief in the necessity of one’s individual participation.      
                                                          
3434 Propriety is the theoretical term, referring to the morally perceived ‘correctness’ of participation. 35 Mancur Olson defines free riders as ”Those who consume the public good without contributing to its 
provision” (Opp, 2009, p. 47). This takes as its assumption that people are rational beings who make all decisions based on an analysis of individual costs and benefits. In relation to individual participation in mobilisation this refers to whether participants are personally influenced by the issue at stake – for instance, in the case of the Palestinians, participation would be perceived as more likely, since they are personally affected by not being granted rights. As Opp has pointed out, when limiting the scope to mobilisation the perception of grievances necessarily leading to participation in mobilisation efforts is problematic, as individuals might perceive its participation in other actions as more beneficial, as well as other issues might be perceived of a relatively higher importance (Opp, 2009, pp. 45-48). 
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movement goal and only serve as a way to attract people to mobilising events, and can be done by making alliances to actors with a frame that can be linked to the SMOs’ own frame (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 472-473).   
Frame transformation takes place when the existing frame of the target group is opposed to the movement’s frame, making a transformation of target group frames necessary. As part of frame transformation, a change in the perceived seriousness of the issue need to occur as a part of frame transformation, accompanied by a shift in what Snow et al. term ‘attributional orientation’: a shift in the prospective participant’s blame of the issue. If the mobilisation takes place on behalf of a movement seeking to change socio-political structures the shift needs to be from victim-blaming to system-blaming. It is dependent on the goal of the movement, the frame transformation can either occur within a specific domain, or as a transformation of one’s entire world view (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 474-476).  
Success of framing strategies The success of a frame alignment process is of course not a given, and there are a wide array of reasons as to why the process can fail, many of which can be incorporated in the mobilisation strategies. Snow et al. makes it clear that there is a relationship between framing alignment success and the level of resonance between the existing frames of the mobilising target and the frame set forward by the movement, such that the greater the resonance prior to the frame alignment process, the greater the likelihood of frame alignment success. Second, the movement must strike a careful balance in its bridging strategy between mobilising as broadly as possible, while at the same time being careful not to dilute the clarity of its goal, by having too many mobilising actors without a clear idea of the movement framing strategy (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 477-478).  
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3.4.3.5. Media strategies for mobilisation The diffusion of new ideas and knowledge from one group to another is an important part of dispersing the mobilisation ideas of a social movement. The so-called ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973, in Koopmans, 2004, p.25) that refer to links between groups with little everyday interaction can be highly influential in this diffusion. As Koopmans mentions, mass media can diffuse knowledge between groups, whose frame perceptions would not otherwise interact (Koopmans, 2004, p. 25). Therefore media access is an important tool for SMOs to consider in their framing strategies, as they can function as weak ties to groups who are not the traditional target group of the SMO.  Gamson argues that in order to perform both action and consensus mobilisation, media plays a role in spreading the frame of the SMO as widely as possible. Media standing can be used to strategise on this, as it refers to whether social movement actors are being quoted or cited as a relevant source and have opportunities for presenting the views of the movement in the media. Media standing is difficult for a social movement to obtain, as granting of standing is often a continuation of previous routines for journalists, who tend to choose the same sources over time (Gamson, 2004, pp. 251-252).  
3.5. Sub conclusion: analytical variables In the above chapter we have outlined our theoretical framework. The chosen point of departure is the political process approach, which provides the overall analytical framework for our analysis. As the political process approach lacks operational variables and concepts for the organisational level, we have supported it with additional theoretical concepts and variables from the resource mobilisation perspective, the theory of processes of mobilisation, and the frame alignment approach. This has resulted in a theoretical framework where relevant themes are indicated for each level, subdivided into more specific variables, which are portrayed in the text box below. The causal relation between the variable and the growth of the social movement is not indicated by the theory for each variable. 
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Where it is indicated it has been explained in the theoretical review above, and will be summed up in the analysis of each variable.  The following is a numbered list of the themes and variables divided into the three analytical levels, as proposed in the theoretical framework.                   
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Theoretical Framework 
 
1st level: Political opportunity structure 1. Political cleavage structure: historical, political, social conflicts solidified in political system 2. Institutional structure: the openness of the system, based on level of centralisation; separation of powers, electoral and party systems; composition of public administration 3. Existing cultural models: prevailing government strategies (exclusive or inclusive); discursive opportunity structure. 
2nd level: Configuration of actors 4. Allies, adversaries and bystanders: capabilities; perceptions; pay offs; interests (compatible/incompatible); susceptibility to pressure 5. Policy domain: advocacy coalitions, policy monopoly, external wider power shifts, high or low profile, bystander perspective. 
3rd level: Analytical organisational level 
Resource mobilisation perspective 6. Resource typology: moral resources (legitimacy), cultural resources, socio-organisational resources (networks); human resources (appropriate use); material resources. 
7. Routinised methods decrease mobilisation potential 
Mobilisation strategies 8. Mobilisation strategies (processes of mobilisation) 
a. form mobilisation potentials,   
b. activate recruitment networks,  
i. Channels of mobilisation: mass media, direct mail, ties with organisations, and friendship ties 
c. arouse the motivation to participate & remove barriers for participation.   
i. Incentives for participation: strong belief in cause, belief in structure as favourable, belief in presence of “incentives” for the target to yield, friends participate, low costs for participation. 
Coordination and reactive mobilisation 9. Counter mobilisation and competitive mobilisation decreases the mobilisation potential. 
Frame alignment approach 10. Societal beliefs: Beliefs about the seriousness of the issue in question; beliefs about the locus of causality or blame; stereotypic beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence; beliefs about the probability of change or the efficacy of collective action; beliefs about the necessity and propriety of ‘standing up’.  11. Frame alignment strategies: Bridging, amplification, extension, transformation.  a. Assumption: there is an increased chance of success if the strategies resonate with existing frames. 
Media strategy:  12. Weak ties; access dilemma (media standing).   
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4. Analysis 
4.1. Introduction The following is an analysis of content of the variables presented in our theoretical framework on the issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. The aim of the chapter is to assess the extent to which each of the variables concerning the political opportunity structure, configuration of actors, and organisational capabilities can explain the level of mobilisation and effect of the strategies, in order to enable a subsequent discussion of social movement theory’s overall applicability to our case  The chapter will start with an outline of the chosen analysis structure, and explain how the theoretical variables will be applied in the analysis, whereupon it will proceed to the analysis, consisting of three consecutive levels. Finally, sub-conclusions will provide a summary of the findings and answer the corresponding research questions. The analysis will not have an overall conclusion, as the findings of the three analytical levels will be combined in the following discussion.   As discussed in the preceding chapter, we have chosen to separate the analysis of the different factors influencing the potentials of mobilisation into three individual analyses. Model 2 below illustrates the alterations made from the initial theoretical model of the political process approach, including both our supplementary variables, and that the third level only contains the analysis of the organisational capabilities, while the interaction context between the three levels of analysis will be discussed in the following chapter.   
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4.1.1. Structure of the analysis The field observations – the empirical data collected during the field work – in Lebanon and the subsequent analysis led to an alteration of the sequence of the presentation of the variables, in order to present the findings in their most logical order, to secure a more fluent argumentation, and to avoid repetition.  There have been no alterations of structure of the political opportunity structure and the configuration of actors, while the organisational level has been restructured. The societal beliefs are theoretically part of the framing strategies, but it was found that an analysis of societal beliefs was also the background for the mobilisation strategies, as it was closely linked to the incentives considerations under mobilisation strategies. Therefore societal beliefs were combined with incentives and perceived costs, as a background for the framing strategies, and presented as the first part in the overall analysis together with the study of reactive mobilisation, as it is linked to the societal beliefs. It is then followed by an investigation into the mobilisation strategies, which have been combined to three steps including the exploration of incentives, before the study of resources, since the mobilisation strategies provide the background for the resource analysis. Finally the framing strategies are investigated, under which we have included media strategy.  
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For each thematic category of variables, the data will be analysed through the following three steps: first, the material obtained through our desk study. Second, we will proceed to present the material collected from our field study. Finally, we will discuss our overall findings regarding the theoretical variable. This stepwise process of analysis will be followed consistently throughout the analysis, except in the cases where no data was available concerning the variable from our desk study. In these cases, only the material from our field study will be presented, and the findings will consequently only be based on this.  
4.2. Political opportunity structure In this section, the variables concerning Lebanon’s political cleavage structures, institutional structure, and existing cultural models will shape the analysis of the political opportunity structure, in order to answer the following research question: 
RQ.1.1. To what extent do the theoretical variables of the political opportunity 
structure influence the potentials of mobilisation as a method to gain rights for 
Palestinians in Lebanon? 
4.2.1. Political cleavages - sectarian society and the civil war  The following will focus on the relevant historical political and social conflicts that have solidified themselves in the Lebanese political system36
4.2.1.1. Desk study observations 
. The structure of the political system will also be discussed in order to understand how the cleavage structures are mirrored and enforced in the political structures.  
As described in the background chapter, Lebanese society is structured around and within a sectarian37 system, both in the confessional nature of its political system38
                                                          
36 As the Lebanese political system is the one in which the SMOs operate, and which correspondingly asserts its enabling and constraining features on their mobilisation potentials, we have chosen only to include political cleavage structure aspects of the Lebanese system here, and not the Palestinian. The social and political conflicts that have solidified themselves within Palestinian society are however considered to be relevant for mobilisation potentials, which is why these will be presented in the section on societal beliefs and reactive mobilisations.  37See appendix B for the elaborate definition.  
, 
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but also in regard to the political affiliations of the population. While Lebanon has 17 sectarian groups39
In general, Lebanese society is characterised by a low level of trust and loyalty between the sects, and a historic fear of subjugation, massacres, marginalisation and foreign control, which goes back to the 19th century, and was exacerbated by the civil war ravaging the country from 1975-1990
, the four largest groups are Christians, the Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze (Haddad, 2003, s. 47). The most important feature of the sects is not their religious background, but rather that they are social reference groups used for promoting social and political groups and beliefs (Haddad 2003, p. 9). Functionally “the religious community is his nation; that with the people to whom 
he belong and with whom he identifies” (Haddad 2003, p. 6), making the primary individual reference the sect, and not to the national identity of being Lebanese.  
40 where foreign actors supported different sides (Haddad, 2003, p. 124). The lack of trust between the sects is enforced by the lack of reconciliation mechanisms after the civil war41
As the Palestinians played a major part in the war, they were included in the pack of foreign scapegoats
 (Omar, 2010). The missing reconciliation can be seen as an outcome of the unarticulated decision of Lebanese political elites after the war, to conveniently hold external actors responsible for the war, thereby avoiding having to deal with inter-sectarian reconciliations (Haugbølle, 2010, p. 19). The lack of trust between sects and the importance assigned to sectarian identity create a situation in which all political decision-making is carried out with the aim of optimising gains for one’s sectarian community, creating legislative procedures and policy-making a constant battleground for sectarian infighting (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 118).   
42
                                                                                                                                                                             
38 See appendix B for an elaborate definition and a distinction from sectarian. 39 See appendix D for a description of the confessional groups.  40 See appendix D for a timeline of Lebanese contemporary history including the civil war. 41 While there has been an international tendency in recent years to use reconciliation mechanisms as in South Africa, almost nothing has been initiated in Lebanon (Omar, 2010). 
  (Haugbølle, 2010, p. 19), and were excluded from the amnesty 
42 The other main culprits being Israel and Syria, depending on the confessional group asked (Haugbølle, 2010, pp. 18-20). 
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law passed for Lebanese militia leaders, many of whom were, and still are, part of the political elite (Knudsen, 2009, p. 57). The perception that the Palestinians were to blame for the civil war was voiced strongest by the Christians and the Shia, while the Druze and other leftist oriented groups who had fought on the side of the Palestinians in the war were less articulate about the blame of the Palestinians (Haugbølle, 2010, p. 19). While in present day Lebanon, perceptions regarding the Palestinians are still rooted in civil war experiences, there are however indications that opinions of the younger generation may be less extreme than those of their sect leaders (Mikdashi, 2011, p. 4). 
4.2.1.2. Field observations Our interviewees all confirmed the sectarian factor as the basic principle of Lebanese society, note that it makes class-based divisions less important and structures society around vertical loyalty to the sect leader (IP25, expert). The interviewees stressed that sectarianism has a profound effect on the social life of people, where for instance “people – especially people who have less resources – they 
are dependent on the sect” (IP24, expert, 29.00). It results in people having more to lose if the system disappears (IP30, expert), and all sects have a state within the state (IP16, Lebanese SMO, 12.20). The system creates security in the chaos of a weak state that is barely holding Lebanese unity together. The split Lebanese identity results in a lack of discursive and political room for dealing with problems beyond the sectarian divide, such as the issue of rights for Palestinians - or as an SMO founder expressed it “the problem: that Lebanese didn’t find a solution or even 
the definition of their entity… the general mood of the Lebanese different forces is all 
the time: please Palestinians wait until we solve this problem or that” (IP5, expert, 46.10). According to our interviewees, the inherent fear of the other sects in the system results in sect leaders presenting themselves as the protectors of the sect against the other sects, with the IPs underlining the inherent conflict in the sectarian system (IP9, international SMO, 24.15). 
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The same generational families have been in power in the sects since the 1950s, and they are protecting the sectarian system in spite of them being political enemies, since they are benefiting directly from it: “the 6 main groups in Lebanon are all 
unified in preventing any real change of the system - they come to unity when the root 
problems of the system are attacked.” (IP9, international SMO, 31.00). The steadfastness of sectarian interests is expressed by the way in which many interviewees perceived Lebanese politics essentially as a political game between deeply sectarian invested interests, which are hard to influence43
4.2.1.3. Findings 
 (IP4, Palestinian SMO, 14.00). 
Our analysis indicates that the sectarian principle inherent in the historical and religious conflicts in Lebanon has resulted in the sect functioning as the primary social and political reference. The affiliation to the sect is the highest priority, with the consequence of the opinions of people often being aligned with those of the sect’s political leaders.  Distrust between sects, exacerbated by the civil war, creates a lack of national unity, and makes decision-making a battleground for advancing sectarian interests. This influences the mobilisation potential in a negative direction when attempting to mobilise for a case where sectarian interests differ. In this way sectarian affiliation permeates political allegiances in a manner that seems difficult to change, as sectarian political elites benefit from the status quo of the system. With regards to the issue of Palestinians, the perception of the Palestinians as one of the main culprits for the civil war persists as an overall frame, while individual sectarian perceptions on the issue still take their point of departure in civil war alliances. In this sense, the Palestinians in Lebanon remain entangled in the seemingly endless sectarian disputes. 
                                                          
43 This indication of a lack of belief in the utility of the political system for voicing grievances can also be seen in the low Lebanese voter turnouts – 53.98 in 2009 (IDEA, 2011). While these indicate a lack of belief in the political system, it does not necessarily imply decreasing sectarian identification, but might on the contrary indicate that beliefs in sectarian institutions outside of the political realm are bigger.  
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4.2.2. Institutional structure in Lebanon Relevant for mobilisation potentials is the institutional structure in Lebanon, as it indicates the enabling or constraining structural features that influence the ways in which social movements can navigate. The theory points to the following features as being relevant for social movement mobilisation potentials: the level of centralisation and the separation of powers, the types of electoral and party systems, and the composition of the public administration, in order to determine the political structural level as open or closed. 
4.2.2.1. Desk study observations Lebanon is a republic with a built in confessional power-sharing mechanism. High ranking positions in government and parliament, and all positions in the public bureaucracy are assigned according to sect. As power is allocated proportionally to sects, there is a lack of a central authority that can arbitrate between the different sects, resulting in Lebanon being split into a collection of what Julia Choucair-Vizoso has called ‘de facto ministates’ (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 115). The political system initially designed to ensure an equal power share among confessional groups has thus only resulted in an institutionalisation of sectarian divisions (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, pp. 115-118). Lebanon’s legislative branch is a unicameral parliament, which has historically functioned under strong Syrian influence44, and is to a large degree subordinate to the executive branch - as Are Knudsen points out: “when the country’s leadership 
troika agrees (and Syria does not oppose), the legislature blindly approves ministerial 
decrees without debate” (Knudsen, 2007, p. 11). Furthermore, Lebanon is ranked as number 127 out of 178 countries45
                                                          
44 The public sector used to be heavily influenced by Syria’s large network of intelligence in Lebanon. (Haddad, 2003, p. 16).  45 Lower than both Jordan and Egypt at number 50 and 98, respectively, but in a shared position with Syria. 
 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2010, (Transparency International, 2010). With power thus being concentrated in the sectarian and corrupt hands of the few and with the 
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judiciary being closely linked with the government, there are few checks and balances on the functional distribution of power (Knudsen, 2007, p. 11). As pointed out by Choucair-Vizoso, this results in a stabilisation of the current political system: 
“[the] corrupt patronage system has created vested interests in perpetuating the 
status quo” (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 124).  
Party system The Lebanese party system is highly influenced by sectarian interests and formed along the lines of civil war divisions46
• March 14 Coalition - the political coalition currently in opposition to government in Lebanon. It was named after the largest anti-Syrian demonstration in the Independence Intifada and the main actors in the coalition are the Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces, and the Kataeb Party, while PSP has just recently left it. Supported by Western powers, in Saudi Arabia, USA and EU (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 122). 
. The parties have historically been based in strong personalities, and not ideologies (Harris, 2007, p. 242). Currently the Lebanese political system is dominated by two coalition blocks, of which the first block is currently in government: 
• March 8 Coalition - the political coalition currently in government in Lebanon. It is named after the day for the pro-Syrian counter demonstrations to the Independence Intifada, and its main political actors are Hizbollah, Amal, and the Progressive Socialist Party, while the Free Patriotic Movement is a close ally of the coalition and also forms part of the government. Supported by Iran and Syria (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 122). While party opinions tend to follow sectarian lines, there is still competition among parties with the same confessional base concerning the strategy of alliances, why they are positioned in different political coalitions.  
                                                          
46 See appendix D for a historical overview of civil war alliances. 
61 
 
Electoral system According to a Freedom House report on the 2009 parliamentary elections, Lebanon is not an electoral democracy (Freedom House, 2011, p. 3). This implies that, while the electoral system is proportional, the democracy is confessional, meaning that a certain number of seats in parliament are allocated to each sect, and only candidates from that sect can stand for the seat. Although the right to vote is non-confessional, and voters can vote for as many candidates as there are seats allocated for their district (IFES, 2009, p. 3), votes tend to fall along confessional lines (Harris, 2007, pp. 239-240). The allocation of seats based on sects makes alliances crossing sectarian boundaries necessary due to the multitude of sects, as no sect has the ability to obtain a majority in parliament on their own. Therefore, political parties in Lebanon are often loose cross-sectarian coalitions based on perceived possibilities of vote-winning, rather than on shared political opinions (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 118) (IFES, 2009), which makes it difficult to reach a consensus internally in the alliances. Political life in Lebanon is therefore characterised by power fights between the alliances, and with the words of a commentary in the Daily Star newspaper: “futile political bickering and a lack of trust between the parties” (Saab, 2011). There is a constant fight between alliances and sects, with more focus on the power balance between sects than on creating political laws with an impact on people’s everyday life. This is for example illustrated by the parties’ dead-locking of the formation of a new government for five months after which the opposition has only worked on delegitimising the government (Al Jazeera 2011). 
4.2.2.2. Field observations The sectarian base of the electoral system was confirmed by the interviewed parties who, even when presenting themselves as secular, mainly rely on support from confessionally based constituencies. The only exception from this rule seems to be the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)47
                                                          
47 A Lebanese political party that advocates for Lebanon to become part of a greater Syria. As one of the only parties, it has a secular base but is however highly influenced by its Syrian affiliation.  
 and to some extent the Future 
62 
 
Movement and Hizbollah. Both Hizbollah and the Future Movement have gone through phases of broader support, where different sects have supported them (IP25, expert; Future Movement, 26.35). The interviewees in general identified political opportunism, as opposed to ideological agreements, as the dynamic behind the quickly shifting alliances in Lebanon, with the interviewees for example stating that both PSP and Hizbollah use the issue of rights for Palestinians as a bargaining card48. The recent alliance shift of PSP from one coalition to another49
With regards to the separation of powers, the theoretical observations are confirmed by our interviewees who point to the lack of a functional separation of powers, leading to the misuse of political offices, including high levels of corruption. The attitude of the interviewees towards the public administration in Lebanon was in general depreciatory. It was spoken of as minimal, and like the political offices, public offices are also misused, suffering from high levels of corruption and wasta
 is an example of the opportunistic tendency of the parties, its precariousness visible in Future Movement’s assertive comment that PSP will soon return to the March 14 alliance (Future Movement, 37.00).  Our interviewees further remarked that the confessional constitution of the system and the following multitude of parties, results in recurrent stalemates of the political system, as the different parties constantly bicker over issues upon which sectarian beliefs are strong, changing alliances according to what they perceive as the opportunities for their sectarian community (IP30, expert; IP25, expert; IP19, Lebanese SMO). As interviewees noted, this can also be seen in the way parties in opposing coalition, with the same confessional base, agree on issues with strong implications for sectarian interests (PSP, 36.55; NLP, 51.00). These stalemates result in a large amount of laws waiting to be passed and implemented (IP22, expert).  
50
                                                          
48 See appendix C, table 2. 49 The PSP used to be part of the March 14 alliance, but in connection with the recent shift of government, they allied themselves with Hizbollah and moved to March 8. 50 See appendix B for an elaborate definition. 
, 
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which makes the use of connections within public or private offices, which are often acquired based on family or sectarian relations, a main channel of influence (IP30, expert; IP25, expert). 
4.2.2.3. Findings The above desk study and field observations of the institutional structure demonstrate that there is a particularly strong interplay between political cleavages and institutional structures in Lebanon. They basically enforce one another. According to the theory, the Lebanese lack of formal separation of powers and decentralisation should lead to a closed system with a strong ability to act. However with seats allocated according to sect, and with a multiparty system that necessitates coalitions, the system opens up, a tendency which is exacerbated by the highly undisciplined parties. This, according to the theory, decreases the ability to act as the power is functionally spread across many political actors. The ability to act is further decreased by the cross-sectarian alliances as the sectarian interests lead parties to agree across coalitions on issues important for the sect, making consensus on these issues very difficult. On top of this, the channels of influence are highly ambiguous and dependent upon sectarian connections.  
 4.2.3. Existing cultural models In the following we will analyse the ways in which the discursive opportunity structure and prevailing government strategies towards contention affect potentials for mobilisation as a means of political influence. The analysis of the discursive opportunity structure will focus on the mechanisms that decide how issues are being talked about, in the Lebanese case the level of freedom of expression and free press. The analysis of prevailing government strategies towards contention focuses on the ways in which the Lebanese government respond to contentious activities regarding the issue of Palestinian rights.  
4.2.3.1. Desk study observations From the end of the civil war in 1990 until 2005, public freedoms were severely restricted, with government and security interference in unions and professional 
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organisations, and strong government control over the issuing of TV station licenses, all of which asserted partial government control over civil society (Harris, 2007, p. 241). However with the exit of Syria in 2005, and the diminished Syrian control of state institutions, control of different freedoms also declined. This resulted in issues which were previously not publicly spoken of before being debated in the open, including the issue of the Palestinians (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 121). The establishment of the LPDC in 2005 can also be seen as part of this opening in the discursive opportunity structure (Brynen, 2009, p. 6). In Lebanon, the composition of media outlets enforces the discursive opportunity structure. While freedom of expression is much greater after 2005, press freedom is still limited, as the media is sharply divided according to sectarian or political affiliations (Cochrane, 2007, p. 3), and have close ties to political groups, while religious leaders have informal or formal censorship powers (Freedom House, 2011, p. 4). Internet access remains unrestricted (Freedom House, 2010), but the nomination of Lebanon as the country with the world’s slowest (and very expensive) internet connection complicates the use of this channel for influencing the discursive opportunity structure (Anderson, 2011). For the Palestinians in Lebanon, the opportunities for influencing the discursive opportunity structure are further curtailed as they are do not enjoy the same freedom of speech or assembly as the Lebanese (Knudsen, 2007, p. 10).  While the Lebanese have a strong tradition for protests on any given issue, and it is possible to discuss the issue of rights of Palestinians more openly after 2005, government responses to contention remain highly non-transparent, and dependent on the issue at stake. As an example, in August 2010 the security services held a critic of the Lebanese military intervention in the Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp51
                                                          
51 In May 2007 fighting broke out between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Islamist militant group Fatah Al-Islam, who had taken up position in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr Al-Bared. As a result of the struggle, the camp was under siege for three months, receiving air bombardments 
 in 
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solitary confinement for 24 hours, and subsequently denied him access to his lawyer or family, while criticism on similar issues has passed without repercussions (Freedom House, 2011, p. 4).  
4.2.3.2. Field observations Our interviewees confirmed our desk study observations. Several of them described how the discursive opportunity structure on the issue of rights of Palestinians changed positively as a result of the Syrian exit in 2005, and how it was also only hereafter that it became possible to discuss the issue openly in parliament (IP28, expert, 22.30; IP38, expert, 11.50; IP25, expert; IP22, expert). Some of our interviewees see the changes made in the labour law in 201052
Concerning the role of the media in reproducing or challenging the discursive opportunity structure, interviewees confirmed that the media is divided according to sect and therefore it is difficult to access with information not aligning with their opinions. In particular the newspapers were described as being either pro or anti rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, and television channels as controlled by the parties (IP12a, Palestinian SMO, 59.00, IP15, Lebanese SMO). This was seen as making media response and portrayal of social movements dependent upon the way in which the goal of the SMO aligns with the opinion of the political party that the specific media outlet is affiliated with (IP15, Lebanese SMO). The media’s monopoly of dissemination of information was seen as increasingly weakened by the increase in the use of social media, and internet based communication, particularly amongst the youth, while the negative influence of the slow speed of internet connections was also acknowledged (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 30.00).  
 as a further positive change in the discursive opportunity structure, as the Palestinians are now written explicitly into the law for the first time (IP28, expert, 26.30; 31.00; IP5, expert, 28.45), while others consider it a show case (IP3, international SMO, 19.30).   
                                                                                                                                                                             and heavy artillery. According to UNRWA, nearly 95 percent of the camp’s infrastructure was damaged during the siege, leaving a large part of the camp population displaced (UNRWA, 2011). 52 In 2010, the Lebanese parliament adopted a law that enabled Palestinian refugees to work in a limited number of professions, if they obtain a work permit.  
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The interviewees further confirmed that the ambiguous ways that the state responds to contention is dependent on the issue at stake. In the case of Nahr Al-Bared the state responded very heavy-handedly (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 17.00; IP22, expert; IP4, Palestinian SMO, 29.30), and the same is believed to be the case for contentious activities regarding the right to freedom of movement, as one SMO commented:  “if they [the activists] try to do something about it [the limited freedom of movement] in Nahr Al-Bared, the Lebanese army will put them in prison” (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 17.00). This shows that when the threat is perceived to be serious enough, repression is harsh, while on other issues like the right to work, contentious activities are not responded to as harshly. As one SMO commented on the government’s response to a mobilising event for the right to work: “ it is starting to 
change, their [the authorities and the army] opinion … They know that we are coming 
to stand, to say our opinions … so they change. They are not strict as much as before … 
because they know that we’re not doing any problems” (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 36.00). 
4.2.3.3. Findings Based on our observations, the discursive opportunity structure has been more facilitative towards the issue of rights of Palestinians in Lebanon since 2005, however it remains controlled by government and sectarian interests - a control which is further enhanced by the way in which sectarian and political groups control the media. While demonstrations and protest events are allowed to a certain extent, government responses also depend on the issue and its implications for power holders. It seems that both the discursive opportunity structure and the government responses to contention are dictated by sectarian interests and by what the authorities perceive as matters of state security.53While the freedom of assembly provides the Lebanese population with an outlet for their grievances, the ambiguous way in which government responds to contentious 
  
                                                          
53 State security and sectarian interests are often overlapping when it comes to matters of stability, for example the Nahr Al-Bared crisis.  
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activities on different issues makes planning of mobilisation activities difficult, as government responses are hard to predict. 
4.2.4. Sub-conclusion of political opportunity structure The above analysis has shown that the political cleavages of the sectarian system are institutionalised in the electoral and political systems, further increasing their influence on societal and political interactions. The stability of the sectarian system rests on the lack of trust between sects that civil war based sectarian divisions created in the population, leading people to continuously support their sectarian leaders and the underlying system. Further solidifying this is that sectarian and political leaders benefit from the system through high-level corruption. The combination of the institutionalisation of the sectarian system, the first priority of sectarian interests, and the need for coalition-making across sectarian divisions results in constant decision-making deadlocks.  While the system results in a stalemate of political decision-making, it still provides the population with an outlet for their grievances through the strong tradition for protests of all kinds, as well as the sectarian subsystems which provide the population with alternative channels for feeling represented, especially due to the sectarian service provision.  Like the current sectarian divisions, the opinions on the issue of rights for Palestinians are rooted in the civil war and fixed along sectarian lines, making them difficult to change. While the discursive opportunity structure has opened up since 2005, perceptions of the Palestinians remain the same due to civil war fears persisting, possibly due to the wounds not having been healed through reconciliation mechanisms.  Concluding on the research question on the influence of the political opportunity structure variables on the potentials of mobilisation as a means to gain rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, the political opportunity structure is not conducive for changes regarding the issue, as long as the sectarian system persist. The distrust 
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between the sects creates constant conflict based on sectarian interests, and channels of influence based on sect. Though the Lebanese system is constructed as a closed system, the multiparty confessional system and the sectarian conflicts makes it into a functional open system, decreasing its ability to act. The conflicts inherent in the structure and its inability to act result in a lack of change exacerbated by the sectarian elites benefiting from the system. There is freedom to work with different causes, but the conflicting sectarian interests, and national interest in keeping stability, are decisive for the government’s handling of different issues. This makes political cleavages and their impact on institutional structures and alliances seem as the most decisive factor of the political opportunity structure. 
4.3. Configuration of actors  The following section will shed light on the configuration of actors relevant for the issue of rights for Palestinians, through an analysis of the variables concerning the broad configuration of actors and the policy domain, with the aim of answering the following research question: 
RQ.1.2. To what extent do the theoretical variables of the configuration of 
actors influence the potentials of mobilisation as a method to gain rights for 
Palestinians in Lebanon? 
4.3.1. Broad configuration of actors – allies, adversaries, and bystanders In this section we will give an introduction to the broad configuration of actors who have a potential impact on the issue, and attempt to categorise them according to the theoretical understanding of allies, adversaries and bystanders, whereupon we will move on to an analysis of the policy domain in the subsequent section.  In Lebanon the most important actors were found to be within the realms of Lebanese political parties and international states, while the media, actors from international organisations and sub-governmental institutions played a minor role.  The media and their role in relation to the issue of rights of Palestinians in Lebanon was introduced in relation to the existing cultural models variable above, why their 
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role will not be further elaborated here. As the political parties will be the main focus of the policy domain analysis, they will not be included in this broad configuration. The same is applicable for the SMOs, whose role will be analysed in the organisational level analysis. The actors introduced in the following will thus include international states, UNRWA, PLO, Palestinian factions, and the LPDC. 
4.3.1.1. Desk study observations 
Protagonists and bystanders The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are represented by PLO in Lebanon, and there is a recognised Lebanese governmental body for Palestinian affairs – the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee.  PLO has historically played an important role as the political representative and service provider for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, but after 1982, their influence diminished, as a result of their exit from Lebanon (Shiblak, 1997, p. 268ff). However, since 2006 PLO has again had a representative office in Lebanon (United Press International, 2006). LPDC is the governmental committee responsible for all communication between the Palestinians and the Lebanese, and the PLO is the representative for the Palestinians with the LPDC. It forms part of the Prime Minister’s office, and on its board are representatives from ministries with files relevant for Palestinian issues (LPDC, 2007).   UNRWA has functioned as a quasi-state through its service provisions since PLO institutions ceased to perform these in 1982. However, they have not been able to significantly improve, but rather just maintain, the living conditions of the Palestinians, primarily due to a lack of funding and the boundaries of their mandate that does not entail advocacy (Özkaya 2005, p.12). 
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The Palestinian factions are the multitude of political actors, present in- and outside of the camps. The factions, the two dominant ones being Hamas and Fatah54
Antagonists 
, play an important role in relation to rights for Palestinians. While they have no political leverage in internal Lebanese politics, and therefore cannot directly influence the decision-making process, their fragmentation and internal fighting for popular Palestinian support (Knudsen, 2003, p. 19) has an important influence on mobilisation potentials, which will be further analysed in the section on societal beliefs.  Currently EU and USA have major donor and trade agreements with Lebanon, and both have a significant role to play in terms of pushing for reforms (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p.132ff). They may have an indirect influence on the Palestinian issue through their regional power, for example the prospect of a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine without the return of the refugees would have a major impact on the Lebanese situation. 
Syrian control of and meddling in internal Lebanese affairs has a long history. As described above, Syria had to give up its direct military presence in 2005, a step which played a part in opening up the discursive opportunity structure on Palestinian issues. Their direct influence on the issue of rights for Palestinians is unclear, however Özkaya argues that Syria has two interests in controlling the issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: 1. Because it is an important issue for international Lebanese dynamics, Syria view control of the issue of Palestinians in Lebanon as part of exercising its control over Lebanon, and 2. Control of the Palestinian issue is part of strengthening its position against Israel (Özkaya 2005, 
                                                          
54 Fatah is the main political party of the PLO, which has traditionally held great support among the population in the Palestinian refugee camps, and still do, although in greater competition with Hamas than before. Hamas is the Islamist political party currently in control of Gaza. In the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon they have traditionally been inferior to Fatah in terms of popular support in the camps, but this situation is changing.   
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p.11). Until 2005 they have supported shifting alliances, through a rule and divide strategy, in order to weaken Lebanon and keep their influence (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 119). Currently they are connected to Hizbollah and Hamas. 
4.3.1.2. Field observations The following protagonists, antagonists and bystanders were identified by interviewees as having some level of importance for the issue. As in the preceding section, bystanders and protagonists have been combined under one heading. 
Protagonists and bystanders PLO was almost unanimously identified as being inefficient by the SMOs and the experts, while the parties did not mention them55
LPDC were identified as being without significant influence by the majority of experts and SMOs, and were criticised by the parties (PSP, 31.00; Future Movement, 48.00; NLP, 57.00)
. The position of the PLO in opposition to other Palestinian factions in Lebanon was assessed as fairly strong, and as improved after the Nahr Al-Bared crisis, but with a danger of losing ground to Hamas, since the PLO legitimacy is very low among the Palestinians due to corrupt leadership (IP26, expert, 20.30). Most interviewees, except for those linked to the PLO, judged the role of PLO as completely powerless concerning lobbying with the Lebanese government or parties, with the basic problem being a lack of political leverage (IP22, expert). The current representatives are perceived to hold no political capital (IP22, expert), and are not judged as competent or willing enough to work for rights of Palestinians in Lebanon (IP29, expert, 31.00). 
56
                                                          
55 See also appendix C, figure 1,2 and 3. 56 See also appendix C, figure 2 and 3 
, as expressed by the Future Movement: “the role of this comedy 
should be activated in a better way” (Future Movement, 47.40). By all actors, and to some extent also themselves, LPDC is seen as a ministerial committee without power for decision-making or implementation, making it some kind of a showcase for intensions of reform, (IP38, expert, 16.30; IP23 expert, 13.00) without the 
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possibility of creating real change (IP22, expert, IP37, Lebanese SMO). One critique is that it voices the concerns of the politicians between the different ministries, but that there is no mechanism for voicing the grassroots’ opinions, which leads to the inclusion of CSO becoming an ad hoc process, for example through LPDC’s participation in the CEP (IP38, expert, 16.30).  UNRWA was in general categorised as inactive concerning the rights of the Palestinians, being seen only as a service provider (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 53.50). There is some level of advocacy with them being part of CEP, but no interviewees judge their role in changes on rights as major. Some interviewees expressed a wish that their role increased, due to their historical commitment to the Palestinians, but none saw this as likely (IP12a, Palestinian SMO, 36.00, IP37, Lebanese SMO).  With regards to the Palestinian factions, only a minority of the interviewees assessed that they had influence on the rights of the Palestinians. In general they all agree on both the right of return and on the rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, though their strategies differ (IP20, Palestinian SMO, 37.00). It could be argued that the factions may have an influence on mobilising their constituency, thus it is considered in the analysis of mobilisation strategies. The influence of the USA and the EU was rated as medium57. In particular they were seen as having the potential to pressure Lebanon to increase their human rights focus, as seen in the UPR process in Lebanon, whereby international pressure according to the SMOs in particular by the EU and the USA, resulted in the passing of law for the right to work58
                                                          
57 See appendix C, figure 1, 2, and 3. 
58 Universal Periodic Review - A review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States carried out once every four years. It provides the opportunity for states themselves to declare which actions they have taken to fulfill human rights obligations, under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council. 
 (IP3, international SMO, 37.00; IP9, international SMO, 16.00). The developments concerning the peace process, and a potential independent Palestinian state were often mentioned as having an influence on the 
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Lebanese situation, as the competition between different factions influence the possibility to mobilise their constituency (PLO, 1.04.20). 
Antagonists Interviewees portrayed Lebanon as a playground for foreign political influence, meaning that it is not only the national political actors who have a say in the politics of Lebanon, making lobby and protest efforts even more difficult to direct (IP11, expert). During our interviews, the power and influences of Syria was widely acknowledged. Their influence currently includes both their power through the connection to Hizbollah, and direct influence, which most interviewees stated as not lessening even after the 2005 ousting of their military presence (IP22, expert), or even arguing that the Syrian influence in Lebanon has been increasing since 2005, based in their alliances (Lebanese Forces, 36.30). In general Syria is described as supporting different actors, in order to weaken Lebanon and keep its influence (IP38, expert, 1.07.30),”when the Syrians were in Lebanon they did not want anything 
about the Palestinians to be solved… because they wanted this problem to remain, it is 
one of their cards… they can move it this way or that way” (IP34, Lebanese Forces, 35.00). This means that Syria is supporting different factions, thereby having influence on the mobilisation of these parties59, in particular the SSNP60
4.3.1.3. Findings 
. 
Our observations regarding the broad configuration of actors relevant to the issue revealed that many interests must come together in order to reach a consensus, both nationally and internationally. While PLO and the LPDC on paper should play a significant role for the issue, their influence seems limited. LPDC is part of the sectarian political game, and its structure and mandate makes it another political arena for trifle negotiations, while the PLO has no political leverage in Lebanese politics, as they are fighting on with Hamas and other factions over internal 
                                                          
59 This strategy is common, and also used by the Lebanese authorities for playing the Palestinian factions against each other (IP26, expert, 16.30). 60 See appendix C, question 3.2 
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Palestinian legitimacy. UNRWA cannot play a role in pushing for rights, primarily due the limits of their mandate. The EU and USA were identified as having some leverage in pushing for human rights issues through processes like the UPR, while the developments in the relations between the different Palestinian factions were also considered important for the mobilisation potential in Lebanon, but with no political influence in Lebanese politics. Previously the discursive opportunity structure on the issue has changed positively since the exit of Syria in 2005 however the real Syrian influence was not identified as having decreased, thus the ousting of Syria has not created political opportunities. A deeper analysis of the Lebanese political parties which have influence on the policy domain will be analysed in the following.  
4.3.2. The Palestinian issue as a policy domain The following analysis of the policy domain will assess whether the current power structures, alliances and interests of the policy domain actors are conducive for mobilisation as a means to gain rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, by looking into the opinions and possible openings created by changes in alliances. First we will introduce the general opinions of the political parties on granting different rights to Palestinians, and their arguments for curtailing or further these rights, whereupon we will proceed to introduce the strategies used by political parties to further their interests regarding the issue, and the impact these have on the potentials of mobilisation as a means of political influence on the issue. Finally, in the findings section we will identify advocacy coalitions, and whether any actor can be said to possess policy monopoly. Furthermore, we will assess whether external wider power shifts have influenced the policy domain, and whether it can be categorised as high or low profile. In addition, we will analyse the potentials of political actors adopting a bystander perspective on the issue.  While the political parties are the main focus of this section, other actors will also be included in the section on findings, based on the conclusion made in the above section that a consensus among many different players is necessary in order to 
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influence the rights of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This will enable an analysis of how many different actors with a stake in the issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, influence the policy domain.  
4.3.2.1. Desk study findings As described above concerning political cleavages, the root of the Palestinian problem in Lebanon lies in the confessional structure of the Lebanese political system, and the memories of the civil war. What further influences party opinions on the issue is the impact that permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon would have on the demographic balance between Christians and Muslims. This would fall to the disadvantage of the Christian community, as the majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are Sunni Muslims (Haddad 2003, p.29; 45).  While sectarian demographic concerns and civil war cleavages play the most dominant role in party reluctance towards granting rights, the following concerns are also part of the picture: 
•  The negation of the right of return. All sides of the political spectrum have stated that allowing for a resettlement is the same as denying the Palestinians their right of return.  
• Economic issues. Lebanon has a large amount of poor people, does not have any unexploited land, and is traditionally a country of emigration, not immigration. Many politicians use this as an argument why Lebanon is not able to absorb the Palestinians (Haddad 2003, p.45-47). While the granting of other rights does not necessarily imply tawteen61
                                                          
61 Tawteen, (directly translated ‘implantation’), is an Arab term used widely in Lebanon to refer to the permanent settlement, or naturalisation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The prohibition of tawteen forms part of the Ta’if Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war. It will be used throughout this report, as it is commonly referred to both orally and in writing, and because it is not only a technical term, but also implies the feelings associated to it.  
, arguments that link the granting of rights with subsequent desires of the Palestinians to settle permanently in Lebanon seem to follow every political discussion of the issue of 
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rights of Palestinians. Every party stresses their opposition to tawteen, but the way in which they link tawteen to different rights varies, and affects the rights they are positive towards granting to the Palestinians. As it was not possible from our studies to discern the exact positions of the parties on the different rights, we have chosen to exemplify their stand on granting rights to Palestinians in the case of the changes made to the labour law in August 2010. We find that the way the parties responded and interacted in relation to the proposal to reform the labour law provides the most recent, and representative sample of their perspective and corresponding actions towards granting rights to Palestinians. It also provides us with the possibility to outline a representative strategy and opinion of the parties which we did not manage to conduct interviews with.  
The Labour Law reform August 2010 – Party responses and interactions 
The initial proposal for legislative reform, put forward by Walid Jumblatt, the party leader 
of the Druze PSP, proposed to end all restrictions imposed on the Palestinian rights to 
property ownership, employment as well as additional social security benefits (Brynen & 
Shehadi, 2010). According to Paul Salem, “The proposal immediately polarised the 
Lebanese political scene along old civil war lines, with Christian leaders opposing it and 
Muslim leaders favouring it.” (Salem, 2010). The SSNP chose to top up with a proposal 
including more expansive reforms. The March 14 Alliance and the Lebanese Forces jointly 
proposed a reform more limited in its character (CEP, 2010). Though they were part of 
proposing the last reform proposal the Christian parties – the Lebanese Forces, the 
Phalange, and FPM -  soon indulged in intra-sectarian haggling, “each worried that the 
other would gain at their expense by taking a tougher anti-tawteen stance” (Brynen & 
Shehadi, 2010). When it comes to the struggle for the Palestinian right of return, Hizbollah 
has taken a leading revolutionary position. (Common Space Initiative, 2010) Their position 
was less pronounced concerning the law, as they were not voicing strong support for the 
proposal due to considerations of their alliance with the Christian FPM. The Future 
Movement position seemed positive, while internally in the party there were disputes 
regarding the supportive stance towards the proposal (Brynen & Shehadi, 2010). 
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4.3.2.2. Field observations The interviewees confirmed the political party opinions exemplified in the case above, and added further perspectives on the opinions and strategies of the parties. Political parties were in general identified as the most important actor influencing rights for Palestinians by all our interview groups. In particular, the Future Movement and PSP were identified as catalysts of change, but the interviewees were 
While the PSP proposed the reform, this might also have been part of a wider sectarian 
power play, as Paul Salem suggests in his comment that Jumblatt might have just 
intended to break up Christian-Muslim alliances, in order to return to old sectarian 
divisions, where Muslims and Palestinians were united against the Christians (Salem, 
2010). Salem also suggests Syrian influence on the proposal, although as Brynen points 
out, developments on the specific issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon primarily 
reflect internal Lebanese political and sectarian dynamics (Brynen, 2010). 
As a result of this process of several proposals and inter- and intra-sectarian disputes, 
the final reform that was passed in August 2010 was based on the weakest proposition 
by the March 14th Alliance, and only adopted changes to the Labour Law. Palestinians 
were now allowed to work in the same professions as other foreigners, and were 
exempted from the $300 fee they previously had to pay for a work permit, and 
obtained social service benefits from a separate fund (Slemrod, 2011). Brynen & 
Shehadi notes that this outcome can be seen as a result of the tradition of seeking 
compromise on the issue, based on concerns of not wanting to disturb the sectarian 
balance (Brynen & Shehadi, 2010).  Furthermore, as Paul Salem points out,  
“Unfortunately, the sectarian reactions to the proposal indicate 
that Lebanon has not moved beyond the discourse that 
prevailed during the civil war. While the Palestinians urgently 
need these social and economic rights, the matter needs to be 
handled in such a way that it does not ignite another civil war 
in Lebanon.” (Salem, 2010). 
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disinclined to identify one party as more powerful than the other. The parties themselves all refused that one party was more important than the other62
Opinions on rights  
.  
The table below is a presentation of the opinions of the parties on granting different rights to Palestinians, as they were described in our interviews63
 
.  
The general opinion of our interviewees was that PSP, the Future Movement, SSNP, and to some extent Hizbollah, are more positively inclined towards the Palestinians, while all the Christian parties are negatively inclined64. The data above confirms that the opinion of the Christian parties are the most negative, and PSP the most positive. The position of the Future Movement is more unclear, with their answers being almost as negative as those of the Christian parties, but our interviewees identified them as one of the parties most positively inclined for Palestinian rights65
                                                          
62 See appendix C, figure 1, 2, 3 and question 3.1. 63 See appendix C, table 1. 64 See appendix C, table 2. 65 See aappendix C, table 2. 
. Roughly speaking the Shia parties, in particular Hizbollah, were regarded as fairly  positive towards Palestinian rights by our interviewees, albeit criticised for being too weak in their implementation, which interviewees assigned to their alliance 
79 
 
with the Christian FPM. This was illustrated by the amount of interviewees pointing towards Hizbollah’s dual play of acting negatively on rights for Palestinians on the basis of their alliance with Aoun, but speaking positively about their rights (Appendix C, table 2). The only Sunni party, the Future Movement, seems to be fairly pro-Palestinian, but also restrained by their alliance with the Christian parties66
Arguments of the parties 
. The ambiguous perspectives regarding the opinion of the Future Movement can however be seen as an expression of the fact that the issue of Palestinian rights is not a main factor in coalition formations, as was also noted by an interviewee (IP25, expert). In the interviews none of the parties expressed that their opinions had changed, except for the Christian parties’ reconciliation with the Palestinians after the civil war, and their support for socio-economic rights, as opposed to downright warfare (Lebanese Forces, 05.05; 08.00; 11.44). The Future Movement argue that they slowly influenced the opinion of their Christian allies, while the allies themselves argue that there are more agreements across the alliances, based on sectarian interests (NLP, 53.00; Future Movement, 1.02.30).  
Our fieldwork confirmed the use of the arguments suggested by Haddad as the background for wanting to grant rights or not, with some modifications. The arguments used by the parties were as follows in the table below: 
                                                          
66 See appendix C, table 2. 
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 Different arguments were used to advocate for curtailment or granting of different rights, in the following manner: 
• The security argument: The threat for Lebanon from the increased militarisation of the camps, leading to arguments for the right of return, against the right of movement, and for increased socio-economic rights. 
• The international responsibility argument: Increased rights will lead to decreased international responsibility and funding, used to argue against any increased rights for the Palestinians as a constant reminder of the right of return.  
• The demographic argument as seen in Haddad’s perspective above, it is used to argue for the right of return and against the right of property. 
• The economic argument underlines the cost of the Palestinians if granted the right to work.  
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• The human rights argument: uses international conventions to argue for increased rights67What was most significant was that all arguments, except the human rights argument, was based on a fear that the Palestinians would settle permanently in Lebanon, a tendency confirmed in table 4. Even though the questions were specifically focused on rights, the parties used arguments focused on the fear of tawteen. Except some references to general human rights, the only factor which would increase the more negatively inclined parties’ willingness to grant some rights was the potential of increasing security in Lebanon, as a granting of the right to work was perceived as a potential for curtailing the increased militarisation of the camps. 
. 
Strategies of the political parties Despite the more or less positive attitude of the PSP, Hizbollah, and the Future Movement towards granting rights outlined above, all interviewees emphasised that parties use the Palestinians as a bargaining card with the aim of either a) dividing the Palestinians, b) bargaining with the right of return, or c) diverting the attention from other issues (IP26, expert, 16.30; IP11, expert). Most parties are accused from one direction or another of having double speech, and of using the issue as a political bargaining card. In particular the Future Movement and Hizbollah were criticised from all sides for being too politically pragmatic, as they are perceived to be more concerned with appeasing their allies than with improving the rights of the Palestinians, leading to a discrepancy between words and actions. While Hizbollah is positively inclined towards the Palestinians, the FPM have strong interests in not granting rights to Palestinians, due to sectarian concerns of demographic changes as a result of tawteen. Though the issue is of higher priority to FPM, as it threatens their sectarian interests, Hizbollah prioritise their alliance with the Christian FPM 
                                                          
67 See appendix C, table 3. 
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over granting rights to Palestinians (IP29, expert, 59.30; IP3, international SMO, 1.00)68
4.3.2.3. Findings 
.  An example of the issues of high sectarian priorities resulting in conflicts on the issue of the Palestinians can be seen in the case of LPDC. The fact that LPDC is kept under the Sunni Prime Minister’s office was by the Future Movement explained as the best position of it, while PSP wanted to create a separate ministry – a plan which by the Future Movement was presented as PSP’s attempt to gain control of another ministry (Future Movement, 37:30; PSP, 30.00). 
As shown in the analysis of the political opportunity structure, politics in Lebanon are very lively with many political fights, which are most often grounded in the division of sectarian benefits. On the issue of rights for Palestinians, party opinions are also based in the sectarian interests, producing a deadlock in the actors’ positions, as their incentives for maintaining the status quo are higher than the perceived costs. The main perceived costs of the politicians are a) disturbing the sectarian balance b) demographic changes and its implementations for the sectarian balance, c) granting rights to the Palestinians will lead to tawteen. The only real perceived incentive is the hope for a better security situation. The policy domain is thus characterised by a lot of lip service being paid to the issue, as well as minor legislative changes, that do not seem to improving the situation on the ground.  Advocacy coalitions concerning the issue of Palestinian rights seem to be crossing the coalitions to a large extent, which is especially true for Christian parties, who perceive the issue as the more important for their sectarian interests than the other parties. Through the Christians prioritizing the issue, it results in the bystander perspective being adopted by other parties, as they are afraid that action on the 
                                                          
68 Some interviewees also noted that the coalition with FPM was quite comfortable for Hizbollah, as they saw granting rights to Palestinians as undermining the legitimacy of Hizbollah as a staunch supporter for the right of return, as a part of the fight against Israel – a factor on which a lot of their popular support is based (IP38, expert, 58.00; Lebanese Forces, 30.30). 
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issue would upset the sectarian balance, thus valuing stability over granting rights for Palestinians. While one would assume that the positive stance of PSP and Hizbollah towards the Palestinians united in one coalition would produce results, as a result of FPM being part of the coalition, and their sectarian based high priority to the issue, the shift does not seem to have changed advocacy coalitions on the issue.  Based on the above, opinions on Palestinian rights are not the decisive factor for forming coalitions, and this creates internal struggles in the alliances due to diverging opinions. The strong Christian opinions on the issue, based in its demographic implications, have significant impacts on possibilities of influence on the issue. Christian parties are present in both of the two dominant coalitions and this makes intra-coalition on the issue difficult when the issue is one of such high priority for Christian interests. Due to the cross-sectarian alliances it can be concluded that no party is allowed to gain the policy monopoly inside either of the alliances. Sectarian interests thus control the issue, and transform it into a bargaining card in sectarian attempts to optimise their own influence in every possible aspect of Lebanese politics. Furthermore, the issue is so rooted in the political cleavage structures from the civil war that it affects the opinions of all sectarian groups in ways that are difficult to change, as long as the system remains such that the political game enables sectarian interest optimisation above all.  The only change in the political opportunity structure that has been facilitative for the issue, the LPDC, has itself become a part of this sectarian infighting, as it remains part of the Sunni Prime Minister’s office, while the Druze PSP try to make it into a ministry, as they see that as a possibility for them to gain control of another ministry. The way the parties themselves described this process of continuous sectarian battles over high-ranking governmental posts underline the way in which the lack of trust between sectarian groups still persist, as each of the interviewed parties seemed to have its own explanations, concerns and conspiracies regarding the way other parties sought to optimise own interests. 
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4.3.3. Sub-conclusion configuration of actors The policy domain of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon is strongly influenced by sectarian interests and how they cut across coalitions. This characteristic of advocacy coalitions results in bystander perspectives by the non-Christian parties. The wider power shift that occurred with the exit of Syria in 2005 has not produced significant changes in the policy domain for political opportunity, but has merely produced a show case institution with little implementing power and political leverage that itself is entangled in sectarian rivalry. Likewise, the coalition shift that allied PSP and Hizbollah did not produce any changes in advocacy coalitions within the policy domain creating a political opportunity, due to their alliance with FPM. The combination of cross sectarian alliances between parties on the one hand, and sectarian based sturdily consolidated opinions on the rights of the Palestinians on the other implies that there is no party or advocacy coalition is hold the policy monopoly. While the international community played a part in successfully getting the labour law passed, as a result of the UPR, they are however also too tangled up in internal Lebanese politics to have a substantial influence. It results in a stable status quo on the issue, and with neither LPDC nor PLO having a role to play, and internal actors having too many vested interests in the internal Lebanese power plays and protecting their sectarian interests, the prospect for a change of the status of the policy domain is not very positive.   Answering the research question of the configuration of actors’ influence on using mobilisation as a method on the policy domain, the variables mainly influence the possibility of identifying openings that can be targeted for creating political influence through mobilisation. The policy domain does not sport windows of opportunity, since the sectarian interests are stable across the changing alliances. In addition, the lack of policy monopoly results in the inability of political actors to acting on Palestinian rights, since no alliance has political leverage to push reforms through, and the Palestinian issue becomes a bargaining card. 
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4.4. Organisational analysis of SMOs The following will shed light on the role of SMOs concerning mobilisation as a method of gaining rights for Palestinians, through the variables concerning societal beliefs and reactive mobilisation, mobilisation strategies, resources, and framing strategies. The analysis will seek to answer the following research question:  
RQ.1.3. To what extent do the theoretical variables of the organisational level 
influence the potentials of mobilisation as a method to gain rights for 
Palestinians in Lebanon? Due to the third level of analysis containing a larger number of variables than the preceding levels of analysis, the course of the analysis will be briefly presented here in order to outline the purpose of each section. The section will begin with an analysis of the societal beliefs concerning the policy domain, since they are the background for the assessment of incentives for participation. This is followed by a brief presentation of mobilisation attempts by SMOs in order to understand the interaction context and establish whether mobilisation has taken place. Secondly, the mobilisation strategies of the SMOs will be analysed, followed by an analysis of the resources available, and the SMO use of them, in order to make an assessment of their influence on SMO mobilisation potentials as a means of gaining rights for the Palestinians. Finally the framing strategies of the SMOs are analysed, whereupon we will attempt to assess the immediate results of the strategies. It should be noted that the amount of material obtained through desk studies is limited, why the following is primarily based on the data collected during the field studies. 
4.4.1. Societal beliefs In the following section, the societal beliefs of Palestinians and Lebanese will be introduced to provide an understanding of the dominant beliefs present in society concerning the issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, and their implications for the incentives for participation in mobilisation. The societal beliefs are important in 
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order to assess whether the SMOs have chosen the appropriate strategies and frames for mobilising their targeted groups. The findings concern the beliefs relevant for the policy domain, and are collected for both Palestinians and Lebanese. The presentation of beliefs is structured by Snow et al.’s division of beliefs into five categories: 1) beliefs about the seriousness of the issue in question, 2) beliefs about the locus of causality or blame, 3) beliefs about the probability of change of the efficacy of collective action, 4) beliefs about the necessity and propriety of ‘standing up’.  
4.4.1.1. Desk study observations In 2003 Haddad investigated the opinions of Lebanese individuals on the issue of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon according to sect. Below is a summary of the opinions on deportation of the Palestinians and the granting of civil rights, if the refugees could not be ousted.  
 
 Clearly the Christian population is the least positive towards the Palestinians, whereas the Sunni and Druze population groups are more positive. Compared to the staunch resistance from the political actors pointed out in the policy domain analysis, there is a surprisingly positive attitude among all sectarian population groups for granting civil rights. Few are positive towards granting citizenship (3-15 per cent), but on the other hand there is not a majority who are against granting any 
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rights (9-34 per cent) (Haddad, 2003, p.  100). On top of this, a recent study by Dalia Mikdashi69
For the Palestinians in Lebanon, the right of return seems to come before everything else. Palestinian participants from the Civitas project
 suggests that the younger generation is more receptive to granting civil rights, though internal Lebanese problems are perceived as more important (Mikdashi, 2011, p. 6). The above does not indicate that the Lebanese do not link rights with potential tawteen as the politicians state, but we have no data available on this belief among the population. 
70
4.4.1.2. Field observations 
 expressed concern with the current situation regarding rights, and saw a strengthening of these rights as an empowerment of their ability to return to their homeland (Nabulsi, 2006, pp. 14-15). However, as it was expressed by one of the participating camp residents: “the 
most pressing need for us is the Right of Return” (Nabulsi, 2006, p. 208). 
Our interviewees confirmed the notion that the perceptions on Palestinians among the Lebanese community is characterised by stereotypes. The Lebanese people have little contact with the Palestinians in everyday life, resulting in a lack of de-confirmation of the stereotypical perceptions from the civil war, in which Palestinians are still portrayed as the instigators that made all Lebanese fight one another, a view particular dominant for the Christians, and to some extent for the Shia (LPDC, 28.30; NLP,47.00).  In respect to the beliefs relevant for the granting of rights to the Palestinians, the following section reveals the remarks. 
                                                          
69 Dalia Mikdashi is a research assistant with the unit on Policy and Governance in Palestinian Refugee Camps, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut.  70 The Civitas research project was a civic needs assessment carried out at the initiative of Nuffield University College, University of Oxford, among Palestinian refugees in exile during 2004 and 2005. It consisted of a series of public meetings investigating the opinions of the diaspora Palestinians.  
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Seriousness of issue Even though Haddad showed that a majority of the Lebanese are for granting some rights, internal Lebanese issues appear to be of higher priority. As one interviewee explained it people are generally not interested, and “normal people they think we 
have enough troubles eh? Lebanese don’t have socio-economic rights. Why would I go 
advocate for the Palestinian rights” (IP38, expert, 51.30). Even among the Palestinians themselves, it seems that the issue of their rights in Lebanon is not perceived as top priority, as the community’s support is much larger when it comes to the right of return. Unanimous support for the right of return was stated by all interviewees, and expressed by the large turn-out to the demonstration on 15th May 2011 (IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 1.00, IP9, international SMO 4.30). The seriousness of the issue is influenced by the different rights having different antagonists and protagonists, why certain - often sectarian - groups perceive some rights as more serious than others. The right to work is opposed by Lebanese population groups that are afraid of the Palestinians pushing them out of the labour market (IP24, expert, 8.45)  while the right to property is opposed by the Shias, as the majority of the camps are in South Lebanon, where the majority of the Shias live (IP29, expert, 1.01.00) . As for the Palestinians, there are different supporters of different rights: “Everyone, children, old people, everyone asks for [the right of return], 
not only the workers, as for the right to work” (IP20, Palestinian SMO, 14.40). 
Locus of blame The locus of blame can refer both to the responsibility of the creation and the solution to a problem. As outlined in the configuration of actors, several of the Lebanese parties use the international responsibility argument, arguing that the international society created the problem of the Palestinian refugees with the creation of Israel, why it must also be their task to solve it. Among our interviewees, and in the AUB study, it is clear that the perception of responsibility for granting the rights is with the Lebanese government, based on this being under their legal jurisdiction (IP10, expert; IP4, Palestinian SMO, 17.00)(Mikdashi, 2011, p. 8). From 
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the Palestinian perspective it is also linked to the PLO, which is generally perceived as incompetent and incapable of influencing the Lebanese, which has an impact on the understanding of the probability of change, affecting the incentives to participate PLO (IP6, international SMO, 2.04.20; IP26, expert 30.30; IP4, Palestinian SMO, 17.00, IP29, expert, 31.00).  
Probability of change Overall, the interviewees expressed a unanimously negative perception of the potential for change, both for rights of the Palestinians and other cases of mobilisation relating to anti-sectarianism or the right of return. One interviewee expresses: “even if the Lebanese, if like half a million went to the streets, I don’t think 
the politicians would do something… [they will say] we give you a this law, be happy 
with it, you did something, and just shut up for ten years” (IP1771
                                                          
71 IP17 talked both on behalf of an international SMO, that she had previously worked for, describing their strategies in detail, and a Palestinian SMO that she was currently active in. For this reason the she is either referred to as Palestinian SMO or international SMO depending on the relevance of her statements. 
, Palestinian SMO, 39.15). Most people seem to believe that there will be some piecemeal change on rights that is not too controversial, for example the law for the right to work, however there is little belief that the more controversial issues will be changed, or that mobilisation works (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 38.30; IP9, international SMO, 29.30). The Independence Intifada in 2005 drew many people to the streets through the momentum after the assassination of Hariri (Future Movement, 53.00), but there is an emergence of understanding that it only had a symbolic effect, with Syria still effectively influencing Lebanon. The people’s perception of potential change has decreased, as the Independence Intifada was proclaimed successful when it happened, but turned into a disappointment (IP22, expert). The interviewees’ viewpoint on why change is difficult to achieve was often a blame directed at the political and sectarian structure. The structure was considered as being too static to create change, as an interviewee states “we make strong campaigns but we’re not 
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able to make a change because there are systemic problems” (IP9, international SMO, 27.30). 
Necessity and propriety of standing up As discussed, several interviewees expressed a lack of belief in mobilisation actions making a difference, however they believed that it was not possible to stop doing anything about it, due to a personal need that one was at least trying to change the current situation (IP23, expert, 29.00; IP29, expert, 19.00; IP15, Lebanese SMO). The participants in the anti-sectarian demonstration expressed the same need to do something, as they were not able to accept the status quo, even though they did not believe that the current structure was likely to change in the near future. 
4.4.1.3. Findings The Lebanese in general would prefer the Palestinians to return to their homeland, but since this is not possible they are inclined to grant them rights, in comparison to the voice of the sectarian leaders. In respect to the societal beliefs related to the policy domain, it is difficult to mobilise both the Lebanese and the Palestinians as they perceive other issues as more serious. There are different pro- and antagonists for each of the rights, making it difficult to engage in one strategy for all rights, and easier to create gradual campaigns for each of the rights. Despite the belief that only the Lebanese government has the ability to change the issue, the government attempts to renounce the responsibility as they blame the UN for creating this problem. This reduces the probability of change, which is supplemented by the Lebanese system in general by creating a slow change, as illustrated in the analysis of the political system, a notion confirmed by the interviewees. Despite the perception of possible change being low, because the system is strong and difficult to change the interviewees still participate in activities such as mobilisations, as they feel a need to express their dissatisfaction. In order to be successful in their mobilisation strategies, the SMOs thus need to take the above into account when attempting to mobilise, and in the choices of the political actors they choose to target.  
91 
 
4.4.2. Reactive mobilisation In connection to societal beliefs, the concept of reactive mobilisation and its impact on the potential of mobilisation to gain rights becomes relevant. Groups with differing goals can mobilise against the issue of rights for Palestinians or even mobilise the same target group, but for a different cause, and the predominant societal beliefs will still have an impact on their possibilities for mobilisation. 
4.4.2.1. Field observations There does not appear to be counter mobilisation occurring on the issue of rights for the Palestinians for the right of return or the anti-sectarian movement (IP38, expert, 30.30). However, there are constant competitive mobilisations taking place from different parties and SMOs for similar causes and different causes. The greatest issue concerning the competitive mobilisation is that Palestinians are greatly mobilised for the right of return, which may decrease their potential mobilisation for rights in Lebanon (IP12a, Palestinian SMO, 1.02.00). The other issue is that it is the same people that go to the same demonstrations the Future Movement, for ideological reasons, the left parties – SSNP, the Communists, the Green Party, and the leftist and secular civil society (IP38, expert, 54.00). 
4.4.2.2. Findings The lack of counter mobilisation may be due to the civil war representing a large and violent mobilisation against the Palestinian presence in general, internalising this opinion in the sectarian differences and making it unnecessary to demonstrate in the current political situation. This proves that mobilisation in Lebanon is a political arena like all others, with the aim of maintaining power, protecting and securing benefits for one’s own sect. When the same group of engaged activists are mobilised for different causes such as women’s rights, civil code, anti-sectarianism, and the Palestinian rights, the mobilisation potential for each cause is eroded. 
4.4.3. Mobilisation strategies The following is an analysis of the mobilisation strategies of the SMOs with remarks on their apparent effects. This includes an analysis of the incentives and costs for 
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participation, which need to be considered when devising the strategies. An analysis of the channels used for mobilising will also be discussed, in order to study the achievements of the SMOs, and how the theoretical variables can be used to explain the implications of these actions on the potential of mobilisation. The variable of mobilisation strategies consist of three steps: consensus mobilisation, and action mobilisation through the creation of networks, and arousal of motivation.  Firstly, broad field observations on the overall level of mobilisation are introduced as the background for the three steps of Klandermans' mobilisation variable, why it is included in the findings under each step. 
4.4.3.1. Background: mobilisation as a strategy In order to assess the efficiency of SMO mobilisation strategies, it is necessary to begin with establishing the extent mobilisation is used as a method by the researched SMOs. The following section will present cases in which SMOs have attempted to mobilise to see how the variables influence the cases of mobilisation.  
Field observations According to our analysis of the collected data, mobilisation was only one among other activities of all SMOs. The interviewed SMOs referred to a wide range of methods for obtaining their goals, the two dominant categories being 1) advocacy and lobbying through studies focusing on legal or economic arguments, aimed at convincing politicians, and 2) consensus mobilising strategies such as awareness and dialogue efforts through workshops and dialogue sessions. Only three of the interviewed organisations spoke of action mobilisation directly as part of their strategy with eight SMOs seeing mobilisation as an efficient means of gaining influence (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 16.00; IP6, international SMO, 39.00; IP17, international SMO, 55.00)72
                                                          
72 See also appendix C, figure 6. 
. Regarding action mobilisation as a means to attract new participants into their SMO, only one SMO spoke of concrete strategic activities for getting new people to join (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 55.00).  
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Only two concrete consensus mobilisation attempts were mentioned by the SMOs73
4.4.3.2. Step 1: formation of mobilisation potentials, consensus mobilisation. 
 which involved: the Civil Rights March arranged in July 2010, described in the text box on p.96, and a sit-in for the right to work in April 2011. The civil rights demonstration was successful in the sense that it managed to mobilise around 8,000-11,000 people. The sit in was a small event, which attracted approximately 4,000 people to do a sit-in, to press for reforms on the right to work (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 16.00). According to the interviewees the sit-in was not considered as being politically influential, although some interviewees thought that the civil rights demonstration played a role in pushing the law on the right to work, along with other factors such as the upcoming UPR and the pressure of PSP (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 1.04.00; IP6, international SMO, 59.30). In sum, the level of consensus and action mobilisation activities is not high, and while the organisations use mobilisation activities to some extent, they prefer the production of research and lobbying of MPs. 
Field observations  As outlined above there are very few consensus mobilising activities, with most common actions being dialogue activities or information campaigns aimed at changing opinions of people. All organisations acknowledged the need to mobilise both Lebanese and Palestinians across sectarian and factional divides, with several conducting dialogue sessions (LPDC, 30.00; IP1, Lebanese SMO, 10.30). The interviewees expressed a belief in consensus mobilising activities, as the aim of changing peoples’ opinions from other sects, gaining the support of 7 SMOs out of 15 and 6 experts out of 1274
                                                          
73 See appendix A for a description of all interviewed SMOs. 74 See appendix C, figure 5 and 6.  
. An independent researcher investigating the effect of the dialogue projects concludes that the effect is small compared to the funding required for carrying these projects through though, and that there is a lack of continuation, which is confirmed by other experts (IP10, expert; IP38, expert, 
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40.20). An example of a creative attempt to consensus mobilisation through new networks was the attempt by one SMO to call the sectarian TV channels’ live shows, voicing their opinion quickly, until they were cut off (IP21, Lebanese SMO, 41.00). Although some consensus mobilisation is conducted, the majority of SMOs mainly mobilised their own constituency (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 1.02.30; IP9, international SMO, 57.50). 
Findings In general the methods applied by the organisations are highly traditional, with very few examples of those other than dialogue projects. It has been revealed that the consensus mobilising activities taking place are not continuous, and have little effect on the perceptions of Lebanese and Palestinians on the issue of Palestinian civil rights. However there is an awareness of the need for perception change, especially in relation to the Christian community. The biggest problem for consensus mobilisation seems to be that the SMOs do not have access to networks which they are not connected to already, which is in particular true for sectarian networks. Therefore, the SMOs face many difficulties in attempting to spread their message beyond their own circles. For the Palestinian target groups, the divided societal structure based on party affiliation makes it difficult for consensus mobilisation to take place outside the channels of the parties, thus the factions somehow play the same role for the Palestinians as the Lebanese sects play for the Lebanese.  
4.4.3.3. Step 2: Create and access recruitment networks, action mobilisation 
Field observations Mobilisation primarily takes place through political parties and CSOs, and youth divisions of supportive Lebanese political parties, such as the Communist party, which has been used as a base of mobilisation (IP5, expert, 58.30). Concretely, for mobilisation and recruitment for campaigns and demonstrations the organisations utilise a mixture of modern and traditional channels, such as e-mails, flyers, social media, religious networks, and personal contacts (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 32.00; IP3, international SMO 43.00; IP20, Palestinian SMO, 9.45). During the Civil Rights March 
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in 2010, there was an attempt to mobilise broadly across Palestinian factional divides, through all available mobilisation channels. Due to political problems with one of the organisers being affiliated with Israeli academics, all Hamas affiliated organisations withdrew from the march (IP6, international SMO, 1.35.00). Only one organisation mentioned a concrete mobilisation strategy for trying to mobilise the Lebanese for joining the Palestinian rights march, which failed because of the ineffective use of available human resources75
Findings 
.  
The main problem for action mobilisation for SMOs is the lack of access to new networks. As outlined above, this hurdle hinders both action and consensus mobilisation. In addition to the problem of accessing networks, the internal strife between different interest groups is taken into mobilisation efforts, which are also affected by external power shifts. It appears that when organisations attempt to mobilise across factional divides, society remains so polarised that mobilisation of one group for an event results in the non-attendance of other groups.  Among the Palestinians, mobilisation primarily takes place through already existing networks of parties and CSOs, and people and organisations primarily succeed in mobilising members of their own group. Attempts to reach new target groups through the media is minimal, as will be outlined in the framing strategies, although the few attempts taken place, have only succeeded in spreading the message to existing protagonists. The participants mobilising and mobilised on civil rights for Palestinians are thus part of the same societal group. As these participants have no connection to other societal groups or knowledge of their incentives, it becomes difficult for them to consensus mobilise other parts of society. As the framing analysis will outline, social media does play an increasingly important role for the smaller grassroots organisations in mobilising, but the larger organisations’ outreach is limited to personal contacts and organisation employees and family.   
                                                          
75 See a case on inappropriate use of resources p.98. 
96 
 
4.4.3.4. Step 3: Arouse motivation to participate and decrease costs  In order to initiate the motivation to participate, it is necessary to understand the dynamics behind the incentives for participation, which are strongly rooted in the societal beliefs concerning the policy domain. Therefore the field observations in this paragraph concerning motivation are in addition to the societal beliefs analysis.  
Field observations The strong belief in the cause of Palestinian rights cannot be separated from the debate on the strategy concerning the link between rights in Lebanon and the right of return. In the figure below a strong debate is reflected between the SMOs concerning whether the right of return should be their sole goal, or if it should be linked with the rights in Lebanon. The answer ‘right to return is above all’ is stated when the SMOs do not want to link the right of return with the rights in Lebanon, and mainly prefer to work on the right of return. The equal amount of confirmatory answers, for example some respondents have given both answers, highlights the disagreement among the SMOs. As a result, there is no unanimously strong support for the rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, not even among the SMOs working with it. In respect to the support from the Lebanese on the issue, the study of Haddad emphasised that there is some level of support from the Lebanese across sects. 
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Incentives for participation – the civil rights 
march June 2010. 
The incentives and costs of participation, and their 
influence on mobilisation success are illustrated in the 
example of the Civil Rights March that took place in July 
2010. With the aim of increasing awareness and pushing 
the government to take action on civil rights for 
Palestinians a coalition of CSOs and activists organised the 
march for four months, resulting in the cooperation of 30 
associations and 8,000-11,000 participants (IP17, 
international SMO, 40.30, IP18, Palestinian SMO, 15.00). 
The result was unclear, as organisers stated that they 
thought it affected the adopting of changes to the labour 
law, along with other factors (IP6, international SMO, 
59.30). Interviewees criticised the march for being a “the 
last Palestinian march, it was a NGO festival” (IP13, 
Lebanese SMO, 32.00), or a picnic where people 
participated only out of duty towards a political party or 
workplace, not because of personal incentives (IP37, 
expert). The youth that did participate out of belief in the 
propriety of the march were disappointed, as they did not 
see any results after the march, and were not willing to 
participate again (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 9.00; IP6, 
international SMO, 1.07.50). In addition, the costs of 
participating in further demonstrations were perceived as 
too high, in comparison with expected outcomes. Youth 
were not willing to participate when there is a risk of being 
arrested, because they would miss their exams (IP18, 
Palestinian SMO, 34.00). Thus they valued the educational 
opportunities they already have, and the participation in 
Lebanese society, higher than participation in a 
demonstration, indicating a low perceived necessity for 
standing up. 
 
The analysis of societal beliefs indicates that the interviewees did not believe that sectarian and political structures were likely to change. In the analysis of the configuration of actors, the sectarian interests were shown to dominate the incentives for political parties to act within the policy domain, but that these are not conducive for the actors to act in favour of Palestinian rights. There are no interviewees expressing an understanding of the political parties as being likely to act in favour of the Palestinians, i.e. to yield to their pressure.  In respect to the use of groups of friends for mobilisation, mobilisation only takes place within sectarian and factional groups. In the above analysis of channels of mobilisation, as confirmed in our discussions with people participating in events and demonstrations, SMOs mainly mobilise within groups which are alike – indicating that SMOs actively use the variable of increasing mobilisation by using a group of likeminded to push others in the same group to mobilise as well (IP13, Palestinian SMO 3.45; IP38, expert, 54.00) 
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The cost of participation, expressed by the interviewees, was the possible reprisal from the security forces, although this was dependent on the sensitivity of the subject, reflecting that the level of costs depends on the issue at stake (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 17.00). For the Lebanese the cost is related to the interests of their sect. For example the Shia have less interest in granting the Palestinians the right to property since there is a concentration of Palestinian refugees in the Shia dominated South (IP11, expert). 
Findings The level of beliefs in the cause is related to the perceived seriousness of the issue. For the Palestinians, the perceived seriousness of the issue is a balance between the perception of not having access to basic rights, and the weighting of the necessity of the issue of rights in Lebanon against the right of return. As illustrated in the Civil Rights March case76
There is however one factor which is perceived to have a direct influence on the Lebanese - the security issue of the camps. ‘The Palestinian time bomb’, is often referred to in the public debate, though none of the SMOs interviewed mentioned it as included in their analysis of their target groups’ incentives. It refers to the increased presence of militant factions in the camps, who according to the politicians need to be targeted with Palestinian socio-economic rights among other 
 the interviewees prioritised exams over participation. There is a constant act of balancing the effects their participation will have on the cause, and the possible costs of participation for the rights already obtained. In addition to this, the free rider concept makes it easier for the Palestinians not to participate, as they will gain from the work of others without participating.  For the Lebanese, the level of belief in the cause is affected by their perception of the seriousness of the issue, of their opinions of the Palestinians, and by them not being affected directly by a change in the laws.  
                                                          
76 See text box p.96 
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Mobilising Lebanese for the Civil Rights 
March – ineffective use of human resources 
In the concrete mobilisation efforts described for the 
civil rights march in July 2010, the initial strategy of 
main organisers was to hire two consultants to 
mobilise respectively Lebanese and Palestinians. The 
consultant hired for mobilising the Lebanese was a 
young female Lebanese student with Palestinian 
roots. The strategy was for her to approach the 
Lebanese political parties, gain their support, and try 
to get them to mobilise their electoral base for the 
march. As young and unknown by the politicians, the 
consultant lacked legitimacy and leverage (IP38, 
expert, 1.00), which resulted in very little 
mobilisation of Lebanese for the civil rights march as 
“they love to give nice words... but not really do 
anything” (IP6, international SMO, 1.55.10).   
means. In respect to the costs of participation for the Lebanese, the sectarian system has wide implications for mobilisation efforts, as individuals will only agree to participate, if their loyalty to their sect will not be affected. This is related to the different interest of the sects in play concerning the different rights.  For the Palestinians, one of the main perceived costs of participation is the potential repression from the state since organisations are not able to secure that participants in demonstrations will not be imprisoned.  In addition to this, the key to security in mobilisation is the attendance of a large number of participants, to lessen the risk of the authorities’ willingness to take actions against the crowd. Here the problem of not being able to increase mobilisation is cyclical. A lack of people attending the demonstration increases the chance of violent repercussions. Additionally, the analysis of the discursive opportunity structure showed that work on some rights is not sanctioned by the authorities, possibly decreasing activities on rights that the authorities are repressing. In relation to the use of groups of friends to increase social incentives for participation, this is a function performed primarily through sectarian networks, in particular the parties, or through the CSOs. 
4.4.4. The resource mobilisation perspective In order to understand the dynamics and factors behind the low level of mobilisation and the lack of political influence identified in the mobilisation chapter, the capabilities of the SMOs in terms of their use of resources and strategies will be analysed. The resource perspective assumes that increased resources have a 
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positive influence on the potential for mobilisation and its success. In the following, the resources will be analysed according to the categorisation suggested by Edwards & McCarthy, being: human, cultural, socio-organisational, moral, and financial resources. Since there is very little information available from our studies undertaken on these variables, the desk study observations will be included in the field observations when applicable. 
4.4.4.1. Field observations 
Human, cultural and socio-organisational resources The majority of the interviewed SMOs are organised like traditional CSOs wherein the majority of active people being are paid staff and a small percentage are volunteers, resulting in a democratic deficit between the grassroots support of the movement and their professional administration (Suleiman, 1997, pp. 408-409). As a result of interviews conducted with experts and organisational actors, it appears that the organisations lack the sufficient resources in particular human and socio-organisational resources for mobilisation. According to one interviewee from a UN funded civil society initiative there is not enough mobilisation, they lack communication skills, outreach, and human resources (IP38, expert, 43.30). This is supported by the study of Jaber Suleiman, a Palestinian human rights lawyer and academic, to conclude that the Palestinian CSOs lack basic administrative, human and socio-organisational resources (Suleiman, 1997, p. 409). A relevant factor on the cooperation amongst SMOs is that almost all organisations working with Palestinian rights are Palestinian organisations. Some interviewees argue that this is due to a gentlemen’s agreement on the division of work - Lebanese work with Lebanese problems, and Palestinians with Palestinian problems (IP9, international SMO, 2.00). Other interviewees argue that Lebanese organisations were active concerning the Palestinian rights under umbrella themes, like general human rights, or that they are afraid of upsetting their constituency by working with Palestinian issues (IP27, expert, 10.10). The split between Lebanese and Palestinian SMOs was remarked: “they lack proper cooperation and coordination with Lebanese 
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counterparts, because it is even more relevant and more productive if you have a 
Lebanese counterpart” (IP38, expert, 43.00). An expert argued that if Lebanese SMOs were active and involved in mobilising for Palestinian rights, they may be able to mobilise differently though, as the message would be differently understood if it came from them (IP27, expert, 10.10), as cooperation is necessary from the notion that “you are weak, and you are weak, so you put together to overcome your 
weakness.” (IP26, expert, 21.40).  As for cooperation and coordination between the SMOs level of activeness on the issue of Palestinian rights, the general perception among interviewees was critical towards it. An interviewed expert confirmed Jaber Suleiman’s critique that coordination and cooperation among SMOs remain limited, with little information sharing or joint projects (Suleiman, 1997, p.408; IP10, expert). A forum for coordination among Palestinian organisations working on Palestinian issues in Lebanon was set up in 1994, with leading representatives from all active organisations, but only the presidents of the forum mention it as relevant in matters of coordination (IP6, international SMO, 1.20.00; IP7, Palestinian SMO, 25.00). Concerning the cooperation between the Palestinian SMOs, the factional power fights have an influence, since many organisations have links to a political faction. For example several Hamas related factions withdrew from the civil rights march. According to one of the main organisers behind the march “now hopefully it will 
change, but during the division time we always had this problem [that organisations withdraw due to factional strifes] … the main reason was the division [between Hamas and Fatah]” (IP6, international SMO, 1.35.00), thus pointing out the possibilities for cross-factional mobilisation within the Palestinian community (IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 10.45). A factor in the missing cooperation among SMOs, mentioned by the interviewees, is that foreign aid leads to increasing competition among SMOs. As one IP, himself a member of a ‘donor darling’ SMO, pragmatically noted: “regarding the programmes that are funded from here and there, and each 
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NGO has its own program … and they want to promote themselves” (IP4, Palestinian organisation, 57.25). 
Financial resources The majority of the SMOs are funded by international donors, which, according to an article by Suleiman, is a needs based choice: '”Palestinian CSOs' receive no aid from 
the Lebanese Government, and 20 per cent or less of their funding from local resources. 
They are thus heavily dependent on foreign sources” (Suleiman, 1997, p. 401). Interviewees expressed that the vast amount of foreign donor funding creates an increasingly professionalised CSO sector (IP29, expert, 17.00). For instance, there are currently large amounts of funding streaming into rights based advocacy CSOs (IP10, expert), possibly explaining why the number of SMOs working on the issue of rights for Palestinians seems to be increasing (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 37.50). It was also stated that CSOs follow the donor fashions in project designs, currently being the ‘social media fashion’, where it was previously the ‘demonstration fashion’ (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 18.45). 
Moral resources In respect to the discussion on legitimacy, a gap was identified between the more formalised SMOs – the CSOs - and the activists, who were organised more loosely. In general the activists criticised the CSOs for their lack of roots and connections to the communities, for only reaching their own communities, and for being restricted by donors and affiliations to parties. According to interviewees, Palestinian SMOs are often affiliated to a political party (IP9, international SMO, 15.00) There are a few independent organisations with internal funding. The independent organisations argue that it is necessary to be independent in order to determine goals on the grassroots level, and to attract people who are not affiliated with a party (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 24.00; IP12a, Palestinian SMO, 1.17.00). One of the smaller, independent grassroots organisations criticised the CSOs, stating that “NGOs, the 
real big mistake, they don’t sit with the people, they don’t talk with people. They don’t 
really know what people want.” (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 52.50). According to an 
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activist the legitimacy of the SMOs is limited as: “the people who are with them, they 
say that they are doing good… because they only help the people who are with them” (IP20, Palestinian SMO, 24.30), which results in them only having legitimacy among their own constituency (IP20, Palestinian SMO, 25.00). Another interviewee linked the party affiliation to a restriction of the SMO’s room of manoeuvre, limiting the possibility of attracting people: “they have to pay [for being political]” (IP9, international SMO, 57.50). Apparently, in order to mobilise broadly, it was necessary to have a neutral man mobilising in the camps – a man not affiliated to any party, not employed on piecework, who is able to convince the people who are not affiliated to a party to participate (IP20, Palestinian SMO 28.20). According to interviewees living in the camps, many Palestinians in the camps perceive organisations as being controlled by their source of funding – whether party or donor - and thus illegitimate for advocating for the rights of the Palestinians, as they will follow the money and not the needs of the community77 (IP4, Palestinian SMO, 24.00). Concerning the possession of moral resources, the Norwegian People’s Aid was mentioned, as their long term presence in Lebanon is; a visible commitment making them respected among the Palestinians, their staff being Palestinian, including their charismatic leader; and enabling them to be perceived as almost Palestinian while still maintaining their relative neutrality as an international organisation (IP17, international SMO, 1.01.00)78
4.4.4.2. Findings 
. 
Material, moral and cultural resources – external resource dependency Financial resources predominantly stem from political patrons or foreign aid, making the SMOs dependent on political or donor demands regarding activities and focus areas. The party connection that many SMOs have, further limits their 
                                                          
77 Some funding sources were considered more illegitimate than others. For instance, one interviewee mentioned USAID and British Council as completely undermining the legitimacy of the SMOs receiving it, due to a perception of the SMOs becoming the funding agencies’ puppets (IP17, Palestinian SMO, 1.02.00). 78 See appendix C, question 1. 
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manoeuvring space and outreach potentials, due to the strong significance that party affiliation has for social relations in the camps, limiting their cultural resources to be appropriate only for their primary constituency. In a mobilisation potential perspective, the donor dependency has several implications. Firstly, the issues that the donor funded SMOs are dealing with are not necessarily responding to the wishes of the population, but to the ones of the donors. This is also valid for the choice of strategies, in donor dependency potentially leading the activities of the professionalised SMOs to follow the ‘trends’ of the donor community, thereby shifting the incentives behind strategies from ideological beliefs to funding considerations. This is problematic for the legitimacy and mobilisation potential of the organisations, as it will be difficult to mobilise for something which the population does not perceive as necessary to stand up for – as seems to be the case with Palestinian rights as opposed to the right of return.  Secondly, the incentives of the mobilising actors of the donor funded SMOs are not necessarily based on personal beliefs in the necessity and propriety of mobilisation on a particular issue, but on the salary that they will receive. As staff salaries are most likely not dependent on how many people they mobilise, efforts may be affected by this. The problem for the smaller grassroots SMOs, which may have a better connection to the population, is a lack of funding based on their choice of being independent. Secondly, even though they may enjoy support with the population, they are not able to mobilise broadly and are attempted influenced by factions when they become too big. Finally, the creation of a professionalised civil society with little grassroots activity creates another elite structure, and civil society’s potential role as an outlet for voluntary and grassroots activity, including the potentials for creating social movements based on popular grievances, is moved one step further away from political influence, as political elites grab hold of the money and the influence. 
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Lack of socio-organisational resources The socio-organisational resources, or the coordination and cooperation among the different SMOs, are limited. An example is the forum for coordination, which does not seem to have any real effect. Most coordination happens informally, while it appears that the forum merely serves as a ‘figureheads on display structure’ - a symptomatic feature of the SMO structure in general, with little connection between top and grassroots levels of the organisation. The missing links both horizontally and vertically within and between organisations make it difficult to initiate mobilisation processes, as it appears that the majority of SMOs have clear top down structures, with volunteers having little decision making power. Furthermore, the SMOs are only able to mobilise their own constituencies, making the results in mobilisation low. It seems that there is an agreement on the need for coordination, and a lot of talk among larger SMO leaders and with politicians, but little actual coordination results on the ground. The gravest problem is the lack of cooperation between Lebanese and Palestinian SMOs concerning rights for Palestinians, as the analysis proves that the parties and SMOs mainly mobilise their own constituency, although the obvious road to mobilising broadly would be close cooperation with Lebanese SMOs. A factor in play concerning the lack of coordination between the Palestinian SMOs is the fact that Palestinian society is divided along factional lines. For instance, one SMO is affiliated to the political faction PFLP, making their cooperation with other SMOs centred in PFLP supporters and allies, as all SMOs know that the organisation follows the priorities of PFLP. This argument is supported by NPA functioning as the spokesperson for the Palestinian SMOs, since their status as international organisation, but with legitimacy in the Palestinian community, lifts them above factional divisions. The legitimacy of their leader results in legitimacy across the Palestinian spectrum and with the Lebanese stakeholders, strengthening the political leverage of the SMOs upwards.  
Inappropriate use of human resources On the only occasion where the strategy of the organisation included both the need to mobilise Lebanese and Palestinians, the organisation did not hire a consultant 
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with the appropriate human resources and political leverage for the designated task. Hence, in the few cases when mobilisation is attempted, it is without considerations of the appropriate strategy and human resources needed to succeed in mobilising the targeted group.  
Routinised methods Theoretically the argument of routinised methods is derived from organisations finding verified ways of accessing resource, leading to their activities becoming the activities they know will lead to this funding. As shown in the strategies of the SMOs, the methods applied on rights for Palestinians are dialogue activities and rights-based projects, including lobbying and demonstrating for rights. For the right of return there is some creativity, for example with the demonstration for the right of return taking place at the borders79
4.4.5. Frame alignment strategies 
. The majority of the SMOs use the same buzz words, resonating with donors, when they speak of their activities: awareness raising, advocacy, lobbying, and it seems that activities are shaped by the donor funding coming in, rather than innovative creativity necessary for getting their goals through. An analysis may be that for the organisations, the incentives for working with the Palestinian rights in Lebanon seems to have more to do with a pragmatic rationale regarding a professional assessment of funding possibilities than a belief in the possibilities for influence on political decision-making. This may weaken the mobilisation potential, resulting in decreased legitimacy and decreased participation due to a lack of attempt for strategies based on the dynamics of incentives and mobilisation.  
According to the framing theory, using the appropriate frames for the context and opinions of the target group, will increase the potential for mobilisation success. In order to discuss if this understanding is true for the Lebanese context, the following will analyse the use and outcome of the framing strategies of the SMOs. The analysis 
                                                          
79 See appendix E for a description of the case, which will also be discussed in the following chapter in the section on political influence. 
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is rooted in the theoretical assumption that resonance of SMO frames with the existing frames of their target groups is conducive to mobilisation success. The analysis clarifies how the SMOs portray their goal and alignment with existing frames in the population, in order to be as convincing as possible in their mobilisation efforts. It is only with this knowledge at hand that it becomes possible to assess whether the mobilisation strategies of the SMOs have contributed to mobilisation. An important channel of influence in relation to framing strategies is the media. According to SMT, media serve as ‘weak ties’: a means to spread SMO frames to groups of people that are not part of the same social interaction group, why the use of media strategies will be part of the following analysis. Where information from the desk study is relevant it is included under the empirical observations. 
4.4.5.1. Field observations In an attempt to change the perceptions of the Lebanese and the Palestinian communities regarding rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, the SMOs have had to apply a combination of frame amplification and frame transformation, while bridging and extension were not widely used. The following outlines their strategies, and contains a tentative analysis of the results of the strategies. Most of the strategies are a mix of frame transformation and frame amplification, as the positions of the target groups vary. 
Strategies of master frames Possibly due to the rights-based approach influencing the CSOs there is a predominant belief among many organisations that a legal human rights frame is the best way to present the Palestinian rights issue (IP5, Palestinian SMO, 9.30), by integrating the Palestinian rights into the wider frame of fighting for general human rights in Lebanon. This frame amplification strategy has in particular been aimed at the Lebanese population through dialogue initiatives and media campaigns. (IP12a, 
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Palestinian SMO, 11.00; IP17, international SMO, 15.00; IP1, Lebanese SMO, 5.00)80
Strategies of linking the right of return and rights, and delinking tawteen and 
rights 
. It is not clear if the human rights focus has managed to mobilise Palestinians or Lebanese. It seems that the case of the Palestinians is perceived as so politicised and complicated that a combination with Lebanese human rights would damage the wider cause (IP9, international SMO, 20.00). 
For the Lebanese target group there has been a few attempts of frame transformation, linking the granting of right with increased security. Focusing on the positive contributions of the Palestinians to the Lebanese economy, this has in particular been linked to granting the right to work. There are also talks of wanting to delink the understanding that increased rights leads to tawteen, but no concrete strategies for doing this - except sending the message that the Palestinians want to return, for example through the Right of Return March (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 29.20). Frame transformation has primarily been done through publishing economic reports and legal studies (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 8.20). The use of different framing arguments for rights, when targeting the Lebanese, can be seen in table 3 below81
 
. 
                                                          
80 See appendix C, table 3 81 See appendix C, table 3. 
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Frame amplification has been used in order to get the Palestinian community to support the rights, by linking the right of return with the rights for Palestinians (IP18, Palestinian SMO 24.40). This is done in order to transfer the strong Palestinian support for the right of return to less supported rights in Lebanon. There is great debate on this strategy though, with several IPs stating that they see this link as harmful, which can be seen in the spread of answers of the SMOs in table 4 below (IP18, Palestinian SMO 29.20). 
 On one hand there is a belief among the SMOs that the two need to be handled together, in order to emphasise for the Lebanese that the fight for civil rights is not a step on the way to permanent settlement, but a step towards Palestine. On the other hand the organisations think that the focus should be on the right of return - either because they have an ideological commitment to the right of return as the sole legitimate goal, or due a possible opening in the peace process, for example due to the reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. In this way they find that a focus on 
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the rights in Lebanon dilutes the primary cause (IP14, international SMO; IP18, Palestinian SMO, 29.20).  
Results The effects of the strategies are unclear. On one hand it is clear from the turn-outs at the Right of Return March and the Civil Rights March, that the right of return enjoys unanimous support among the Palestinians, and can unify the different actors, while the rights in Lebanon are disputed. On the other hand this comparison is unfair, due to the very different starting points, and there seems to be some agreement among interviewees that the activities of the SMOs have made a difference, for example with an otherwise critical activist remarking that “people think like this now, people 
want their rights and return“ (IP18, Palestinian SMO, 24.20). The effects of the strategies of conveying to the Lebanese politicians that granting rights does not imply permanent settlement, is disputed as well, with Lebanese politicians using the argument that rights will lead to tawteen, as seen in table 4. It does not seem that the framing strategies are efficient, as the human rights argument is almost not being used by the politicians in table 3, while they use economic arguments to argue against rights, opposite of the framing attempts of the SMOs. It only seems that the security argument is used by the politicians, although it is not the main framing strategy of the SMOs. From this, it seems unlikely that the framing strategies of the SMOs are influencing the parties to a great extent. Experts state that more could be done on delinking the understanding of rights leading to tawteen, pointing towards the SMOs strategies not being successful (IP23, expert, 14.10). From the minor Lebanese participation in the mobilisations, the level of mobilisation is not high, and it seems unlikely that there are high levels of action mobilisation, when taking the statements and findings from the societal beliefs and incentives into account. 
Framing of security - victimisation and the creation of fear It has been clarified in the configuration of actors that one of the only reasons the parties could agree upon as resulting in an increased need for rights, is the security 
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argument. It is not clear if this is a perception shared by the population. The Palestinian organisations express a tendency to stop using the discourse of victimisation previously employed, seeing a softer, less confrontational and militant discourse as better. As one interviewee expressed it 
 “In Lebanon we, the Palestinians, we always market ourselves as victims, and the 
Lebanese, in general, they love us too much... and there is nothing. When we talk 
about ourselves as victims, we didn’t do anything to improve the victim situation” (IP4, Palestinian SMO, 52.15).  Some interviewees expressed that the change in discourse has been recognised by Lebanese partners, e.g. in the CEP82
Result 
 (IP37, Lebanese SMO). This being said, the Palestinian SMOs are criticised by some interviewees for not taking the history of the civil war into consideration in their strategies and framing efforts. It is argued that they fail to properly address their role as a scapegoat in relation to the civil war, and the PLO military presence in Lebanon in their mobilisation efforts towards the Lebanese (IP37, Lebanese SMO). The softening of the discourse is opposed by another tendency, which is the use of fear creation to obtain benefits. One SMO explains that the function of their demonstration and sit-ins is on one hand awareness raising among the media and population, and on the other hand making the politicians afraid, since they see what the SMOs are capable of (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 42.00). This understanding is disputed though, with another SMO refusing to use the fear card, as it will only give short term results and possibly back fire (IP4, Palestinian SMO, 28.00). 
As the starting point for this strategy is unknown and the amount of SMOs employing the strategy unknown, it is not possible to predict the results. It can be concluded that the use of security discourses is a precarious balancing act, which can easily go wrong. This is applicable no matter whether it is strategies for 
                                                          
82 See appendix A for a description. 
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underlining the gain in security by giving the Palestinians rights, apologising for the role in the civil war, or for pressuring the government to grant rights due to fear imposed by the number of people on the street. 
Strategies on media standing As described in the analysis of existing cultural models, many political parties have their own TV channels, such as Hizbollah’s Al-Manar TV, and the Future Movement’s Future TV, with newspapers being divided according to political parties as well (Cochrane, 2007). Apart from LPDC, none of the interviewed organisations mentioned a specific media strategy. The only attempt mentioned in order to increase media publicity, was by one SMO who had invited different media to workshops with the aim of increasing publicity on the issue. According to the SMO, the media that attended the workshops have been more positive afterwards and have published articles on some of their activities. It was however not all media attending the workshop, and the ones who did were already positively inclined towards Palestinian rights (IP2, Palestinian SMO, 21.00). 
Results The media standing thus seems to have been improved by the SMO’s efforts, but the outreach remains limited to protagonists target groups, limiting the impact in relation to frame transformation. The real challenge lies in improving the organisations’ media standing among the antagonist target groups, which is a first step in conveying the frame of the SMO to the target groups whose frames the strategy seeks to align with.  
4.4.5.2. Findings For the strategies employed by the SMOs, the amplification of frames of the Palestinians to see the fight for rights in Lebanon as part of the fight for the right of return has been partially successful. It is not apparent that the attempted frame transformation of the Lebanese opinions linking rights and tawteen has been successful. The result of the opposing views on using victimisation and fear creation as part of the frame alignment strategies is not clear, but this will most likely depend 
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on the target group. The use of the fear creation strategies may also result in immediate concessions on rights, but a long term deteriorating relationship with the Lebanese authorities. Concerning the use of media in changing opinions, the media standing is highly influenced by the media being sectarian affiliated, and following the line of the party regarding the issue of rights for Palestinians. This is supplemented by the population primarily watching the TV stations and reading the newspapers affiliated to their party or sect. This makes the theoretical hypothesis that media functions as an access point to wider target groups weak. However, as Lebanon is situated in a wider Arab speaking region with many regional and international news sources such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, access to these media channels would create the hypothesised ties to wider target groups. However, as one interviewee noted, in order to get Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya to cover, it has to be big (IP30, expert) – a scenario highly unlikely for the case of rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. Furthermore, Al Jazeera has covered the issue in a wider perspective, but again - because of the politicised nature of the issue, and its special importance for a number of sectarian groups, coverage on Al Jazeera will not increase mobilisation potentials as long as politicians are comfortable.  
4.4.6. Sub-conclusion on organisational analysis of SMOs The Lebanese societal beliefs of Palestinian rights are influenced by the sectarian opinions, while the Palestinian beliefs are influenced by the balance with the fight for the right of return. The societal beliefs make it difficult to mobilise both the Lebanese and the Palestinians as they perceive other issues than Palestinian rights as more serious. Even though the perception of the probability of change is perceived as very low, due to the system being strong and difficult to change, the interviewees still participate in activities like mobilisations, as they feel a need to express their dissatisfaction. The constant counter mobilisations, makes potential participants critical as to which cause they will support.  
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Concluding on the mobilisation strategies, there is some use of mobilisation as a method by the SMOs investigated, though the consequent level of mobilisation is low and the derived political influence disputed. The level of consensus mobilisation is low due to lack of access to networks that are not agreeing with the SMO, and both the Palestinians and the Lebanese are restrained by the party or sectarian affiliation decreasing the possibility to consensus mobilise them. Action mobilisation mainly happens within likeminded circles, but power struggles between the different groups complicates participation of different actors.  For the Palestinian community, mobilisation is affected by a) perceived priority balanced with the right of return, b) reprisal from the government when participating in demonstrations c) perceived lack of incentives for the target to yield, and a lack of belief in the structures as favourable to change. For the Lebanese, the main incentives and costs of participation are a) a belief that the Lebanese have enough rights issues to deal with themselves, b) the cost of participation in activities contrary to general sectarian beliefs of one’s community, i.e. security of the sects and economic effects c) perceived lack of incentives for the target to yield, and a lack of belief in the structures as favourable to change, d) an incentive in a possible security gain by granting socio-economic rights. To conclude, the incentives for the Palestinian and Lebanese are currently not strong for mobilising the Palestinian rights. From the resource analysis follows that increased resources does not necessarily increase the mobilisation potential, with for instance increased financial resources affecting the legitimacy and leading to routinised methods, decreasing the mobilisation potential. Coordination is informal with factional and sectarian divisions making coordination among SMOs from rivalling factions difficult, and a lack of Lebanese-Palestinian cooperation.  Evaluating the framing strategies, the SMOs have not succeeded in increasing the readiness to act collectively among the Palestinian target group, even though their 
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everyday life is affected by the lack of rights. This is mainly influenced by the fact that the right of return remains perceived as more important than rights in Lebanon. It seems unlikely that there has been a large amount of action mobilisation of the Lebanese taking place based on the framing strategies, as the SMOs do not reach out across their own constituencies, due to a lack of cooperation with Lebanese SMOs and the media being sectarian.  Answering the research question on the extent to which the different variables of the organisational level influence the mobilisation potential, the quality and form of the SMO strategies and use of resources can be said to influence the level of actual mobilisation to a small extent, as structural factors lie behind most of the failures and successes. Overall, it can be concluded that the mobilisation strategies on Palestinian rights have not been successful. Attempts have been made to mobilise broadly through parties and CSO constituents, but due to a) lack of outreach as there is a lack coordination, rooted in the different sectarian interests, funding competition and factional divisions, b) lack of outreach through partnerships and use of media, c) lack incentives for Lebanese participation, due to protection of sectarian interests d) competitive mobilisation on the right of return, and finally, e) lack of legitimacy due to perceived donor dependency, attempts have only been partially successful. Hence, the actual influence of most of the variables on mobilisation potentials have their root in the structures of the Lebanese society, making it unsuitable to focus merely on this level.   
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5. Concluding discussion In the following we will attempt to make an assessment of the overall explanatory power of social movement theory for our case, discussing the findings of the analysis with the aim of answering our problem formulation. First we will discuss the explanatory power of each variable applied in the above analysis for our case, and secondly use the conclusions derived from this discussion to point out overall weaknesses and strengths of the theory. After this, additional theories are applied in order to add supplementary perspectives to SMT, and make our findings more general and useful for other cases of social movements in the Middle East. Finally, based on the discussion of the general value of the theory, and its explanatory power for our case, we will proceed to suggest ways to supplement and further develop the theory. 
5.1 The applied variables – to what extent can they explain the case? The model below is a modification of the theoretical model of the political process approach, with our additional theory, reflecting our conclusions on the relations between the different variables.  It should be remarked that in the model below, the strategies of public authorities form part of the interaction context, whereas in the analysis they were analysed as part of the structural level, in order to ease the analytical separation of structure and actor. Societal beliefs are in our model placed between the configuration of actors and the interaction context, as we understand them as the policy domain specific beliefs grounded in the political cleavages, but different from the strategy specific incentives. Reactive mobilisation is included in societal beliefs to the extent it is relevant. The theoretical connections where the interaction context influences both the configuration of actors and the structural level, is omitted in our model, since our findings did not identify such connections concerning the case of rights for Palestinians. The background for the added arrows between the variables will be revealed during the discussion below, why the model performs a summative function. The 
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theoretical additions that we have made to the political process approach in order to create our framework are marked in red boxes below.  
 
5.1.1. The political opportunity structure  As the above analysis has shown, the sectarian structure as a political cleavage structure seems the single most decisive factor for all social and political interactions in the Lebanese context. Therefore it has a significant influence on several dynamics impacting social movement success, which will be outlined throughout the discussion. The sectarian structure permeates all sectors of society, and is continuously reproduced by both politicians and SMOs through their actions. If this sectarian base is not recognised, a full understanding of the mechanisms working to enable or constrain social movement success is not possible.  When analysing the institutional structure, we found it difficult to separate the electoral and party systems, and the public administration from the sectarian structure, as it is embedded in these institutional structures. While the theoretical concepts of open and closed structures helped us understand the workings of the Lebanese system, our characterisation of Lebanon as an open structure is not based 
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on the general variable of decentralisation or a high degree of separation of powers. Instead it is founded in sectarian political cleavages and the institutional enforcement of sectarianism. Thus, while the institutional variables were useful as tools for structuring our analysis of the institutional structure, it was the effect of the political cleavages that proved to possess the better explanatory power for the Lebanese institutional structure, and its impact on mobilisation potentials. Our analysis showed that the behaviour within political alliances and cross alliances form part of the explanation for the openness of the Lebanese political system. We have indicated this direction of influence in our model by adding an arrow leading from the configuration of actors to the structures of the system, whereas in the theoretical model it is only characterised as the structure influencing the configuration of actors. The cultural models variable shows us how the sectarian media and international actors shape what it is allowed to talk about, for example with the opening for discussions on rights of Palestinians after 2005, but with sectarian media dictating the coverage of the issues. In our case, a causal relation was established between political cleavage structures and cultural models, through sectarian interests and state security interests dictating the discursive opportunity structure and the government response to contention. 
5.1.2. Configuration of actors  The political process approach assumes that the configuration of actors is more susceptible to pressure than the political opportunity structure, and that shifts in the configuration of actors create opportunities for mobilisation. However, on issues as tied up on sectarian interests as rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, our findings point to a configuration of actors where alliance structures might look different than the political cleavage structure, but nonetheless are no more susceptible to pressure than the political opportunity structure. This is firstly because sectarian-based opinions are considered first priority, and secondly because the political system necessitates cross-sectarian alliances, explaining why intra-coalition consensus on 
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issues on which sectarian interests differ, will never be possible. Thus our analysis rejects the notion of the configuration of actors being more susceptible to pressure than the political opportunity structure, concerning the specific policy domain of rights for Palestinians. As described above, our analysis showed that the most defining feature of the political opportunity structure on the policy domain of rights for Palestinians are the political cleavages, which is why we in the model have enforced the arrow indicating the relation between the cleavage structure and the configuration of actors. Along with the political cleavage structure, the policy domain variable arguably holds the strongest explanatory power for our case. The variable enables identification of a potential policy monopoly, advocacy coalitions, the profile of the policy domain, and whether actors have adopted the bystander perspective. Thus, it creates a framework for sorting observations of how the different political actors form policy domain-specific alliances, based on the priority level of the issue at stake. This being said, the variable does not provide any analytical aide, except for stating the link between cleavage structures and the configuration of political actors, but giving no tools for analysing the implications of this link. Our findings have shown that the constitution of political cleavages and institutional structures, and the relationship between the two, has a decisive impact on the ways in which both opinions, alliances, and the profile of the policy domain are formed regarding rights for Palestinians. An example is our empirical findings showing that a bystander perspective can be a very efficient strategy for maintaining the status quo on an issue. In order to improve the theoretical understanding of these interrelations, a theory would need to hypothesise on the relations between these variables, and how social movements can use them to identify opportunities and influence policy-making. 
5.1.3. Societal beliefs  The variables concerning societal beliefs and individual incentives for participation have received much attention in recent studies on social movements, as part of the 
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increasing focus on individuals and individual perceptions and motivations. In the Lebanese context of Palestinian rights, societal beliefs and consequent incentives for participation are to a large extent the societal expression of the sectarian structure. When the majority of the living population has gone through a civil war, where divisions were based on the same sects that societal structure and political system are still built upon, individuals will naturally seek towards safety and security in their own sect, be less likely to question the dominant beliefs of that sect - and thereby less prone to mobilisation efforts. Furthermore, on a more general level, beliefs of politicians and population alike are tied up on sectarian communal ties to a much larger extent than in the Western secular systems on which the basic structural assumptions of SMT are based. Hence, incentives and consequent choices of participation are based on sectarian founded considerations, more so than on the individualistic rationality assumed by the theory. The theory’s assumption of individual rational choices thus reveals its contextual limitations, as the conclusions regarding participation behaviour based on the assumption of individual rational choice, is not the same as the sectarian rational choice in the Lebanese context. Thus, one might argue that the recent SMT shift in focus from the political opportunity structure to the underlying emotional and personal incentives for participation, is not conducive for explaining the Lebanese dynamics, as the political cleavages dictates the individual behaviour to a very large extent when it comes to politics. Furthermore, the societal beliefs variable does not account for the dynamics of rationality subjacent to the Palestinians not standing up for their own rights, based on everyday grievances, while on the other hand fervently holding on to the right of return. Our findings have shown that competitive mobilisation on the issue of right of return is more successful than on rights in Lebanon, suggesting that other aspects than simple individualistic choices are at play. While in other countries Palestinian refugees have settled without it being perceived as a negative impact on their desire to return, our findings have shown that in Lebanon the settlement and basic rights have been politicised, highlighting the fact that larger structural factors both inside and outside Lebanon affect choices of participation, which makes it 
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problematic always to assume individualistic rational choice based on a cost benefit analysis of participation. Therefore the link between the cleavage structure as the background for the sectarian logic, and the societal beliefs, should be enforced. 
5.1.4. Interaction context The model presented in the beginning of the discussion reflects that part of the structure is included in the interaction context, thus attempting to put emphasis on the mutual connection between structure and agent. The analysis of the discursive opportunity structure and the strategies of the government’s use of repressive or facilitative methods towards the SMOs are used to identify potential openings for mobilisation as a method for gaining rights for the Palestinians. We found that both government strategies and the discursive opportunity structure are highly dependent upon the considerations of underlying sectarian interests that in some instances coincide with national interests of security. This can be seen in the differing government responses on the different rights – with activities on the freedom of movement in Nahr Al-Bared not being tolerated, while marches on the right to work have passed unhindered. The change in the discursive opportunity structure as a result of the Syrian exit in 2005 is another example of this interrelation, as Syrian influence in the country is strongly intertwined in the sectarian divisions. From the analysis of the discursive opportunity structure, the political cleavages including the history of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and the sectarian interests influence on party behaviour and societal beliefs, no windows of opportunity were identified for mobilisation as a method to gain rights for Palestinians currently. The strongest example of the importance of sectarian interests, that also underlines the inferior importance of the shifting alliances for the specific issue of rights for Palestinians, was the lack of opportunity created for Palestinian rights by Hizbollah gaining power, although they explicitly support Palestinian rights. We find that opportunities will most likely not develop, since there is little gain for any of the sects in mobilising on or responding to mobilising attempts for Palestinian rights, why changes in the alliances will most likely not create any openings.  
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5.1.5. Mobilisation strategies Klandermans & Oegema’s theory of mobilisation processes includes concrete hypotheses of causal relationship between variables and social movement success. The listed processes can thus be used as a ‘check list’ for SMO strategies. The process variables are useful as tools to establish whether the SMOs have completed them, but cannot explain the underlying reasons for SMO success in completing the process or not. Our findings have shown that consensus mobilisation is difficult on the issue of rights for Palestinians, as opinions are tied to sectarian affiliations. For example the channels of mobilisation used by the SMOs are manifold, but due to the underlying sectarian systemic structures and the factional divisions of Palestinian society, mobilisation does not reach beyond primary constituencies or allow broad coalition building.  
5.1.6. Resource mobilisation perspectives The variables concerning the availability and use of resources have been useful for identifying the different types of resources available to the SMOs, and the way they have utilised them. However, the theory fails to explain the interaction between the different resources and their relation with other variables. Our findings have shown that there are significant relations between the source of financial resources and the level of SMO legitimacy in the population, while the political cleavages that divide societal beliefs according to sect have been shown to have an important influence on the way in which socio-organisational resources and channels of influence can be utilised. Furthermore, the fact that financial resources are predominantly foreign aid also influence the way in which SMOs utilise socio-organisational resources, as the large amounts of donor funding available on the issue of rights of Palestinians create competition among SMOs that affect cooperation and coordination. While the resource mobilisation variables do mention the significance of SMO dependence on external financial resources and its concomitant implications for SMO room of manoeuvre, it does not account for the influence that this has on relations between the use and availability of different resources. The variable regarding routinised methods assisted us in establishing that SMO methods indeed were routinised and 
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traditional, which could be linked to the donor dependency. However in our specific case it appears questionable whether this factor played a major part in the failure of mobilisation efforts, as incentives of participation were based on perceptions of structural constraints, with people’s understanding of the importance of the policy domain playing a more important role. In addition our findings have shown that the large amounts of donor funding pouring into civil society produce a professionalised civil society sector, where the majority of SMO members are employed, with little grassroots activity. The special factor of donor funding and consequent risks of professionalising civil society is necessary to take into account when analysing social movement emergence and success in developing countries, as it affects the incentives for participation in organisational work on issues that receive large amounts of donor funding. When the incentives behind working for an issue are financial considerations, the likelihood of societal beliefs matching the goals of the organisations is arguably smaller, as is the legitimacy of the organisations, both factors negatively affecting mobilisation potentials. Foreign aid patterns and the professionalisation of civil society are therefore relevant contextual factors that the theory needs to take into consideration when being applied in a developmental context. Therefore it is necessary to add a direct relation between the international context and the interaction context, in particular the mobilisation strategies and resources of the SMOs. 
5.1.7. Framing strategies The variables regarding framing strategies have been a useful analytical tool for establishing the frame alignment attempts of the SMOs. They formulate a causal relationship between the variables and mobilisation potentials, and they moreover recognise the impact of structural aspects on mobilisation potentials, in combination with SMO frame alignment success. The variables have in our case been useful for identifying the different framing attempts of the SMOs. However, as was hinted at in the section regarding variables on societal beliefs and incentives, it 
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is arguably unlikely that people will change their opinion on an issue that holds importance for one’s sect.  People are less likely to change their opinion based on the strategies referred to in the variables on frame alignment, as individual rational choices are based on different considerations than in the Western context where the variables were formulated. Thus, in a wider perspective it can be concluded that framing strategies have less relevance in contexts where affiliation to a community is valued equally to or higher than individual freedom. The frame alignment variables should therefore be reformulated to fit such a context. The sectarian factor influences the use of concrete framing strategies, as our findings have shown that the composition of the media in Lebanon follow sectarian and factional lines, why they cannot serve as weak ties. As mentioned above in relation to societal beliefs, the development of SMT towards a focus on individual perceptions and beliefs is thus not suitable for explaining the Lebanese context.  
5.2. Explaining the structural dynamics Our findings have shown that structural dynamics permeate the relations between the variables of the SMT, as they are also reproduced by politicians, SMOs, and individual actors. The theory falls short of the appropriate tools for understanding the way that political cleavage structures permeate and influence the other levels and their variables. In order to understand why structures play such an important role, we will discuss the additional explanatory power of theories explaining the overarching social and political mechanisms that define relations, power constellations and interplays between the factors influencing the mobilisation potential on rights for Palestinians. In many ways Lebanon’s political system is unique, and many a scholar has struggled to fit it into traditional regime categories, resulting in a frequent denomination of Lebanon as ‘the odd one out’ in Middle Eastern regime definitions. However, though Lebanon sports a peculiar mix of confessional democracy and strong sectarian communities, the political system can arguably be said to have clear neopatrimonial features, in a uniquely Lebanese way, why these theories can be 
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used to explain why the sectarian dynamics have such a pronounced influence on mobilisation for Palestinian rights in Lebanon.  In the following we will therefore introduce the basic theoretical characteristics of neopatrimonial states relevant for our case, whereupon we will proceed to a discussion of how they can contribute to an understanding of the Lebanese context.   Furthermore, we will in the following introduce a critique of the applicability of the traditional civil society understanding in developing countries, and the Middle East in particular, as this will provide supplementary theoretical perspectives on our field study findings on the influence of donor aid on organisational choices and subsequent popular legitimacy.  These additional theoretical perspectives are furthermore used to indicate future research areas that can strengthen the applicability of SMT in a Lebanese and wider Middle Eastern context. 
5.2.1. Lebanon: neopatrimonial characteristics and notions of civil society  Theoretically neopatrimonialism is portrayed as a system mixing patrimonial and legal-rational modes of governing. Its basic rationality is an exchange between the political leader and political elites, in which the political leader grants material and political influence to the political elites in return for loyalty, based on religion or family ties. The leader maintains his or her power through strategies of divide and rule and elite rotation, and governs based on informal and personal patronage-client relationships (Bank & Richter, 2010, pp. 2-5).  Theoretically speaking, Lebanon is not a patrimonial case, since there is no one leader from whom all power flows, but we argue that it has neopatrimonial traits, with the loyalties of the sect underlying the legal-rational political structures, and each sect constituting its own system of neopatrimonial relations. The use of rule and divide strategies are less relevant for Lebanon, since there is not one ruler to conduct the strategy and take use of the divisions which exist between the sects.  
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Within each sect, an elite of religious leaders, politicians and influential families are in control of resources, using personal patron-client relationships to distribute these. Our analysis showed that the distribution of resources – with security being seen as an important resource and benefit of the sect – is used to obtain loyalty. In this way neopatrimonial lines of loyalty exist vertically inside each sect and the priority to this religious-family loyalty is predominant both on the political and societal level. Thus, securing resources for obtaining loyalty becomes the priority of the sectarian leaders, and a necessity for the survival of the leadership. This feature of neopatrimonial theory supports our field observation of how the sects manage to exert such a strong influence on societal beliefs and opinions of individuals, thereby shaping incentives and consequently - the mobilisation potentials. Our characterisation of the Lebanese political system as having several neopatrimonial systems competing for influence and interest optimisation, can help in explaining why horizontal alliances of both organisations and parties are difficult, in particular concerning areas of sectarian interest, as they are based on concerns regarding sectarian benefits and concomitant suspicion, as everybody is aware that concerns for sectarian alliances will always be first priority.  The mix of neopatrimonial traits and the legal-rational bureaucratic system used by neopatrimonial theory, can explain why the open/closed function of the Lebanese political system is not primarily a cause of its institutional structure. We found that the crossing alliances between the non-sectarian based alliances are rooted in the undisciplined parties working to further the sectarian interests, which undercuts the formal structure of the political structures, making Lebanon an open structure. Thus the orientation towards the sect, and the consecutive importance of securing resources and sectarian interests for maintaining the patronage relationships, can assist in clarifying how Lebanese system functionally becomes an open system.  The neopatrimonial theory can inform the analysis of stability, as our analysis of the political institutions and the societal beliefs showed that the combination of 
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cultural, religious, political and financial loyalty to sectarian leaders makes the sectarian structure stable and sectarian opinions difficult to alter. Illuminating this, the theory of neopatrimonialism underlines that the sectarian structure is stable as long as the sect manages to secure resources that it can distribute, explaining why the fight over resource control is exacerbated.  The Africanists Chabal and Daloz (1999) support many of the empirical observations that we found in Lebanon in their classic study on the uselessness of ‘civil society’ as a concept for describing African realities, useful for understanding donor influence in Lebanon. Firstly, they consider the classic notion of civil society as being in opposition to the state, invalid for the African states, since the states are founded on neopatrimonial, vertical systems which do not divide society strictly into state, civil society and market (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. xix). Secondly, they argue that Western civil society logic perceives the individual as a political building brick for the creation of civil society organisations, which is invalid in the African context as “individual rationality is essentially based on communal logic.” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 156). Both characteristics are partly true for Lebanon, which problematises the donors’ conception of using CSOs as a legitimate part of the people, able to mobilise broadly and exert political pressure to further their rights-based causes. Lust-Okar and Zerhouni further criticise the legitimacy of the traditional CSO understanding in the Middle East, as they argue that there are different channels for political participation in the Middle East, and that the channel of CSOs and political parties only represent the urban, educated elites. Instead they pinpoint the informal social networks as the most important for popular political participation, (Lust-Okar & Zerhouni, 2008, p. 28), hereby rejecting the concept of civil society, instead applying ‘political participation’, defined as an ”activity by 
private citizens designed to influence governmental decision-making” (Huntington and Nelson 1976, p.4) in (Lust-Okar & Zerhouni 2008, p.17). Lust-Okar and Zerhouni’s critique of the civil society notion can be used to underpin our empirical finding that the CSOs in Lebanon have been professionalised through the incoming 
128 
 
donor funding coming in for rights-based projects, resulting in the CSOs not mobilising broadly, therefore not being able to create mass mobilisation. Bayat pinpoints this critique, concluding that it is questionable “whether the present NGOs 
are structurally able to foster grass-roots participation for meaningful development,” (Bayat, 2002, p. 19) and that they merely foster a new sort of clientelism.  The point of bringing in neopatrimonialism and critique of civil society concepts has been to underline that our field study findings showed several links between variables that our framework of social movement theory could not account for. Based on the findings of our field study, we have made our conclusions as to what the investigation of the Lebanese case tells us, with additional theory supporting the plausibility of our findings. Hence, neopatrimonialism provided the theoretical background for additional perspectives on contextual Lebanese specificities of the interplay between structure and agency, as it showed how religious-family loyalty and patronage networks reproduce and maintain the sectarian structure. The addition of critiques of traditional understandings of civil society, and their applicability in developing countries, and the Middle East in particular, inform our understanding of the sometimes problematic role of donors, and points out future prospective mobilisation channels.  
5.3. Mobilisation as a means to gain political influence in Lebanon The discussions above highlight the differences between the links between variables found in our case and in the theory chosen. Our analysis also reveals an even deeper concern with the theory when being applied to Lebanon: is the assumption that mobilisation results in political influence, underlying the whole theory, valid in the Lebanese context? The general assumption of SMT is that mass mobilisation will lead to political influence, thus having both growth and influence as success criteria. Since the analysed SMOs have not managed to mobilise broadly, theoretically it could be argued that the lack of influence was therefore due to the lack of mobilisation. However, in relation to our case, this does not seem to apply, as we have analysed 
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that its lack of political influence is mainly rooted in the sectarian structure. In order to underpin this finding, and in order to enable a broader generalisability of our findings, other cases of Lebanese mobilisation, their level of success, and the dynamics explaining the results, will be introduced in the following. When conducting our field work, there were two fairly successful events of mobilisation, using mass mobilisation as a method for gaining attention, and with a long term goal of obtaining political influence83
5.3.1. Right of Return March 
. These two movements have both managed to mass mobilise, thus succeeding in the task that the SMOs working on rights for Palestinians in Lebanon have not. Whether they have managed to obtain political influence through their mobilisation is another discussion. It is not possible to directly compare the SMOs working on rights for Palestinians with the other cases, due to several differences - for example the right of return is mainly event-based as opposed to a mature movement - but the following will highlight the main important factors when analysing mobilisation as a means for political influence in the Lebanese context. 
The Right of Return March sported cooperation between a multitude of actors, with alliance building being essential for the success of large scale action mobilisation (IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 45.00). Consensus mobilisation was not necessary to a large extent, since the incentives for participation and the societal beliefs on the issue were positive, highly encouraged by the Palestinians receiving a previously impossible opportunity: being able to go to the border to see their homeland. Analysing this, the large-scale cooperation was partially due to the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, which made participation from both factions possible – an obstruction for the civil rights march in June 2010. (IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 26.00). The Syrian revolt also played a role, as it was a possibility for Hizbollah to divert attention from the Syrian events (IP11, expert). It can be concluded that the decisive 
                                                          
83 See appendix E for a specification of the background for the cases.  
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factor in creating successful mobilisation, was the regional political opportunity structure opening up with the changes in Syria and the actors in the peace process. 
5.3.2. The Anti-sectarian movement The anti-sectarian movement84
5.3.3. Political influence 
 has almost no organisational or financial resources - a fact which points to the capabilities of the anti-sectarian SMOs not being the driving force behind their successful mobilisations. Social media spreads their voices of dissatisfaction, resulting in action mobilisation (IP15, Lebanese SMO, 1.00; IP16, Lebanese SMO, 35.00). There is no unified statement as to what they are against, but it refers to different aspects of the sectarian, non-secular system and the connected laws. There is no unified strategy in whether they want to reform the system from within, or revolutionise the whole system (IP16, Lebanese SMO, 35.00). Still, their demonstrations have attracted up to 30,000 people. The motivation for participation does not seem to be a clear expectation of reaching a political goal, but a necessity of expressing dissatisfaction with the system (IP23, expert, 29.00). Their success is rooted in them being a diffuse expression of protest, striking a general dissatisfaction with the current system from across all sectarian population groups, and using the inspiration from the Arab spring as a trigger for action mobilisation. 
Although both of the movements introduced above have managed to mobilise to a much larger extent than SMOs working for rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, their political influence may not be higher. It is difficult to establish the effect of the mobilisations, as they are in the middle of a still continuing development, but for now the following analysis can be made. The Right of Return Movement has not changed the opinions of the Lebanese politicians – publicly all political leaders support the right of return, and have a national interest in the Palestinians leaving, so there is not much to be changed. The 
                                                          
84 The Anti-sectarian Movement as it is explained here, is understood as both the organisers of the Laïque demonstrations, and the Topple the Regime movement. See appendix A for a short description of the two initiatives, and E for a thorough description of the movement. 
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issue is that they have little if any political power on the issue, why the policy domain is static in Lebanon. Instead the event was aimed at creating international pressure, and sending a message to the international community that the Palestinians want to return (IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 19.00; 33.00), but also informing the Lebanese that they do not want tawteen, and the PLO that the right of return is not negotiable. It is unclear if they have succeeded in these goals. The mobilisations were only briefly reported on in international media, and in Lebanese media the Palestinians were accused of being violent and causing troubles with the Lebanese, although public statements by the parties said that they supported their right of return (IP38, expert, 50.20) (Zaatari, 2011) (Daily Star, 2011). International opinions do not appear to have been highly influenced by the demonstrations, and the political opportunity structure surrounding the issue has not been altered. The anti-sectarian movement has diffuse goals – to revolutionise the system, to create a civil legal code, to create a secular law etc. Their influence is unclear. Several actors who were not active in the movement agreed on their goals, but did not see the timing as good, or the movement as organised enough (IP38, expert, 02.00). As one interviewee expressed it, they can ”push a 100 laws in parliament and 
nothing will change” (IP13, Palestinian activist, 23.40). In comparison with the analysis of the political influence of the SMOs working with rights for Palestinians, the movement will have a difficult time obtaining political influence, as the six kings of the system – the traditionally powerful families – will always seek to maintain the status quo. An example of this is how, according to interviewees, the media and the government have already tried to obstruct the growth of the movement. First by trying to ‘infiltrate’ the demonstrations, thereby neutralising their contentious potential, while simultaneously using different media channels to display the internal strife and lack of organisation, and in that way discrediting the movement  (IP15, Lebanese SMO).  
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5.3.4. The Independence Intifada Finally the case of the Independence Intifada, in the West mostly referred to as the Cedar Revolution, will be briefly introduced. After the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 85
5.3.5. Political influence and opportunity identification 
 “politicians and citizens mobilised in an 
unprecedented show of unity to demand Lebanese sovereignty and the restoration of 
political freedoms curtailed by Syria” (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 121). The assassination of Hariri showed a clear gap between pro and anti-Syrian political figures, and managed to mobilised hundreds of thousands, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian troops on April 26, 2005 (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 121). This led to an opening in the discursive opportunity structure – suddenly the Palestinian arms, and the arms of Hizbollah were being debated, and the security system, which had previously been influenced by Syria, was reformed. The level of enduring political influence is not promising though. Several of our interviewees state that the Syrian influence is back in Lebanon, (IP25, expert, IP22, expert) supported by Choucair-Vizoso stating that “the momentum for change created by the Syrian 
withdrawal rapidly dissipated, and the old divides in Lebanese politics and society 
resurfaced” (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 122), pointing out that the political cleavages are extremely stable, and not prone to the pressure of mass mobilisation. 
To conclude, the addition of these cases of mass mobilisation in Lebanon indicates that it is possible to mobilise broadly on certain issues that have a trigger and touch people deeply, or where a feeling of everyday dissatisfaction cuts across sectarian divides. The right of return and anti-sectarian movements have not had influence due to a lack of either political openings or political leverage. The right of return movement saw a political opening because of the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, but there was no political leverage nationally in Lebanon on the issue – it is primarily located at international levels. For the anti-sectarian movement, the Lebanese 
                                                          
85 Immediately after the assassination the predominant perception was that Syria was behind the act (Choucair-Vizoso 2008, p.120). However recently an increasing focus has been put on the role of Hizbollah in the assassination (Daily Star, 2011). 
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political actors have the political leverage to respond to the demands of the movement, but no interest in doing so – indicating that there is no specific opening for the mobilisation to have an impact, except that of the inspiration from the Arab spring.  These examples stress 1) political openings, and 2) political leverage of the targets of mobilisation, as essential for reaching political influence. Two factors are crucial in shaping the political opportunities, for the above cases, and for our main analysis:  a) The sectarian structure and political institutions’ influence on the alliance traditions and political actors’ priorities and interest on the policy domain  b) The political cleavages and sectarian interests influencing the societal beliefs of both Palestinians and Lebanese.  This emphasises the need for hypotheses to identify political openings and political leverage, and link them to the other levels of the theory. The Independence Intifada highlights how stable the sectarian structures and divisions are in Lebanon, adding a strong point for stable structural traits explaining the lack of political openings. 
5.4. General critique and future areas of research From the discussion of the explanatory power of the variables for our case, we can conclude that the theory’s strength mainly lies in its descriptive abilities. Our chosen theoretical categories have been useful for ordering the observations of our desk and field studies, but as shown above, some of the relations between the variables are fundamentally different or were non-existent in the theory. Therefore our theoretical framework’s analytical value is limited, and even more so in a context as the Lebanese, where underlying political cleavages, and their penetration of all societal and political spheres have such a significant impact on nearly all variables. Each building block holds a descriptive power regarding the part of reality it seeks to explain, however each of them simultaneously fails to hypothesise as to that building block’s effect on the other variables – it mainly describes that there is a causal relation. Thus the theory is incapable of formulating general hypotheses that 
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synthesise the case-based results. This problem is in particular true for the interplay between structure and agency which the theory – as seen in model 1 on p. 33 – states is there, but provides little insight into the dynamics of. The theoretical aspects focused on the organisational level that we added to the PPA, do not provide us with any hypotheses on its influence on the structure – except if mobilisation is successful and has an aim that challenges the structures.  Our attempt to synthesise the different parts into a single theoretical framework and to investigate its explanatory power has revealed a lack of correspondence and interaction between the different schools of thought within social movement theory. From our case we can conclude that the major interplay takes place in the way that the sectarian structure influences all other aspects, and is continuously reproduced by politicians, SMOs, and individuals alike. While this reproduction process primarily takes place subconsciously, the potentials of SMOs actively influencing sectarian, political and institutional structures, in order to gain rights for Palestinians in Lebanon is however limited. While SMT was not able to fully account for the underlying dynamics of these interactions, the inclusion of neopatrimonialism seems to be able to shed light on the effect of the predominantly structural dynamics. When analysing the Lebanese context, it appears peculiar that so much theoretical effort has been put into developing the interaction context variables, and not the structural variables, or the link between the two. However, the fact that the relationship between structure and agency may be somewhat different in the Western context upon which the theory was formulated, can account for the missing emphasis on further developments of structural aspects. But if one wishes to formulate a broadly applicable theory that can be used in contexts with different regime types or structural dynamics, where explanations of social movements may be particularly relevant, in the light of recent popular uprisings in the region, a modification of the structural aspects of the theory is needed. Although neopatrimonial theory can account for some of the underlying dynamics of Lebanese society, and thus provides an example of the value of an analysis of the 
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underlying structural base for formulating more fitting variables, it still does not make up for the missing links between different parts of the theory. For future research we would thus suggest a larger focus on ways in which different parts of the theory interact and correlate with one another, in order to achieve a better understanding of the dual relationship between structure and agency.  The suggestions for future developments should also be seen in light of our attempt to broaden up social theory to point towards SMT’s potential explanatory power in the Middle East. Because many of the Middle Eastern countries carry the critical traits of our case - neopatrimonial dynamics, a large influx of donor money and international interests, plus differences between insiders and outsiders - our additions to SMT are also relevant for understanding social movements in these countries. 
5.4.1. Suggestions for future developments In the above analysis, we have primarily used the theoretical variables as guiding tools for structuring the collection of data, while we have confirmed some of the theoretical relations and rejected others.  In order to explain the dynamics of our case, we find that the theory should shift its focus more towards structural factors and how they influence, and are reproduced by other levels of the theory. With regards to the political opportunity structure, our findings point towards a stronger emphasis on how political cleavages and the institutional structure influence one another. In Lebanon, the political cleavage structures appear to be the informal expression of mechanisms that are formalised in the institutional structure. These two variables should to a larger extent be compared, and causal relations between the two should be explored and developed as they seem to have a significant impact on all other factors. While in Lebanon the sectarian structure is institutionalised, institutional structures are not necessarily an expression of political cleavages, as in many Middle Eastern countries the majority of interactions happen informally through neopatrimonial channels. 
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Cultural models can arguably be said to be the practical outcome of political cleavages, and the link between the two should be strengthened, with hypotheses regarding cultural models formulated on the basis of political cleavage structure characteristics.  With regards to the configuration of actors we suggest that further hypotheses be developed regarding the effect of political actor behaviour on mobilisation potentials, based on our finding that a bystander perspective strategy can be an effective means of maintaining status quo. The policy domain has a highly developed theoretical base, but not in relation to social movement influence outside traditional channels. Furthermore, the configuration of actors must be better linked to the political cleavage structures, as our research has shown that its influence on social movement success is not only based on pure political interest and the institutional structure, but also on societal, in our case sectarian, structures and how it affects alliances and potentials of influence. In relation to this, the neopatrimonial understanding that resource procurement is the top priority of the sects, and that the different sects fight each other over securing resources can be used to inform hypothesising on different strategies. Societal beliefs have proven to be highly relevant, and are a necessary first step of analysis along with the political cleavage structures. The understanding of the interrelation between the two is decisive for identifying where opportunities for mobilisation lie, as the interrelation between them expresses how the beliefs are shaped by the cocktail of political cleavages, the policy domain, and the strategies of the different actors. As the variables are now, they remain descriptive, but as they are also highly context dependent, we find it difficult to formulate general hypotheses on them. We however suggest that they be further developed in detail to include more factors, and thereby enable an improved understanding of their interplay with political opportunity structures, including how neopatrimonialism influences the opinions of people in exchange for benefits.    
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Curiously, while its name implies the recognition of interactions between variables, the interaction context’s variables however fail to account for these relationships, partially due to our theoretical framework being pieced together by different parts of the theory, partially due to the theory not hypothesising over the effects of this relation. It is necessary to produce hypotheses considering how the two previous levels influence the strategies of the actors and how these strategies shape the opportunities for the SMOs, as the theoretical framework currently only describes that the strategies of the public authorities reflect on the opportunities for mobilisation. With regards to resources, the RMP variables are too simple in their causal relations, and do not account for relations between individual resource types. In relation to this, neopatrimonialism can inform the analysis of dynamics underlying the lack of socio-organisational resources, and the origins of financial resources and the implications of these origins. Our findings show that more resources do not necessarily imply a higher chance of success, as other factors also have an influence, and as resources may come with strings attached. We thus find it necessary to explore the interplay between structural opportunities and resource availability, use and applicability, and their influence on mobilisation potential. The same applies for the variables concerning strategies, as they should be based on a better understanding of the relationship between identification of opportunities and political cleavages influencing societal beliefs, incentives and effective channels of mobilisation. From our case it seems that research into alternative channels for mobilisation in societies with strong communal ties should be considered - for example mobilisation of groups and the handling of incentives affected by group interests. In relation to the mobilisation potentials derived from resources and strategies above it is in particular necessary to investigate the effect of international intervention, and its effect on the actions of SMOs and their mobilisation potentials. Future research could look into the dynamics between the subjects prioritised by 
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the population, and those prioritised by the donor, and its effect on the mobilisation potential.  Finally, the framing strategies should be developed in such a way that they take into account the societal and structural factors influencing choices of participation.  To sum up, we suggest the following as areas of research necessary to investigate for extending the applicability of SMT to a Middle Eastern context: 
• Investigation of the effect of the political cleavages and neopatrimonial structures on: 
o alliance formation 
o the strategies of political actors on different policy domains 
o perceptions and incentives concerning different policy domains 
• Development of hypotheses concerning the identification of political openings, and political leverage of political actors, in order to identify windows of opportunity for social movements, using neopatrimonial analysis of the stability of structures.  
• Enquiry into the influence of CSOs as recipients of foreign aid on mobilisation potentials, and the internal relations between procurement and use of different resources. While we find the above developments highly necessary, it is however beyond the scope of our research to formulate new variables for studying social movements in Lebanon and the wider Middle East. The focus of our research has been a first exploration of the applicability and limits of social movement theory on a case, based in a different context than the one upon which the theory was formulated.  Concerning the generalisability of this discussion, the case has certain critical features, which have influenced the outcome of the discussion, and are critical for the generalisability of the findings. The sectarian and neopatrimonial features of Lebanon are critical for the mobilisation potential, as are the degree of freedom of 
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speech and assembly. The issue of Palestinian rights is highly influenced by the Palestinians being an outsider group in Lebanon, and the workings of the organisations focusing on the issue in Lebanon are influenced by rights being a donor darling case.  Results from the future research areas suggested will enhance the theory’s explanatory power not only in the Lebanese case, but also in the wider Middle East, as the dynamics of neopatrimonialism and donor dependency is applicable for several countries in the region. Aside from this, an investigation of the Independence Intifada in Lebanon could test our findings from a critical case study on a more general Lebanese context, where there was a broad mobilisation of different sects. In order to expand the theory’s applicability to the current revolts in the Middle East, a comparative study between the different cases in a retro-perspective is needed, in particular looking at the deeper levels of the interplay between structural factors and mobilising agents, and the identification of windows of opportunity.  
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6. Conclusion The main purpose of our thesis has been to investigate the dynamics of the Lebanese contextual factors influencing the potential of mobilisation as a method to obtain rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, and to investigate the explanatory power of social movement theory in a context different from the one in which it takes its point of departure. The following conclusion will attempt to answer the problem formulation by concluding on the theoretical framework and the findings produced through our desk study and field study in the analysis and discussion. Methodologically, we formed our theoretical framework by adding theoretical perspectives on mobilisation, resources and framing strategies to the political process approach. This resulted in a three layered theoretical framework that provided an investigative starting point for researching the dynamics between the constraining and enabling features of the Lebanese opportunity structure, and the capabilities of the SMOs working for rights for Palestinians in Lebanon.  Our analysis and discussion of the theoretical variables of the political opportunity structure, the configuration of actors, and the organisational level, and their explanatory power for our case subsequently showed that mobilisation as a means of obtaining rights for Palestinians in Lebanon is not effective. While there have been some attempts at mobilisation, they have not been successful in reaching beyond the primary constituencies of the SMOs. Regarding the theoretical variables, we found that it was components of the political opportunity structure that had the influences the mobilisation potentials to the greatest extent. In particular, sectarian political cleavage structures were the most decisive, as these structures are continuously reproduced by politicians, SMOs, and individuals. The analysis of the political opportunity structure and the configuration of actors produced the following conclusions: 
Combined research question on analysis: 
To what extent do the theoretical variables of  
1. the political opportunity structure, 
2. the configuration of actors, 
3. the organisational level, 
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• The political opportunity structure is not facilitative for mobilisation due to the political cleavages among sectarian groups, and between the sectarian groups and the Palestinian refugees, and the way they these cleavages affect the political system, the media, and the interests of the parties.  
• The stability of the sectarian structure is maintained by schisms and subsequent fears of others created between sects, and the fact that the elites of each sect benefit from the current system, making changes in the political opportunity structure less likely.  
• The policy domain is in political deadlock since no party holds the policy monopoly, due to the crossing alliances and differing interests. 
• The policy domain is not inclined to producing windows of opportunities, since the parties keep each other in check based on the stable sectarian interests, although the alliances change.  When analysing the organisational strategies and resources, we found that the variables of the political opportunity structure and the configuration of actors had a large impact on SMO room of manoeuvre. In the analysis of the organisational level, the following factors were found as the most defining:  
• The lack of SMO outreach, due to deficient coordination as a result of different sectarian interests, funding competition and factional divisions. 
• The lack of outreach through partnerships and use of media.  
• The lack of incentives for Lebanese participation due to a preference for sectarian or national interests. 
• The competitive mobilisation on the right of return, and the perceived risk associated with participation decreases the incentives for the Palestinians.  
• The lack of legitimacy of the larger SMOs due to perceived donor dependency.   
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Balancing the analyses of the variables, it seems that the structural factors influence mobilisation as a means of political influence on the specific issue of rights of Palestinians, to a larger extent than the organisational factors. 
 Answering our problem formulation, the categories of our SMT framework are helpful for structuring the observations on our case, but not for explaining the interplay between the different levels. SMT can explain some of the influences of the political opportunity structure on the configuration of actors, but not the complex relations between these two levels, and their influence on strategies of SMOs, or the interplay back and forth between the configuration of actors and the political opportunity structure.  We thus found that, on an overall level, the theoretical framework does not explain our case – instead it provides a descriptive framework for structuring the findings of our observations. Through an attempt to grasp the dynamics behind the formation of mass mobilisation, the theory only explains some of the dynamics of the case of Palestinian rights in Lebanon. Our case outlined the following links that the theory does not account for:  
• The international context influencing the strategies and resources of the SMOs. 
• The political cleavages heavily influencing the alliance traditions, the policy domain and the societal beliefs. 
• The configuration of actors influencing the characterisation of the structure.  
Problem formulation: To what extent can social movement theory explain the interplay 
between political opportunity structures, configurations of actors and social movement 
organisations, regarding mobilisation as a method to gain rights for Palestinians in 
Lebanon, and what additional perspectives might be added to social movement theory in 
order to enhance its explanatory power? 
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Conversely, we could not confirm the theoretical relation of the SMOs actively influencing the strategies of the Lebanese authorities, the configuration of actors or the structure to a large extent. Hence, the SMT framework does not provide an explanation of the facilitative or constraining influence of the structural level on the interaction context. The influence of the international actors directly on the mobilisation potential of the SMOs is not accounted for either, and SMT does not explain the dynamics behind the identification of political opportunities.  The basic assumption of SMT is that political influence comes with mass mobilisations. Our analysis showed that this assumption should be elaborated on, in order for it to be applicable in the Lebanese context. The success of mobilisation depends on the level of political leverage resting with the actors attempted influenced, and the existence of political opportunities for mass mobilisation, as to be able to exert pressure. The cases in Lebanon reveal that it is particularly difficult to achieve long-lasting political influence with mass mobilisation, which may be due to the combination of rational-legal and neopatrimonial structures creating a stable state of constant power fights between sects, which offers few windows of opportunity for the creation of social movements on issues of high sectarian interest. In order to shed light on this complex relationship, the theory of neopatrimonialism was introduced to highlight the dynamics behind a system fused between legal-rational political structures and patron-client relationships that stabilises the system due to loyalty being exchanged for distribution of benefits.   In the Lebanese context the main influences on the creation of opportunities were identified as the sectarian structure and political institutions’ influence on the alliance traditions, the political actors’ priorities and interest in the policy domain, in addition to the political cleavages and sectarian interests influencing the societal beliefs of both Palestinians and Lebanese.  
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From this assessment of SMT’s explanatory power for our case we have outlined future research areas, in order for mobilisation theory to enhance its explanatory value in the Lebanese case: 
• Firstly, the influence of political cleavages and neopatrimonial structures on alliance formation, strategies of political actors and opinions should be investigated, in order for the SMOs to devise efficient strategies.  
• Secondly, hypotheses on the process for identification of windows of opportunity should be formulated.  
• Thirdly, the influence of foreign aid on SMO resources, and the consequent mobilisation potentials should be clarified. In order for the theory to be applicable not just to a Western context, but to a broader Middle Eastern context, to investigate the effects of neopatrimonial structures and donor influences. Having concluded on our findings concerning mobilisation as a method for obtaining rights for Palestinians in Lebanon, and the extent to which SMT could explain the dynamics affecting its potentials for influence, we will broaden our perspective to touch on the special features of Lebanon that have made it stand out as a calm spot in a sea of uprisings.    
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7. Perspectivation The mystery of Lebanon as a quiet island in a changing Middle East was ever-present in the production of this research. Two questions persist: why is there no popular uprising in Lebanon, and what factors need to be altered in order for this to happen? Lebanon sports values such as freedom of speech and allows popular protests. Combined with the democratic albeit sectarian structures; people have an outlet for grievances – through protest possibilities and through sectarian patronage networks. Therefore the system ends up functioning as a safety valve. Furthermore, the dynamics behind the amended labour law demonstrates a symbol of apparent reform in order to keep the peace86
                                                          
86 This resembles a liberalising autocracy strategy, where regime leaders undertake continuous processes of reform, not with the purpose of actual reform, but with the purpose of remaining in power. By giving the opposition and the population certain or seeming concessions on for instance freedom of speech or civil society’s room of manoeuvre, the power holders gain legitimacy with the reforms functioning as a security valve for population grievances. The concept is used to explain more authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, and while Lebanon is not an autocracy, the concept is useful for understanding the dynamics following the apparent reforms (Brumberg, 2003, p. 7), (Valbjørn & Seeberg, 2008, pp. 95-96;109-110), (Valbjørn, 2006, s. 5). 
. The government was under pressure to show reform due to the upcoming UPR, and passed a law perceived as some kind of improvement by activists, yet in reality creating little change in labour market opportunities for the Palestinians. Hence, it creates a feeling of accomplishment for the activists and an outlet for their grievances, while the political leaders maintain their control, decreasing the level of desperation, as opposed to the neighbouring countries. The sectarian based patron-client relationships play a role in the ‘missing’ uprising in Lebanese. People feel secure in their sectarian community, and the loyalty, patronage, and fear of others create a status quo in the sectarian allegiances, as people value their sectarian safety higher than Lebanese national unity. Hence, an open protest culture, the inherent importance of sectarian community affiliations, and the consequent sectarian dependency and goodwill created by the patronage 
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system makes broad mobilisation and subsequent political influence in Lebanon less likely than in more authoritarian regimes with a less heterogeneous population.  In respect to the possibility of an Arab spring of mass mobilisation87
                                                          
87 A mass mobilisation in this case would have to include major participation from different sects. 
 happening in Lebanon, our analysis suggests that as long as the strong sectarian structure is in place, it is highly unlikely that mass mobilisation can occur on issues where strong conflicting sectarian interests are present. This may not be the case for issues with a broader appeal across the sects. If shifts occur at the structural level, for example by a change in the power relations with Syria, and if people see a window of opportunity in this, it may function as the trigger for broad mobilisations. If the subject is attractive enough for people from across different sects - for instance if the sects do not have competitive interests, or general dissatisfactions are triggered – cross sectarian mobilisation can happen without the cooperation of SMOs rooted in the different sects. There are attempts to mobilise for the different causes already, but some sort of political opportunity is necessary for it to become a mass mobilisation. 
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Appendix A. List of interviewees and description of interviewee 
organisations, institutions, and initiatives 
1. List of interviewees, and corresponding IP numbers 
IP = interview person, used to refer to interviewees throughout the report. 
*indicates that the interview was not recorded, why we have not quoted the interviewee. 
IP Category Sub category Specification 
SMOs    
1 SMO Lebanese  Advocacy & consensus mobilisation 
2 SMO Palestinian  Advocacy & action mobilisation 
3 SMO International  Advocacy & consensus mobilisation 
4 SMO Palestinian  Advocacy & consensus mobilisation 
6 SMO International  Advocacy & action mobilisation 
7 SMO Palestinian Service delivery 
8* SMO Lebanese Service delivery 
9 SMO International Advocacy & consensus mobilisation 
37* SMO Lebanese  Advocacy & consensus mobilisation 
12a/b SMO (rights 
& the Right 
of return) 
Palestinian Action mobilisation 
13 Palestinian Advocacy & action mobilisation 
14* International Action mobilisation 
20 SMO Palestinian Service delivery 
17 SMO International/Palestinian Action mobilisation 
18 SMO Palestinian Advocacy & action mobilisation 
19* SMO (Anti-
sectarian) 
Lebanese Advocacy & action mobilisation 
21 Lebanese Service delivery & action 
mobilisation 
15* Lebanese  Action mobilisation 
16 Lebanese Action mobilisation 
      
 Experts     
10* Expert Legal expert Advocacy and research 
5 Expert Legal expert Advocacy and research 
22* Expert EU diplomat   
23 Expert Researcher   
24 Expert Researcher Research 
25* Expert Danish diplomat   
11* Expert Hamas think tank Research 
26 Expert Researcher Advocacy and research 
27 Expert UN researcher Advocacy and research 
28 Expert Palestinian journalist   
29 Expert Lebanese journalist   
30* Expert Danish journalist   
38 Expert Researcher Advocacy and research 
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 Parties     
31 Party Christian   
32 Party Druze   
33 Party Sunni   
34 Party Christian   
      
Others     
36 SMO Lebanese quasi-governmental 
organisation 
  
35 Party Palestinian party   
 
2. SMOs and activists 
Employees and activists from the following SMOs were interviewed: 
Amel Association - A Lebanese organisation with the aim of promoting social, economic, civil 
and cultural rights for the underprivileged in Lebanon. Its programs primarily 
concerns social and health services, education, human rights, trainings, and rural 
development. 
Arab NGO Network for Development - a regional network focusing on development policies, 
democracy and socio-economic reforms, and globalisation and trade in the Arab 
world. Its members include seven national networks and 27 non-governmental 
organisations from 11 Arab countries. ANND facilitated the work of 22 Lebanese 
NGOs 
Association Najdeh - Palestinian civil society organisation working with empowerment of 
Palestinian refugee women and children in Lebanon through awareness and tool-
provision to influence decision-making processes affecting their lives and 
communities. Its programs include vocational training, social affairs and services, 
psychosocial support, and microenterprise.  
AUB Secular Club - a student organisation working for a secular Lebanese state, based at the 
American University of Beirut. Has played a central role in the Laïque Prides, and 
in the anti-sectarian movement.  
Committee for the Employment of Palestinians - A multi-member committee that emerged as 
a result of a workshop on the employability of Palestinians in Lebanon in 2006. It 
works to secure the employment and employability of the Palestinians. Its 
current members include LPDC, UNRWA, PLO, ILO, The Lebanese Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Labour, as well as representatives from Lebanese and 
Palestinian civil society and the business community.  
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Council of Citizens - a Lebanese civil society initiative working for a secular Lebanese state 
through non-violent means. 
National Institute for Social Care and Vocational Training (NISC) - a service providing 
organisation founded by the General Union of Palestinian Women, and Lebanese 
and Palestinian professionals in 1976. Since then it has provided services to the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, while simultaneously preserving the Palestinian 
identity and culture.  
National Union of Labourers Association - a Lebanese workers union with a strong activist 
profile and a positive stance towards including Palestinians in their unions.  
Norwegian Peoples Aid - The Norwegian labour movement's humanitarian organisation for 
solidarity. Its vision is solidarity in action, and it has been present in Lebanon 
since the Israeli invasion in 1982. In Lebanon it supports local organisations 
promoting the rights of the Palestinian refugees, the rights of women and youth 
to participate, and combating violence against women. 
Palestinian Human Rights Organisation - a civil society organisation established in 1997 
with the aim of promoting, protecting and defending the rights of the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon. They raise awareness among the Palestinians and through 
this encourages peaceful campaigning for obtaining their rights in Lebanon.  
Palestinian Civil Right Campaign Lebanon - an international campaign working for the rights 
of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon through awareness raising and petitions. 
Palestinian Culture Club AUB - Student association for Palestinians at the American 
University of Beirut. Has a mix of cultural and politically based activities, with 
many of its members also being part of the PYM. 
Palestinian Culture Club Mar Elias - an initiative for youth in the Palestinian refugee camp of 
Mar Elias. Its members are activists that seek to find alternative ways to improve 
the situation for Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Palestinian Culture Club Shatila - an initiative for youth in the Palestinian refugee camp of 
Shatila. Its activities seek to attract new members and participants. 
Palestinian Youth Movement - an international movement of Palestinian youth that seeks to 
maintain the Palestinian identity among the youth, and promote the active 
participation of Palestinian youth in decision-making on the rights of the 
Palestinians, especially regarding the right of return. In Lebanon, many of the PCC 
members are also PYM members.   
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Palestinian Youth Organisation - a Palestinian youth initiative that focuses on activities for 
children and has a wider mission of securing rights for Palestinians, maintaining 
the right of return.  
Topple the Regime - also referred to as the Anti-Sectarian Movement, is a grassroots 
initiative against the sectarian base of the political system. It has had large 
popular support with numbers of up to 20.000 demonstrators, but in recent 
months it has lost its momentum due to internal disagreements and 
governmental attempts to infiltrate and take over the movement. 
Youth Advocacy Process - A network of Lebanese and Palestinian youth organisations 
working for a national youth policy for Lebanon that enables youth to participate 
in decision-making processes. Their work involves empowerment of youth to 
advocate for change, lobbying, and partnerships with media. They have a specific 
folder for youth policies in relation to Palestinian issues. 
 
3. Experts 
Experts from the following research institutions, initiatives, and newspapers were 
interviewed: 
Aidun - Centre for Refugee Rights. An independent Palestinian civil body established to 
defend the right of return of Palestinian refugees.  
Al Akhbar - Lebanese newspaper with a strong file on Palestinian issues. 
Al Mustaqbal (The Future) – Lebanese newspaper affiliated with the Future Movement. 
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations - a research organisation focusing on 
Palestinian issues in Lebanon and in the Arab world.  
Common Space Initiative - a UNDP funded initiative that seeks to facilitate structured 
dialogue among policy makers, intellectuals, experts, civil society, stakeholders, 
and individuals, with the aim of strengthening Lebanese unity and identity in 
order to overcome sectarian divisions. 
The Danish Embassy – The Diplomatic mission of Denmark in Lebanon. 
The European Union - Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Lebanon 
Human Development Centre - a civil society organisation with a human rights focus, 
established by Lebanese and Palestinian lawyers. 
International Labour Organisation - a specialised UN agency that seeks to develop labour 
standards and promote decent work conditions through the agreements between 
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governments, employers and workers. In Lebanon they have played an important 
part in the CEP as the implementing force for a number of initiatives for the 
employment of Palestinian refugees. 
 
Issam Fares Institute - an AUB research institute for public policy and international affairs. 
Under their public policy research program they have a folder on policy and 
governance in Palestinian refugee camps, and they play an active part in 
promoting dialogue and cooperation between government, scholars and civil 
society on the Palestinian issue in Lebanon. 
 
4. Parties 
Representatives from the following parties were interviewed: 
Future Movement - the political party of Rafiq Hariri, the Lebanese president that was 
murdered in 2005. The party has a predominantly Sunni constituency, but also 
enjoyed wider Lebanese support in the immediate aftermath of the Cedar 
Revolution in 2005, as they played a leading role in mobilisation efforts.  
Lebanese Forces - a Lebanese political party with a predominantly Christian constituency. It 
was the main Christian militia during the civil war, where it fought the 
Palestinian militias and the Syrian troops, which is why the party was banned 
from 1994 to 2005, during Syrian influence in the country. Based in civil war 
cleavages, the Lebanese Forces still maintain a strong position on the Palestinian 
presence in Lebanon.   
National Liberal Party - a Lebanese political party with a predominantly Christian voter base. 
It is one of the smaller parties in the March 14 coalition that is currently in 
opposition, and has a strong focus on Lebanese independence. NLP formed part 
of the Christian militia alliance that fought the Palestinians in the civil war, but 
their present day stance towards the Palestinians in Lebanon is not as 
uncompromising as the one of the Lebanese Forces. 
Progressive Socialist Party - a Lebanese party with a predominantly Druze party that is 
currently in the March 8 coalition that is in government. It fought on the side of 
the Palestinians in the civil war, and has been voicing strong support for granting 
rights for the Palestinians. 
 
5. Other actors 
Representatives from the following organisations and institutions were interviewed: 
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Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee - an inter-ministerial government body that was 
formed in 2005 with the aim of implementing the policies of the Lebanese 
government towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, in coordination with 
UNRWA, PLO, Lebanese and Palestinian counterparts and civil society. 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation - the umbrella organisation serving as the official 
representative of the Palestinian people. It has recently reopened its embassy in 
Lebanon, although its political influence regarding the situation of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon remains limited. 
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Appendix B. Concept clarification 
 
In order to clarify key concepts used throughout the report, the following section will 
present our understanding of these concepts. 
 
Action mobilisation is defined as the process of turning passive supporters of a SM or SMO 
into participating activists engaging in collective action. Action mobilisation is 
contingent upon a preceding process of consensus mobilisation  
 
Activists are defined as individual participants in non-formalised grassroots activities with a 
political aim. 
 
Agency refers to the processes through which individual agents carry out actions. In relation 
to structure, these actions are seen as both a result of, and at the same time 
reproducing this structure, in Giddens’ understanding of structure and agency as 
a mutually enforcing dualism (Kaspersen, 2005, p. 381).    
 
Civil society organisations are here understood as organisations within civil society, defined 
as the sphere of influence intermediating between state and citizen. 
 
Collectivities of actors are here understood as the bundles of individuals working together in 
small groups or organisations, either in CSOs or in smaller grassroots initiatives. 
Hence, each SMO is perceived as a separate collectivity of actors.  
 
Confessional system refers to a political system in which political power is shared based on 
religious affiliation, maintaining a balance between different confessions, or 
religious groups.  
 
Consensus mobilisation is here understood as the process whereby social movements or 
SMOs attempt to mobilise passive bystanders and opponents into supporting the 
goals of the movement. 
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Donors are here understood as both international organisations donating money, as well as 
nation states making donations through projects, donor agents or embassies. 
 
The Middle East is here understood as encompassing the countries of Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. 
 
Mobilisation is here understood according to Snow et al.’s definition of micromobilisation as 
“the range of interactive processes devised and employed by SMOs and their 
representative actors to mobilize or influence various target groups with respect to 
the pursuit of collective or common interests (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & 
Benford, 1986, pp. 464-465). 
 
Mobilisation potential of a social movement is defined as the pool of individuals within 
society that, as a result of successful consensus mobilisation, could be mobilised 
into collective action. 
 
Mobilisation success is here understood in two steps: First, mobilising agents have to 
succeed in mobilising broadly, and secondly this mobilisation has to result in 
political influence, understood as the SMOs accomplishing their political goals.  
 
Palestinian refugees are here understood as the Palestinians that fled their homeland as a 
consequence of events taking place in 1948 and 1967, as well as their 
descendants. The term here includes both Palestinian refugees eligible of UNRWA 
services, as well as so called Non-ID refugees. 
 
Policy domain is here understood as the sphere in which policy-making on a specific issue is 
shaped, through the influence and interaction of different structural factors and 
political actors.  
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Political influence is here understood as a term with different levels. It can refer to affecting 
the opinions of decision makers, but is ultimately understood as succeeding in 
influencing the decision-making process to the extent where a passed law is also 
implemented. While the separate influence of structural factors and actors on the 
implementation of a law is difficult to account for, this is however an important 
part of the definition of political influence in the context of Lebanon, as the 
process from policy-making over legislation to implementation is not always a 
simple and straightforward one. 
 
Resources are defined as “goods [...] that actors can use to achieve their goals” (Opp, 2009, p. 
139). 
 
Right of return refers to the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland, 
based in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 that states “the 
refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours 
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” (United Nations, 1948). 
 
Rights have in Lebanon become a politicised issue. In general, human rights are understood 
as "basic rights and freedoms that all people are entitled to regardless of 
nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, race, religion, language, or other status.” 
(Amnesty, 2011). Generally, human rights are split into two categories: the socio-
economic rights and the civil-political rights. Both categories are endorsed in the 
Universal Human Rights Declaration  (UN, 1948), socio-economic rights meaning 
for example the right to work and social security, civil rights being rights like 
freedom of speech, and political rights including the right to vote and hold 
political office (Scott & Gallagher, 2006, p. xiv) (Altman, 2003). While Palestinians 
do not have citizenship, and do not wish to obtain it in Lebanon, civic rights are 
excluded from the understanding.    
 
Sect here simply refers to a group of distinct religious belief in Lebanon, without any 
derogatory or fanatic connotations. 
 
Sectarianism is here understood as a situation in which societal and political groups of 
different religious background are in internecine conflict, entailing both conflicts 
within sects of the same religious background, but also between sects of different 
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background. Along with confessionalism, it is the term most commonly applied to 
describe the Lebanese situation.  
 
Social movement is here understood by applying a mix of two definitions from Opp, and 
Snow et al, respectively, which are explained in depth in the theoretical chapter. 
We see a social movement as “a collectivity of actors who want to achieve their 
shared goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target” (Opp, 2009, p. 41) 
working “outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of 
challenging or defending extant authority” (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004, p. 11). 
 
Social movement organisation (SMO) is considered “a complex, or formal, organization which 
identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or counter movement 
and attempts to implement these goals.” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1218), in 
(Opp, 2009). With regards to Palestinian rights in Lebanon, the SMOs are often 
also civil society organisations (CSOs), which is a broad term including NGOs, 
lobby groups and charities, all with the defining feature of not being affiliated to 
the state, often with an beneficial aim, for example providing services or 
advocating policy (Hutter, 2004, s. 1) (Karns, 2011) 
  Where the distinction is beneficial the more formalised SMOs are termed CSOs, 
and the less formalised groupings called activists.  
 
Structure is defined according to Giddens' understanding, in which structures are seen as 
only existing through agents continuously reproducing it - it is thus made up of 
the rules and resources that agents draw upon in this process of reproduction. 
Therefore structure can be both enabling and constraining, and in the structure-
agency relation, structure is thus seen as both the outcome and the medium of 
individual actions (Kaspersen, 2005, pp. 381-382). While we use Giddens' 
understanding of structures when we analyse the sectarian structures and the 
way in which they have been reproduced and maintained, we also refer to 
structures in its traditional understanding - for instance for referring to 
institutional or political structures. When structure is used with these 
connotations, we have indicated it by referring to them as namely 'political' or 
'institutional' structures, in order to distinguish these less loaded words from the 
more philosophical understanding of structure. Using ‘the structural level’ we 
refer to both the sectarian structures and the institutional structures included in 
the structural level of the political process approach. 
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Tawteen, (directly translated ‘implantation’), is an Arab term used widely in Lebanon to 
refer to the permanent settlement, or naturalisation of the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. The prohibition of tawteen forms part of the Ta’if Agreement that ended 
the Lebanese civil war. It will be used throughout this report, as it is commonly 
referred to both orally and in writing, and because it is not only a technical term, 
but also implies the feelings associated to it.  
 
Wasta is a commonly used term in the Arab world, were it is openly commented about 
someone that ’he or she has wasta’, meaning that a person has good connections 
that can facilitate access to favours or benefits. Schlumberger has defined it as ” 
wasta being the Arab term for 'intercession' or 'intermediation', meaning 
personalistic networks for mutual benefit” (Schlumberger, 2000, p. 12). It is often 
referred to in connection to family ties or acquaintances.  
 
 
  
Appendix C. Statistics on empirical observations
 
The following is a statistical presentation of selected inter
The title on each graph indicates which group of respondents the graph concerns, followed by an 
indication of the number of respondents for the specific question.
For the parties, there is a total of 4 respondents.
For the SMOs, there is a total of 19 respondents.
For the experts, there is a total of 13 respondents.
 
1. Opinions regarding the important actors within the policy domain of Palestinian 
rights. 
 
The x-axis refers to the answers given, indicated below the axis. The y
answers given.  
Figure 1. 
Total respondents: 4 parties 
 
 
 
  
13 
 
view responses. 
 
 
 
 
-axis refers to the amount of 
 
Figure 2. 
Total respondents: 13 experts 
 
Figure 3. 
Total respondents: 13 SMOs 
 
 
2. Party opinions on different rights
 
The experts were not asked about this question, since the statements of the experts were used 
analytically, why their personal opinion on the matter was not interesting. The SMOs were not asked 
on their opinion of all the different rights. Their campaigns 
prove that all SMOs support the right to work, social services and education. Some mentioned the 
right to own property as their new area of work, after the right to work campaign has been in focus 
for some years. None of the SMOs talk of the right to free movement, except one SMO mentioning that 
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and given statements in the interviews 
15 
 
this topic is considered off-limits by the Lebanese authorities, due to the security measurements 
currently being taken at Nahr Al- Bared. The right to form NGOs and participate in local elections 
were only mentioned by a few respondents. 
Table 1. 
 
  
Party opinion on different rights 
 
  PSP NLP Future Lebanese Forces 
Right to work  for for for for 
Right to social services for for  n.a. for 
Right to education for for for for 
Right to own property for against against against 
Right to free movement for  n.a. n.a.  against 
Right to form NGOs for against for against 
Right to participate in local 
elections 
against   n.a. against against 
Total respondents: 4 
3. Expert and SMO perceptions of parties 
The following is an extraction of statements made by all experts and SMOs on the different parties’ 
strategies and actions, plus all other parties than the one in question. Therefore the total number of 
respondents is 37, but the numbers in parentheses indicates how many respondents agree with the 
statement. They have not been systematically asked about the different parties, but asked to name 
the parties who are important, and what they think about the political level and the actions of the 
parties. 
3.1 Most important parties, specifically mentioned 
See also figure 2 and 3 
PSP (3) 
Future (3) 
SSNP (1) 
3.2 External perceptions of parties 
The point of the presentation of perceptions of parties is to establish the perceptions of the parties’ 
actions, and to triangulate the information of the parties, with other actors’ account of the parties.  
Table 2. 
Party Perception 
The March 8th 
coalition 
 
PSP  Use the Palestinians as a bargaining card (5) 
 
Is supportive of rights (7) 
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Should be the main advocate on Palestinian rights since they have no 
confessional stake (1) 
 
Hizbollah 
 
Are restricted by alliances: 
For this statement: 
- Are bad in action, but good in words. Use the Palestinians as a 
bargaining card (7) 
- Pragmatic strategies due to their alliance with Aoun and Hamas (7) 
- Are with the resistance against Israel, but not with the rights (3) 
Against this statement: 
- Is independent from Syria in the actions concerning rights for 
Palestinians (1) 
 
Have the power and potential to change within the policy domain on rights for 
Palestinians 
- Have the possibility to convince people to support the civil rights, as 
they have legitimacy that is also non-sectarian, and the parliamentary 
power (1) 
- Pro rights for Palestinians, but they are moderate (2) 
 
Amal 
 
They are with the resistance against Israel, but not with the rights (2) 
Are pro rights, but moderate (1) 
They have double speech (1) 
FPM 
 
Aoun wants to seem like the defender of the Christians (1) 
It is better than other Christian parties:  
- They are against rights, but use a weaker language than march 8 
Christian parties (2) 
SSNP 
 
They have legitimacy (2) 
They are split internally, and only supportive of Palestinian rights when they 
are in opposition (1) 
The March 14th 
coalition 
 
The Future 
Movement 
 
They are restricted by their alliance: 
- They are not too supportive due to the alliance with the Christians (2) 
- They are pro Palestinian rights, but moderate (2) 
 
They are trusted by PLO as they have clear speech (1) 
 
The SMOs are unclear on their real aim: 
- Their aim is to tawteen the Palestinians (2) 
- Their aim is not to tawteen (2) 
- They are ready to negotiate the tawteen (2) 
Lebanese Forces 
 
They fear tawteen (1)
They are trusted by PLO as they have clear speech, and no double standards 
(1) 
They are against civil rights (1)
 
National Liberal 
Party 
They are against rights (1)
The Phalangists 
 
They are trusted by 
They are against rights (1)
Palestinian 
factions 
 
The Palestinian 
factions 
 
They do not want to change the status quo (1)
They all agree on CR, but have their own priorities (1)
PLO 
 
They are too cooperative with the 
Hamas 
 
They talk, but there is no action (1)
Total respondents: 37 
 
4. Opinions on effective measures for reaching political influence
 
Figure 4. 
Total respondents: 4 
Figure 5. 
17 
 
 
 
PLO as they have clear speech (1) 
 
 
 
Lebanese Authorities (1) 
 
 
 
Total respondents: 12 
 
 
Figure 6. 
Total respondents: 15 
 
5. Arguments used to argue for or against rights for Palestinians in Lebanon.
For or against rights, is understood as the Lebanese government granting the Palestinian rig
Lebanon. The answers of the experts are their opinions on what the effective arguments are for the 
SMOs. 
18 
 
 
 
hts in 
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The arguments are understood as: 
The security argument:  the threat for Lebanon from the increased militarisation of the camps, 
leading to arguments for the right of return, and for a decrease of the right of movement, and for 
increased socio-economic rights.  
The international responsibility argument: increased rights will lead to decreased international 
responsibility and funding, used to argue against any increased rights for the Palestinians as a 
constant reminder of the right of return.  
The demographic argument: as seen in Haddad’s perspective above, is used to argue for the right of 
return. 
The economic argument: uses economic arguments to underline the cost of the Palestinians to argue 
against the right to work.  
The human rights argument: uses international conventions to argue for increased rights.  
Table 3. 
Parties For rights Against rights 
Security argument 3   
Demographic argument   1 
Human rights argument 2   
Economic argument   1 
International responsibility   1 
SMOs   
Security argument 2   
Demographic argument     
Human rights argument 7   
Economic argument 5   
International responsibility   1 
Experts     
Security argument     
Demographic argument     
Human rights argument 3   
Economic argument 5   
International responsibility     
Note: Parties: 4 respondents. Experts: 7 respondents. SMOs: 11 respondents. 
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6. Connection between the right of return, the rights of the Palestinians in Lebanon, 
and tawteen. 
 
Table 4. 
Parties Confirms Rejects 
Right of return is above all 1   
Rights leads to increased empowerment 
and want for the right of return 
  2 
Rights leads to tawteen  3   
SMOs     
Right of return is above all 7   
Rights leads to increased empowerment 
and want for the right of return 
7 2 
Rights leads to tawteen    1 
Experts     
Right of return is above all 2 1 
Rights leads to increased empowerment 
and want for the right of return 
2 1 
Rights leads to tawteen    5 
Note: Parties: 4 respondents. Experts: 7 respondents. SMOs: 12 respondents. 
 
The answers of the experts are their indication of which link they find that the SMOs should agitate 
for. 
 
7. The legitimacy of the SMOs working with rights for Palestinians, among different 
parts of the population 
 
This question was not posed directly to the SMOs, explaining why the number of respondents is low. 
It was mainly the more activist and less formalised SMOs who criticised the more formalised SMOs, 
constituted as CSOs, for not having legitimacy among the population, why these answers are 
negatively skewed. 
This question was only answered by one party which indicated that the SMOs do not have legitimacy 
among the Lebanese. 
 
 
  
Figure 7. 
Total respondents: 5 SMOs 
 
 
Figure 8. 
Total respondents: 6 SMOs 
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8. SMO channels of mobilisation
 
Figure 9. 
Total respondents: 10 SMOs. Includes SMOs with different aims.
 
9. Groups which the SMOs have attempted to mobilise.
 
Figure 10. 
Total respondents: 7 SMOs. Includes SMOs with different aims.
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10. SMOs’ idea of the potential target groups’ 
participation 
This question only includes SMOs who have directly stated what their analysis is of the costs and 
incentives for the people they attempt to mobilise. 
Figure 11. 
Total respondents: 5 SMOs 
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perceived cost and incentives for 
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Appendix D. Background information on Lebanon and the Palestinian 
refugees 
 
The following is a collection of background facts on Lebanon and the Palestinian refugees 
living there. It is not a complete factual overview, but rather a selection of specific pieces of 
information that we found a necessary base in order to understand the context in which our 
case bases itself.  
 
1. Historical overview  
 
1948 Arab war, including Lebanon, against Israel, resulting in 100.000 Palestinian 
refugees turning to Lebanon. Establishment of UNRWA to provide basic 
services for the refugees. 
1967 Arab war, excluding Lebanon, with Israel, resulting in 100.000 Palestinian 
refugees turning to Lebanon, increasing the number of refugees to approx. 
240.000 
1969 Cairo Agreement, allowed PLO to take military action without Lebanese 
interference. Forebode Lebanese entrance into the camps. Recognition of 
Palestinian civil rights.  
1970  Eviction of PLO from Jordan. Influx of its leadership and guerrilla base in 
Lebanon. Creation of a Palestinian ‘state within the state,’ PLO was 
particularly strong in the south. 
1975-
1990 
Lebanese civil war 
1975-1979,  Sectarian violence, and Syrian intervention 
1978-1982,  Israeli intervention 
1982-1983, Pisraeli invasion, and international intervention, leading to the 
eviction of PLO and the Sabra and Shatila massacres 
1983-1989,  Increased sectarian violence, including War of the Camps 
1989, Taif Accord.  Aoun start a military rebellion against it. 
1990,  Syrian intervention against Aoun 
1989 The Taif Accord, aiming for peace between the different parties. Negotiated by 
the Arab League. 
1991 Increased Syrian influence, military, political and economic.  
1991 Passing of amnesty law for all parties of the civil war, except the Palestinians 
1991 The Palestinians give up their weapons in Lebanon, and formal dialogue with 
the Lebanese commences 
1991 Kuwait war – Palestinians loose support, and emigrate from Kuwait and other 
Arab countries, leading to economic decline. 
1993 Oslo Accords – PLO negotiates with Israel, but not on the issue of refugees, 
reviving the debate on resettlement in Lebanon. 
2005 Assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Start of Cedar Revolution resulting in the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, to investigate the murder of Hariri. 
2005 Establishment of LPDC by the Council of Ministers, with the aim of improving 
Palestinian living conditions, as part of the political opening due to the 
ousting of Syria. 
2006 Hizbollah and Israel conflict 
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2007 Nahr El Bared camp bombed by Lebanese army, due to infiltration of the 
camp by Islamic groups. Resulted in restricted freedom of movement and 
slow rebuilding of the camp. 
2008 End of 18 month political dispute with the Arab League mediated Doha 
Agreement.  
2011 Collapse of government. Re-alignment of the Druze to support the March 8 
coalition, strengthening Hizbollah’s position. 5 month political stalemate. 
Creation of new Hizbollah dominated government 
 (LPDC, 2009)  (Haddad, 2003) (Özkaya, 2005) (Abdallah, 2008)  (Rosenfeld, 2010) 
(BBC, 2010) (Knudsen, 2007) 
 
 
 
2. Main actors during the civil war 
 
Christians 
Phalange/Lebanese Forces - militia 
Lebanese Forces, Lebanese Social Democratic Party (Kataeb) – political 
parties 
The Christian militias were dominated by the Phalange, forming the Kataeb 
Regulatory Forces led by Gemayel, which later developed into the Lebanese Forces, 
by the inclusion of other militias, which in general were allied with Israel during 
the war. (Özkaya, 2005, p. 32). 
South Lebanon Army - militia 
The South Lebanon Army, led by Saad Haddad, was also a Christian militia, in 
reality installed by Israel (Knudsen, 2007, p. 31). 
 
Shiite 
Amal – militia and political party 
Shiite militia established in the 70’s as the militia of the Movement of the 
Disinherited. Firstly affiliated with the PLO, subsequently fighting PLO in the War of 
the Camps, 1984-85. Fighting Hizbollah after the War of the Camps. Main 
challenger of Israel’s invasion in 1982, together with LNM. (Özkaya, 2005, s. 41;44) 
 
Hizbollah – militia and political party 
Created as a splinter of Amal, whom they found too secular, as a response to the 
Israeli invasion in 1982. Backed by Iran and Syria. Fighting with Amal for control of 
the South, and the Shia part of Beirut in the end of the civil war. Kept control of the 
South with Syria’s blessing after the end of the civil war (BBC, 2010). 
 
Druze 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) – political party 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) – mainly militia 
PSP was a social-democratic, secular coalition founded in 1949, primarily 
consisting of Muslims, led by the Druze Kamal Jumblatt. Allied with PLO. Struggling 
for a change of the political system, away from Maronite dominance. LNM (Pan 
Arab militia allied with PLO, and strongly associated with PSP) weakened in 1977 
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after the death of K. Jumblatt. Main challenger of Israelis invasion of Lebanon 
together with Amal (Özkaya, 2005, s. 34;44-45). 
 
Sunni 
There were no major Lebanese Sunni militias during the civil war. 
Palestinian 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – militia and political party 
Major presence in Lebanon from 1970. Allied with LNM. Opposing Christian 
militias. Ousted from Lebanon in 1982  (Harris, 2007, p. 244) 
 
Major internal fragmentation of Palestinians, with other Palestinian factions being 
supported by Syria and Iraq, and having different ideological backgrounds than 
PLO  (Knudsen, 2003, p. 10ff) 
Other foreign actors 
Lebanon reflects the Sunni-Shia battle for Middle East influence with Saudi Arabia 
and Syria and Iran having vested interests in the internal Lebanese politics. 
Lebanon has great influence on the security of Israel, and is therefore of strategic 
interest for the USA. Rooted in colonial history, France and the EU is involved as 
well (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 116) (Harris, 2007, p. 254) 
 
3. The confessional system 
The sect is the basic organising unit in Lebanon. The extended family is essential for 
supporting its members, in exchange for loyalty, with the family being the traditional way to 
advance politically as “it plugged into wider clan and patronage networks” (Harris, 2007, p. 
236). Family associations have also played a social security function. Each sect has its own 
religious institutions, as there is no civil code in Lebanon (Harris, 2007, pp. 236-239).   
The basic feature of communication within the Lebanese system is sectarian, with most 
communication and interaction taking place within the sect, and not between the sects. The 
result of this is a low level of trust and loyalty, and therefore the brief contact does not 
develop into common social institutions, shared perceptions of problems and solutions, 
mixed families etc. (Haddad, 2003, p.  124).  
 
Lebanon has 17 officially recognized sects, where seven of those have political weight, i.e. 
politically guaranteed ministerial positions. The following is a brief overview of the power 
and interests of the groups. The interest is deeply vested in the geographical location and 
societal position of the groups, why these are described. 
Lebanon was constituted on the basis of a power sharing between the Muslims and the 
Christians – who feared becoming absorbed in the Arab land surrounding them (Haddad 
2003, p. 6).   
 
The Maronite Christians are the demographic dominant Christian group and political leaders 
of the Christians. Their homeland is in Eastern Beirut and the northern half of Mount 
Lebanon, and they are represented in the poorer strata of society to a greater extent than the 
other Christian groups. Traditionally the Christians have been allied with the West. 
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The Orthodox Christians are the second largest Christian group, historically located within 
the cities, and towards the Israeli border. Historically they have been at the forefront of the 
fight not to equal Arab with Muslim, and are more integrated with the Sunnis than the 
Maronites. 
The Greek Catholics have in general followed the Maronites politically, and mainly live in 
Eastern Beirut and in the Bekaa. 
 
The Armenians are mainly located in Eastern Beirut, and have mainly been distanced from 
Lebanese politics, attempting only to support the factions in power. 
 
The Sunnis have historically been concentrated in the cities, and were, until the Shia moved 
into the cities and gained political strength, in a double game where they entered 
partnerships with the Maronites, and advocated for increased benefits to the Muslims. With 
the formation of Palestinian and Shia political groupings under the civil war, the Sunnis also 
started to form new sectarian political movements. Traditionally they have also been 
championing the Pan-Arabic movement, thus being allied with the Arab countries. 
 
The Shia have been underrepresented until the 80’s in which they migrated from the South 
to the cities and turned to their own sectarian militant organisations, and acquired foreign 
sponsors in Iran and Syria, increasing their political, military and economic power. 
 
The Druze is religiously in a position between the Muslim and Christians, positioned in the 
Chouf Mountains above Beirut. Traditionally they have a closeness with the Maronites, but 
have allied with the Sunnis, leftists and Palestinians, recently seeming most comfortable 
with Sunni alliances, but in 2011 changed to the Shia alliance (Harris, 2007, p. 234ff). 
 
Though the seven groups above are guaranteed ministerial posts, our interviewees referred 
to the ‘six kings,’ (IP9, International SMO, 31.00) meaning the following six political parties, 
as they are considered the main influential actors inside Lebanon, with the following 
leaders: 
• Sunni:  
o Future Movement: Hariri 
• Shia:  
o Hizbollah: Nasrallah 
o Amal: Berri 
• Druze 
o Progressive Socialist Party: Jumblatt  
• The Christians:  
o Lebanese Forces: Geagea 
o Free Patriotic Movement: Aoun 
 
4. General facts 
Access to media 
Around 1 million people had access to internet, and 1.5 had mobile phones in 2009, and 
there are 7 TV stations in 2007  (CIA, 2011). 
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Economy 
The economy of Lebanon was in rapid growth until the civil war, which punctured the status 
as a regional business centre. The economic growth is cantered in the cities, with a large 
spread of wealth. The first Hariri government managed to attract massive foreign and 
Lebanese diaspora investment in Lebanon, though the economic growth slowed due to loans 
being made on inflated rates. After the assassination of Hariri the UN Security Council has 
kept financing Lebanon, to keep the economic shock for investors low (Harris, 2007, p. 239). 
The GDP per capita in 2008 was 13510 USD, (HDI, 2011), and a high Human Development 
Index ranking in 2009 (UNDP, 2009, p. 172). 
 
5. Civil society 
CSOs already proliferated under the civil war through relief work, and for the Palestinian 
CSOs this continued after the ousting of PLO in 1982, although their numbers were reduced 
with the departure of PLO and subsequent funding (Suleiman, 1997, p. 402). Several 
academics argue that the civil war led to a partial collapse of the state, creating a vacuum 
both in service provision and in security, which resulted in the proliferation of CSOs with 
affiliation to the different sects, moving in to fill the service vacuum left by the failing state. 
The sectarian division of the CSOs continues until today (Bayat, 2002, p. 32), and as the 
Lebanese state remains too weak to sustain its institutions the current civil society is still 
performing basic service provision, (Jerichow, 2011). 
The Palestinian civil society consists of both formalised CSOs and loosely organised groups, 
working with service provision and political activism where “the three pillars of Palestinian 
political activism in Lebanon are the provision of civic rights to the refugees, resisting 
naturalisation and upholding the right of return to their homeland/natal villages.” (Knudsen 
2007, p.  6). The Palestinians have become increasingly dependent on the service provision 
of the CSOs over the years (Mikdashi, 2011, p. 1). 
This CSO system created by the civil war still exists, and as the Lebanese state is still weak, 
and with no Palestinian state, Palestinian SMOs in Lebanon operate in difficult conditions. 
The majority of them are organised in a traditional CSO sense, but as Jaber Suleiman rightly 
points out, the abovementioned factors leave the SMOs with no government to influence 
(Suleiman, 1997, p. 397). Furthermore, Palestinian SMOs can in legal terms not exist in 
Lebanon, as Palestinian refugees are not permitted to form associations. Therefore the de 
facto Palestinian SMOs are Lebanese in legal terms, with Lebanese board members 
(Suleiman, 1997, p. 401).  
 
6. History of the Palestinians in Lebanon 
 
The framework for the Palestinians is different from other groups of citizens as there are 
special laws and regulations applicable to them, which have resulted in a protection gap for 
the refugees, as most of the refugees are stateless (Knudsen, 2007, p. 3). Most are barred 
from becoming Lebanese nationals, and hereby obtaining the key to social rights. 
Historically, the Palestinians were by a 1962 decree considered a special category of 
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foreigners who are “not holding documents from their original countries and residing in 
Lebanon” (UNHCR) in (Knudsen, 2007, p. 3). The refugees were barred from civic rights, only 
eligible to the services rendered to them by UNRWA, and from 1964 not allowed to join the 
necessary syndicates for working in certain high-status professions (Knudsen, 2007, p. 3) 
Lebanon signed the Casablanca accord together with seven other Arab states in 1965, aimed 
at granting the Palestinian certain rights. It was signed with reservations though, among 
others making the right to work conditional to the economic development of the country in 
general (Knudsen, 2007, p. 4). 
In 1983 the Palestinians were banned from working in 72 professions (Knudsen, 2007, p. 4), 
and after the war, widespread discrimination of Palestinians has been taking place. One such 
example was the 46 jobs added to the list of jobs banned for Palestinians in 1995 (Knudsen, 
2007, p. 8). Another is the amendment made to the property law in 2001 that was 
specifically designed to remove the Palestinian right to own property, as it stipulated that 
anyone  without the ‘nationality of a recognized state’ would not be permitted to own 
property (Knudsen, 2007, p. 12)  
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Appendix E: Other cases of mobilisation 
 
1. The movement for the right of return 
The movement for the right of return1 staged a march on the commemoration day of the 
Nakba, on the 15th of May 2011 at the borders to Israel with around 50.000 mainly 
Palestinian participants, as part of an international commemoration campaign with 
demonstrations in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine (Economist, 2011). 
The right of return march consisted of a multitude of mainly Palestinian CSOs, activists and 
political parties cooperating like never 
before, with different Palestinian political 
factions and the support of Lebanese 
parties, including Hizbollah’s security 
support allowing for the demonstration to 
take place at the borders to Israel (IP12b, 
Palestinian SMO, 1.00; 10.44). Concerning 
the mobilisation strategies it was not 
necessary to a large extent to create 
consensus mobilisation, since all actors 
support the right of return, but to create 
action mobilisation on the issue. This was 
created by being innovative – hosting the 
march at the border and coordinating well 
(IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 45.00). Normally a 
special permission is required to access this 
area, which is in general not granted to the Palestinian refugees (IP11, expert). Though CSOs 
were part of it, it did not seem to be perceived as a CSO project, but as part of an 
international campaign and an obligation – as a Palestinian it is considered strictly necessary 
to mark it (IP12b, Palestinian SMO, 1.00; 26.00). 
 
  
                                                          
1 In the report Palestinian rights SMOs refer to the Palestinian rights in Lebanon, and is distinguished from the 
right of return movement, which is mainly described in this chapter. The reason that they are seen as a 
movement, and not as a single event, is the fact that it is a wider international network of activists that aim to 
organise similar and other activities in the future. 
The poster above was seen on the streets of Beirut after the march 
for the right of return after the event. 
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2. The anti-sectarian movement2 
The anti-sectarian movement has been growing since the winter 2010. During spring 2011 it 
had demonstrations with more than 30.000 participants, but has gone through a crisis after 
this. On the 15/5 – the same day as the Right of Return March they staged a demonstration 
in Beirut with around 1500 participants (IP15, Lebanese SMO). 
The movement is split between two strategies – the 
Laïque movement, meaning secularism in French, which 
focuses of reforming from the inside through 
advocating for civil marriage, against domestic violence, 
passing a law for the right for women to pass on their 
citizenship to their children. The ‘topple the regime’ 
movement wants to topple the regime (IP16, Lebanese 
SMO, 6.00). The organisation of the two is overlapping 
though, and it is not clear who is who. 
 
 
 
                                   
There is almost no coordination and organisation, 
though they are currently trying to restructure. Most 
interviewees blame their current crisis – they see the 
number of people participating falling from 50.000 to 
1.500 due to a lack of clarity in message and 
organisation (IP23, expert 29.00). There are no 
formalised SMOs participating, no successful alliance 
building, and all work is done by activists – mainly 
university students. There is no clear media strategy 
for mobilising, with most of it disseminating through 
social media (IP16, Lebanese SMO, 35.00). 
From our observations at the Laïque demonstration we participated in on the 15/5, most 
participants expressed that they were there to show their anger against a useless system, 
and to move on the momentum of the Arab spring. 
 
  
                                                          
2 The anti-sectarian movement is defined as a movement, and not a single event, as it has a wider aim of 
toppling the regime, and stages continuous demonstrations and mobilising activities. Furthermore, it is 
currently reorganising itself, in order to enlarge its mobilisation potential. 
The pictures show the slogans of the Laïque 
pride, and a man holding the flowers being 
distributed at the demonstration. 
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3. The Independence Intifada  
The Independence Intifada, by Americans coined the Cedar Revolution, was a mass 
mobilisation taking place in 2005. After the assassination of Hariri “politicians and citizens 
mobilised in an unprecedented show of unity to demand Lebanese sovereignty and the 
restoration of political freedoms curtailed by Syria” (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 121). The 
assassination of Hariri showed a clear gap between pro and anti-Syrian political figures, and 
managed to mobilised hundreds of thousands, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian troops on 
April 26, 2005 (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 121). 
The lasting change has not been noticeable, with Choucair-Vizoso stating that “the 
momentum for change created by the Syrian withdrawal rapidly dissipated, and the old divides 
in Lebanese politics and society resurfaced” (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008, p. 122), pointing out that 
the political cleavages are extremely stable, and not prone to the pressure of mass 
mobilisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Appendix F: Interview guides 
 
1. SMOs (CSOs and activists) 
 
Aim 
• Get to know the mobilisation strategy of the organisation 
• Get an overview of the capabilities of the organisation 
• Get an overview of their relationship to other CSOs in Lebanon 
 
Activities and vision 
What is your understanding of rights? 
What is your group’s vision? 
 
Who is your target group?  
(Which individuals and organisations are the targets for mobilisation? (religious, 
party/bloc supporters, geographical, class-based)?  
 
What are your activities? 
Organisational build-up of the coalition 
Who are the actors involved in your group, and how is it structured? 
What is your leadership structure? Is there unity in the group?  
Do you (+ the others) have experience with rights campaigns/lobbying/the Palestinian 
issue/mobilisation strategies? 
 
Financial resources:  
Where is your funding from?  
Are you continuously experiencing underfunding? 
 
External Alliances 
Are you cooperating with other actors with similar goals?  
Are there groups with similar goals who you do not cooperate with? Why? 
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Are there groups with compatible goals, who you are/could be cooperating with? 
(master frames) 
Are you cooperating with any political actors? Palestinian actors? 
With LPDC? With UNRWA? 
 
Strategies of organisation 
Framing: 
How do you frame your message? (Right to return – rights in Lebanon – tawteen)  
How is it different from that of the political actors? 
Is it similar to that of other rights campaigns?  
Frame alignment 
What is your target group’s view on the case? 
How do you present your view – and make them agree with you through the way you 
talk about it, and your activities?  
(Types of frame alignment: bridging, amplification, extension, transformation).  
Frame change: 
Do you think it is possible to make this link? (Right to return – rights in Lebanon) 
Do you think it is beneficial to link the cause of rights for Palestinians to a broader 
rights movement, or the anti-sectarian movement? 
 
Media strategy:  
What is your media strategy? 
Do you have different target groups – and do you take it into consideration? (is there a 
difference between Lebanese and Palestinians) 
 
How are you treated by the media – do you get through with your things? Has it 
changed? 
 
Do you use creative means of drawing media attention/general attention to your 
cause? What is the effect of these? 
Do you use academic resources? 
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Resource mobilisation: 
Do you have a general strategy for getting people to join the movement/join the 
demonstrations? (is there a difference between Lebanese and Palestinians?) 
What channels do you use for mobilisation? (mass media, direct mail, ties with 
organisations, and friendship ties, existing networks (e.g. parties, unions etc)) 
Do any of the channels exclude others (e.g. different parties)? 
Motivation considerations:  
What are the incentives (costs and benefits) of participation for different groups of 
potential supporters? Do you make the advantages clear for potential participants? 
(is there a difference between Lebanese and Palestinians?) 
 
Type of mobilisation: 
Do you focus on changing people’s opinions or getting people to act?  
Do you focus on mobilising individuals, or mobilising existing networks and getting 
them to ally? 
Expansion of movement 
Which mobilisation strategy do you use to broaden the movement? 
 
Legitimacy: 
What is your legitimacy - within Lebanese and Palestinian civil society and society in 
general? 
Among political actors? 
For activists: what is the legitimacy of the Palestinian and Lebanese CSOs among the 
population in the camps? 
 
Future of the movement 
Where do you think you are going from here and what are your chances of success? 
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Inspiration 
Have you been inspired by the methods and results of mobilisations in Lebanon? 
 
Policy domain 
Main actors: 
Who are the main political actors influencing the issue of rights for Palestinians? 
 
Opinion of actors 
What are the different actors’ opinions? 
Who has the most dominant opinion/gets to influence the opinion of the other actors?  
Has this changed after the shift of government? 
Alliances 
What are their alliances? 
 
How do you see the channels of influence in the media and the political system, and 
which channels are you using in your work? 
 
Other actors’ actions: 
Countermobilisation 
Have opposing organisations or groups started mobilising as a response to the 
Palestinian rights campaign? 
If yes, what consequences for the success of the campaign do you think this has? 
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2. Experts 
 
Aim 
• To get an overview of the dominant views on the issue of Palestinian rights within Lebanese 
society and among political actors. 
• To get an overview of the potential for political influence that the social and political context 
provide. 
• To get an overview of Lebanese civil society actors focusing on the issue of Palestinian rights, 
and their capabilities for mobilisation and political influence. 
 
Discourse 
Discourse 
What is the dominant opinion/way of talking about resettlement and rights?  
How are the two linked? 
 
Change in discourse 
Has it changed as a result of Hizbollah’s increased power in government?  
Media 
Which media advocates which opinions? 
Are there any pro-Palestinian rights media?  
 
Policy domain 
Main actors: 
Who are the main political actors influencing the issue of rights for Palestinians? 
 
Opinion of actors 
What are the different actors’ opinions? 
Who has the most dominant opinion/gets to influence the opinion of the other actors?  
Has this changed after the shift of government? 
Alliances 
What are their alliances? 
 
Channels of influence 
Main channels of influence 
In your opinion, what are the main channels of influence regarding the issue of 
Palestinian rights? 
Are official or unofficial channels the most used/efficient, in order to influence political 
subejcts? 
How do CSO’s in general influence political parties? 
LPDC 
LPDC’s role 
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 What is the role of LPDC on the issue? 
How are they positioned in relation to civil society and the government? 
Is it a governmental institution? 
Overall power shift  
How does overall power shifts influence the work of LPDC? Does it e.g. influence the 
constitution of the board? 
 
Civil society actors 
Main actors 
Who are the main civil society actors on the issue?  
Relationship between actors  
How would you characterise the relationship between the various actors? 
Are they in coalition, opponents, or just agreeing without having formed a coalition? 
External alliances 
What is the relationship with other civil society actors with similar goals, such as 
women’s rights, general human rights etc.?   
And do you see a potential for the rights for Palestinians to gain from allying 
themselves with these causes? 
Does the CSOs’ framing of the issue fit with master frames of other actors or coalitions, 
e.g. general human rights in Lebanon? 
 
Potentials for political influence 
What is, in your opinion, the potential for political influence on the issue? 
Do the existing organisations or coalitions have the capabilities to obtain political 
influence? 
Which actors is it necessary to include, in order to obtain political influence? 
How can mobilisation be used to gain political influence in Lebanon? 
Which mobilisation strategies should be used? 
 
 
The dominant civil society actor 
Identification and position 
Is there a dominant civil society actor on the issue? 
If yes, what is your impression of them?  
Capacity 
Do they have the capacity to lead the campaign?  
Do they have a chance of gaining influence on the issue?  
And how? 
Legitimacy 
What is the legitimacy of the dominant actor within Lebanese and Palestinian civil 
society and society in general? 
 What is the legitimacy of the dominant actor among political actors? 
Leadership 
What strategic capacities do the leaders and members possess? 
Framing 
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Is the dominant actor’s framing of the issue of rights for Palestinian refugees similar to 
the framing used by the political establishment? 
Does the framing of the dominant actor fit with master frames of other actors or 
coalitions, e.g. general human rights in Lebanon? 
Financial resources 
Where does the dominant actor get their money from? 
Where do CSOs in general raise money? And has the pattern of this changed since 
2010? 
State 
What is the state’s response to the actions of CSOs on the issue – repression, 
cooperation? (note to self: can LPDC be seen as an indicator of the POS/state? What is 
their role in the state’s response?) 
 
  
Other actors’ actions: 
Countermobilisation 
Have opposing organisations or groups started mobilising as a response to the 
Palestinian rights campaign? 
 If yes, what consequences for the success of the campaign do you think this has? 
Women’s rights 
Does the opposition use the same arguments against Palestinian rights as they do 
against women’s rights?  
What would be the effect on Palestinian rights if women’s rights were improved? 
 
 
Independence Intifada 
 
Mobilisation and social change 
What is your opinion on the general connection between mobilisation and social 
change in the Lebanese context? 
Independence Intifada mobilisation 
How was mobilisation used to gain influence in the lead up to, and during the 
Independence Intifada?  
Independence Intifada Strategies 
What were the strategies used by the movement, and did they correspond to the 
traditional repertoire of contention applied in Lebanon? 
Government response 
What was the response of the government to the Independence Intifada? 
How has the government historically responded to contenders? 
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3. Parties 
 
Aim:  
• Understand the opinions of the actors within the policy domain, and the possibilities for 
changes in them. 
• Understand the internal alliances, and the possibilities for changes in them. 
• Understand the influences of the POS on the actions of the CSOs and their potential to gain 
influence. 
Political opinion and general discourse 
 
Opinion of the party 
What is your party’s opinion on the issue of Palestinian rights in Lebanon? 
What is your party’s opinion on the resettlement (i.e. citizenship)? 
How does this issue relate to the granting of rights? 
  
The party’s understanding of the general discourse 
Does this opinion reflect the general view of Lebanese society? 
What do you think the majority of the Lebanese think of the issue? 
 
Change in opinions 
Has your party’s opinion changed?  
If so, why? 
Has the general opinion of the Lebanese citizens changed? 
 (do any of these changes have something to do with the increased power of Hizbollah?) 
 
Policy Domain 
Level of influence 
How do you see your own level of influence on the issue? 
Who are the (other) main actors within the policy domain? 
Who has the most influence on the policies regarding the issue? 
Has it changed after the shift in government with the increased power of Hizbollah? 
 
Opinion of political actors 
What is the opinion of the different political actors? 
Who is allied with whom, concerning this issue? (internally in the 8th and 14th of March 
alliances) 
Are there any alliances crossing the two main coalitions in parliament? (e.g. 
confessional alliances) 
 
Alliances  
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Who are you allied with?  
Do they share your opinion on this issue?  
If no, do you see this as a problem?  
Will/has it affected your opinion? 
 
 
CSOs 
Knowledge of actors 
Which organisations working with the issue do you know?  
What do you think of them and their work? 
Do you cooperate or communicate with any of the organisations?  
How? 
And if so, for what reason? 
 
Master frames 
Are there links between the issue of Palestinian rights and other rights campaigns? 
(especially for the Christians: Do you see a link between the granting of women’s rights 
and rights for Palestinians?) 
 
Channels of influence 
Influence of POS on CSOs: 
How do you think the alliances and opinions of the political actors are influencing the 
possible actions that the CSOs can take? 
How do you think the alliances and opinions of the political actors are influencing the 
potential influence that this can have? 
 
Channels of influence 
What are the channels of influence for CSOs if they want to influence the opinion of the 
parties? 
 
Attempt of influence 
 Are there any of these actors who are trying to influence your opinion? 
For pro-Palestinian political actors: If a campaign on Palestinian rights should succeed 
in creating change, what would be the most efficient channels of influence to use? 
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Appendix G: Example of meaning extractions of interviews 
 
The following is an example of the meaning extractions that we carried out for all interviews. The 
rest of the meaning extractions are burned on a CD for the supervisor, and co-examiner, but not 
available to the public. 
 
Meaning extraction of interview with Fadi Zarifeh, Lebanese Forces, 10 May 2011 
 
Numbers in parentheses are indications of minutes of recording.  
Green colour = central statements. 
Fadi Zarifeh is responsible for Palestinian Affairs within the Lebanese Forces, a Christian, nationalist 
party who fought against the Palestinians in the civil war. 
Key points of interview: 
• Xenophobic views of the Palestinians still exist within the Lebanese political establishment 
• All parties seem to believe that they have done the most for the Palestinians 
• Tawteen is still a very valid argument according to the Lebanese Forces 
• The opinion of LF does not seem open to influence from civil society lobbying or advocacy, it 
is very ideological and fear based.   
 
Description of interview 
Party opinion on the issue 
The Lebanese Forces don’t talk about civil rights, we talk about human rights. Civil rights is what the 
Lebanese have, we don’t want that, but human rights yes (02.50). 
The Palestinians must return (03.30). 
We are against tawteen but for the right of return (04.40). 
The civil war was between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, but after that we did human rights. In 
2005 we met with the Palestinians; it was very courageous of us after the civil war (05.05). We have 
held conferences on the Palestinian issue within the Lebanese Forces. We are ready to forget the 
past, but we are Lebanese, they are Palestinians (06.00). 
We are not saying Palestinians are evil, we are saying that Palestinians must go back, or to some 
other Arab country (45.00). Libya is a big country; Iraq is like France, why should Palestinians be in 
Lebanon? (47.00). 
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The Palestinians are not helping themselves; they are killing people outside the camps. They have to 
adhere to Lebanese law (53.00). 
Lebanon should control the Palestinian camps, any country should control its territory (54.00). 
The rights 
Labour and property rights 
Yes, they should have the right to work. The right to property no. Tawteen equals the property. If 
Palestinians start owning land, it will be too difficult to go back to Palestine (08.00). 
They should make a difference between standard human rights and human rights in Lebanon 
(09.00). 
Inheritance and social services 
Civil rights equals tawteen. Lebanese women should not give rights to the children, if the father is 
Palestinian. The social services that are in the labour law are ok (10.00). 
Education  
They should have the right to education (11.44). The problem is not education it is the syndicates 
(12.30).  
Reciprocity law 
How can we talk about reciprocity? They should have only regular human rights, not civil rights 
(13.00). 
Right to form NGOs 
They should not have the right to form NGOs. NGOs have a facade, behind is terrorism and other risks. 
The NGOs want to be hidden parties (13.30). We can give whatever they need, if it is human rights. 
NGOs is not a human right, it’s a civil right (14.35). 
Freedom of movement 
The camps are a military issue, we cannot intervene in the freedom of movement. In general, the 
restrictions are not bad (15.00). 
That Palestinians need to obtain a visa to come back to Lebanon is not a restriction of movement. The 
Palestinian issue cannot be internal, it should be international (16.00). 
He can go wherever he wants in Lebanon (17.00). 
Non ID refugees 
The Palestinians in 1948, in 1967, in 1975, they are all a big problem. It’s a big problem, the refugees 
that are not registered with UNRWA should go back where they came from (17.45 CQ). Refugees from 
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1948 and other refugees are in Lebanon with or without papers doesn’t matter. UNRWA is not doing 
things, why should we? They don’t die from not eating (20.40 CQ). 
Syndicates and right to election in municipalities 
We are against Palestinians joining syndicates. Step by step they are taking the civil rights. The right 
to be elected in municipalities is full tawteen (25.44). 
Other political parties 
We are the first among all parties to reach out our hand. Hizbollah and Amal should be allies, but the 
Palestinians are a playing card to get their benefits (06.40). 
No one wants the Palestinians to stay, but Hizbollah is not against. If the Israel-Palestine conflict was 
solved, they would have no cause (30.30). 
The Sunnis don’t want them to stay. They are afraid that they will outgrow the Lebanese Sunni 
population, so that Hariri will not be elected, as the Palestinians will not vote for him (32.00). 
There is no dominant actor (37.50). PSP is playing like Hizbollah (off the record). We are the only one 
in Lebanon to give something to the Palestinians. The PSP, Hizbollah, Amal and the Future movement 
didn’t give anything to the Palestinians when Dr. Geagea was in prison. For the others the Palestinian 
issue is a playing card (39.00). 
Hizbollah cannot do anything, and they don’t want to. It is a playing card (41.40). 
Rights in other countries 
They don’t have rights in other Arab countries, why is it only in Lebanon that the Palestinians must have 
the same rights as the Lebanese? If they want to stay in Lebanon they must live under our rule – if they 
want Syrian rights, go to Syria (23.40). 
UNRWA 
If we give Palestinians all their civil rights, UNRWA has no role. It is an international problem (11.00). 
Tawteen and civil rights 
There is a thin line between tawteen and civil rights (19.50). 
When asked whether the Palestinians want tawteen: 
Most will be pleased to stay. The regime in Palestine is Hamas, and Palestine is so small. Lebanese is the 
most beautiful country in the region (26.40). 
Palestinians taking over Lebanon  
Palestinians worked for 60 years until now, they want to get the Lebanese out of Lebanon and take over. 
They will leave Palestine to Israel. The Arab states and the international community are working on the 
Palestinians staying in Lebanon (21.40 CQ). 
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For us there is no hidden agenda, it is our country. The Palestinians have a hidden agenda. The 
Palestinians didn’t do anything to go back to Palestine (28.00). 
We cannot let them take over our country, it is very easy for them (28.40). Arafat wanted to take the 
Christians out and send them to Canada, and the Muslims will stay in the new Palestinian country. 
This is Arafat’s dream (29.30). 
Palestinian political actors 
The Palestinians are working with many foreign intelligence services. The PLO politicians are 
working as they can, but the problems between Hamas and PLO must be solved first (54.50). 
Lebanese general perception 
Every Lebanese must think like this, otherwise he’s not Lebanese (28.40). 
Most Lebanese have no interest in the Palestinians staying in Lebanon (32.50). 
Change in the party’s opinion 
Yes, our opinion changed after the civil war (33.00). The Lebanese Forces worked alone on the issue. 
We were the first to shake hands with the Palestinians and forget the past. We cannot give them what 
they want (33.55). 
Shared opinion with allies 
Our allies were talking about civil rights, we changed it to human rights. We eliminated civil rights, so 
we have influenced all the allies. Before they were all talking about civil rights, but not they are 
saying human rights (42.50). 
Change in the general opinion 
There has been a change regarding human rights and civil rights, but no time will come to change the 
civil rights for Palestinians, it will be giving away our country (37.00). 
The role of Syria 
The Syrian presence in Lebanon prevented the Palestinian issue from being solved. It was a card in 
their hand splitting Lebanese unity. When Siniora started the LPDC, he was more free (35.00). 
The Syrian influence in Lebanon has been increasing since 2005 (36.30). 
Civil society  
The NGOs are lobbying, but it is not changing anything (44.30). 
We have had conferences with Palestinian NGOs and NPA (45.00).  
The NGOs are living from it (48.00). But at the same time, it could be one step forward. In Lebanon 
the problem is how to go back to the homeland, we will only improve the situation a little bit. I know the 
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situation is bad, but I think instead they should spend their time lobbying with Israel about the right 
of return (49.00). 
There is no civil society influence. Demonstrations – so what? It will not change anything. It will go 
straight to tawteen, step by step (51.00). 
Link between Palestinian civil rights and Lebanese civil rights 
The problem is occurring because of the Palestinian issue. If they are not here, there would be no 
problems. The link between the two won’t work (50.00). 
Arab Spring connection 
Lebanon is completely different. (He refers to the situation in other countries as ‘the problems of 
other Arab countries’) (52.00). 
 
 
